Episode 283: Humanitarian Crisis in the Sahel with Dr. Jessica Moody

Coordinated and Produced by Elisa Garbil

The Sahel stands at a crossroad, it is torn by crisis, instability, and shifting power. Join Dr. Jessica Moody and Dominic Bowen as they dive deep into the region’s unfolding humanitarian emergency. What does ECOWAS’s withdrawal mean for the people? How is Russian influence rewriting the rules? And why are jihadist groups gaining ground? From Bamako’s frontlines to the corridors of power, this is your inside look at the struggles shaping the Sahel’s future!

Dr. Jessica Moody is a political risk, due diligence and peacebuilding consultant in West Africa. She conducts open source and on the ground research into political, economic and security developments in West Africa and provides timely forecasts as well as scenario planning to clients, enabling them to better plan their operations. She also provides detailed insights into key personalities across West Africa, to enable businesses to understand power structures and who they should prioritise engagement with.

Jessica has worked in and on West Africa for more than a decade, during which she has consulted for an array of organisations ranging from S&P Global to Horizon Engage to the United States Institute of Peace. Having spent time living and working in Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, she has an extensive range of local contacts in government and the private sector across the region. Jessica has a BA hons degree in History from the University of Nottingham, an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and a PhD in War Studies, focusing on Cote d’Ivoire from King’s College London. She is the author of Life After War: Lessons in Human Centered Peacebuilding from Cote d’Ivoire (London, Bloomsbury) – forthcoming in May 2026.

The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime, to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.

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Transcript:

Dr. Jessica Moody: when we look at jihadist recruitment in the Sahel is that for the vast majority of cases, it has nothing to do with religious extremism. and I think, you’d be hard pressed to find somebody in the Sahel who would say to you that they joined a jihadist group because they believed in establishing a caliphate in the region. The majority of times people join jihadist groups because they are fearful, they’re scared, or they lack employment opportunities.

Elisa Garbil: Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organizations worldwide.

Dominic Bowen: Hi, welcome to the International Risk Podcast. I’m your host, Dominic Bowen. Today we’re in the Sahel, where three Junta LED states have exited Echo Os and formed the Alliance of Sahel States. Now, this is occurring as jihadist violence is spreading. There’s a historic food insecurity, and today we’re gonna discuss these risks and maybe even a few levers that might help.

We’re joined by Dr. Jessica Moody. She’s a Western Central [00:01:00] Africa political risk and peace building specialist. Dr. Jessica Moody. Welcome to the International West Podcast. 

Dr. Jessica Moody: Thanks for having me. 

Dominic Bowen: In January, 2025, Mali Bikini Faso and Nigel formally left Echo us and they’ve now deepened their own security corporations whilst breaking with trade migration and joint security mechanisms with other West African nations.

When you look at this and when you see what’s happened over the last 10 months, what are the new operational and, and geopolitical risks, that this causes? What should governments and, and companies that are interested in West Africa be looking at? 

Dr. Jessica Moody: It’s a really interesting question. I think the withdrawal of, bikini Faso, Mali, and Niger from Echoes has been, a bit of a double-edged sword.

I think the fact that these countries have left the regional grouping, which they felt was, two Western focused, and had too much backing from France. Has meant that they have started to collaborate in a way that we’ve never seen them really do before. there’s historically been a lot of mistrust between countries in the Sahel, and that [00:02:00] has, prevented them creating, unified efforts to tackle jihadist violence in the region.

but what we’re seeing now is because they have left that regional grouping and they’ve established their own grouping, They’ve been more inclined to collaborate and work together. And we’ve seen in recent weeks that they’ve launched a, a unified force to tackle jihadist violence across the region.

So in some respects, we could say that this has been positive for their efforts to tackle jihadist violence. that remains to be seen how effective this unified force is going to be. there’s been a lot of attempts at this kind of a mechanism previously. However, obviously the fact that they have left this regional grouping that provided stability in a lot of West Africa and has historically been seen as much more effective regional grouping, than other, regional blocks in Africa, has created a lot of instability between countries in the Sahel and coastal countries.

and there was a bit of a kind of fallout period after they left echoes, which led to kind of disputes between. Coastal states and countries in the Sahel, and that was very [00:03:00] negative for trade, freedom of movement and, security situations. So particularly in countries like Nigeria, Benin, and vo, the whole departure from, Echoes has been very problematic for them because they’ve seen a lot of kind of disputes on their borders, trade disruption.

And just efforts to tackle which you had is violence in between coastal countries and countries. In Issa, hell have become more complicated because of that. 

Dominic Bowen: It’s very interesting ’cause of course generally where there’s been historical levels of mistrust and now countries are working together, that’s something we should be celebrating. But yeah, understanding the root causes of what’s prompted that is something I think would be really keen to, explore. But perhaps just to, keep unpacking the situation for our listeners today. I understand that there’s about 28.7 million people in the Sahel that need lifesaving assistance.

According to the United Nation, there’s about 4 million people displaced across Burkina Faso, Mali, and, and Nija, and the WFP. The World Food Program predicts that there’ll be 52 million. People food insecure across Western Central Africa during the [00:04:00] 2025 lean season. I mean, these are, these are huge numbers.

These are kind of hard to fully fathom as a single human being. But when you look at the situation, across the Sahel, what are you most concerned about today? 

Dr. Jessica Moody: it’s a very good question. Again, I think the. There are three kind of major, well, two major issues. I think the first one is the political situation is, very problematic across the Sahel.

so as you mentioned at the start, there’s been a kind of a series of coups, in Bikini Niger and Marley. and those cos have really destabilized the political situation in the Sahel. they have meant that you’ve had this kind of rise of populist governments come to power, which was actually quite well received by a lot of populations.

in the hell. However, that rise of populism, the de demand for greater sovereignty has meant that there’s been a determination to push out foreign assistance that came from the west, particularly in the form of. France, the US and the un. and I think that political situation has kind of led to the other major problem, which I [00:05:00] perceive to be the security situation and.

This has been something that has been brewing for a very long time in the Sahel, but it’s the emergence and the rise and the expansion of groups like M, which is an Alida offshoot, and the Islamic State Sahel Province, which is an Islamic State offshoot. and the expansion of these groups means that.

without any kind of, effective strategy to prevent these groups heading further south and towards capital cities, you have a situation where in Mali, for instance, at the moment we have Jihadists that have spread from their strongholds in Northern and central Mali, down towards Bamako, and are now very strong in Western Mali.

and western Mali is historically the mining region of Mali, and that’s where. 80% of mali’s mining happens there. And the mining is very important to the Mian regime at the moment. So you see how the security and political situation becomes interlinked and can really destabilize the government even further.

So we’re at a point now where, the Bamako looks like it may even [00:06:00] fall to jihadist violence. and that’s a situation that’s obviously deeply problematic for all of the reasons that you mentioned. But I think it’s also that. The further that these jihadist groups get towards capital cities, the weaker the regimes become and the more likely we are to see further coups and more destabilization.

and that also poses a risk to coastal countries in West Africa as well. So countries like Senegal, car, Devo, Nigeria that have historically, well less so Nigeria, but have historically been seen as very stable countries in the region. And now looking like they’re facing kind of jihadist threats at their doors as well.

Dominic Bowen: You talked about this destabilization of the political situation and the, the rise of populous governments and that, that pushing out of the US of France and, and the un and of course, I can’t help but wonder, the skeptic would say, well, that, that serves. Russian interests, especially the mining that you mentioned, but you also mentioned the insurgencies, which are adapting and, and adapting quite successfully.

The Al-Qaeda offshoot, you mentioned ISIS in the Sahel province. Now they’re expanding at the same time as Russian linked [00:07:00] forces in Mali. Now rebranded under the Africa course, used to be the the Wagner Group. and there’s, allegations of states giving their weapons to private military. Companies and this raising the risks of harm to civilians.

So when you see all these things going on, does this tell you about the ecosystem of state, non-state foreign security actors, and how does this impact civilians? 

Dr. Jessica Moody: I think the main thing to think about is. The rise of, Wagner and Russian assistance. and the way that this has changed the strategy that a lot of these countries are using to tackle jihadist violence.

and it’s almost changed the nature of the states that we see in the Sahel at the moment. I think historically under when there was French and, US assistance, what tackling jihadist violence looked like was. kind of trying to keep Bamako and cities in southern Marley safe from jihadist violence.

and there was an attempt to kind of, win over hearts and minds. Not very good in a lot of cases, but [00:08:00] there were attempts to do those kinds of things. There were attempts at development programs. there was also a lot of poor military usage. There were a lot of, stray drone strikes, but There was more of a strategy to tackling jihadist violence. what we’ve seen since, Wagner arrived, and now, now Africa go, is that a lot of the attempts to deal with jihadist violence revolve around protecting the regimes that are in place. and not much more than that really. So, for example, the assistance of Wagner is looking primarily at maintaining the regime of a SMI goza in place.

and basically it’s not looking to, to take on something that’s more sustainable and long term and might actually help Marley to reassert, security. and I think the situation means that, You see a huge amount of human rights abuses, a huge amount of massacres of civilians. Wagner is responsible for a considerable number of civilian casualties, almost to the level of jihadist groups in Mali.

So you can see that, massing civilians is not out of the question. And. [00:09:00] Therefore kind of longer term efforts to maintain security are, are all but out the window at the moment. And I think you can see that the, the nature of the state and the nature of kind of providing state services outside of the capital is gradually diminishing.

And you’re just seeing states that kind of retreat and try to maintain control of the capital city basically.

Dominic Bowen: Well, you mentioned the capital city, but you also mentioned bamako before. And then now that’s the capital of Mali and it is facing that fuel blockade that’s been imposed by, the Al-Qaeda linked in insurgents. Now, from what I understand, this has really paralyzed parts of the city. it’s severely disrupted daily life and commerce and trade and even government operations.

Now insurgents across the area have increased their control and influence, not just in rural Mali, but across the Sahel, and in places created shadow governments. And I understand actually we’ve won over much local support in, in many areas now. Bamako is a city of 3 million people. Can you talk us through, whilst it’s not necessarily be a city that we all know, a city with 3 million people.

Must have some significant influence. And if that was to fall, can you help us understand what would that [00:10:00] mean for regional stability and for the confidence of insurgents operating in the region? 

Dr. Jessica Moody: I think if Bamako were to fall, that would be a complete catastrophe. Bamako is a city, it’s a very sleepy city.

It’s very relaxed and calm in relation to a lot of other regional capitals. it’s a lovely place to, to hang out. I’ve spent many lovely evenings in Bamako. Some great bars, some great nightlife, fantastic restaurants, and a really lovely place for culture. There’s like fantastic amount of, Marley and other West African musicians that hang out and have been produced in, in Bamako.

And so it’s a real kind of cultural symbol of West Africa, and I think it’s a really important place. Not just because, you know, it would be a disaster for a major capital city to fall in West Africa to jihadist violence, but also because of this kind of cultural heritage that it has. I think it’s also, it would be so problematic for the rest of the region because.

It would signify a march of Jihadist towards the south and towards coastal states. And also, for countries that are already [00:11:00] dealing with really severe Jihadists insurgencies, in Niger and Burkina Faso, it would be a definite warning sign to them. but I think also for Jane, it would be a, you know, it would be a fantastic success for them, I guess.

I think they would see that as, a symbol of how far they had come and what else they could. March towards. I think the thing to remember though is that although GI had, his violence has been allowed to expand exponentially in the Sahel in recent years, I think, It’s unlikely that there wouldn’t be a significant response where Bamako to fall to Jihadist.

I think that Echos, would respond to that. I think Niger and Bisso would also respond to that, and I think you would also even see. the West attempt to respond to that as well. and not to mention, whether Wagner would want to or Africa Core would want to maintain some kind of stability there.

So I think although we’re seeing a move from Jane m very much towards taking over Bamako and increasing number of attacks around Bamako and as you mentioned, the economic suffocation of Bamako, I think the actual seizure and kind of [00:12:00] administration of Bamako going to Jane. I still feels like it would be, a big step that I think we are,

I would say moderately unlikely to see.

Dominic Bowen: Well, that’s positive to hear and, but I’m keen to hear, with long-term, allies and partners, like France, the United Nations, the US being pushed down and, and less popular in the region, how can regional governments, how can local governments, and partners from Western Central Africa effectively curtail the influence of private military companies like.

The Wagner Group or the Africa Corps, while still focusing on countering jihadist violence and even providing and encouraging positive forms of governments across the region without exacerbating instability and while still respecting the rule of law, and the independent sovereignty of, of different nations.

Dr. Jessica Moody: I think it’s almost impossible. I think, the problem with the influence of Wagner and Africa core is that they. It is a sort of state capture model, in which the government becomes so dependent on the support of these, private military companies that there’s [00:13:00] no way of kind of, detaching one from the other.

And I think that means that, were you to remove the influence of Africa Court in Mali tomorrow. You would see the government would almost certainly fall. the security situation is so poor at the moment that I think without Russian assistance, I think the regime of a would be quite likely to collapse quite quickly.

and obviously in a situation of extreme insecurity, you don’t want the government to collapse. That makes the situation even worse, even if the government is not particularly good. What you will see is that the Jihadists would definitely take advantage of, the collapse of a government. And so you find yourself in a bit of a catch 22 situation where you don’t wanna remove that assistance because the government will collapse.

But with that assistance in place, the government really struggles to deal with, the security problems that it faces. and I think. Regional governments, like in Ghana and Senegal, they have been really keen to kind of overcome the split between Echos and the a ES states by trying to help.

Countries in the Sahel more on a [00:14:00] kind of bilateral basis. and I think partly this is in self-interest because they want to prevent, jihadists coming, coming over into their countries. but partly it’s out of a sense of kind of Pan-Africanism and then a desire to regroup and, and get back together as a region.

but I think none of that assistance will be based around the idea of we need to get rid of. The Russian assistance, not just from a perspective of kind of political stability, but also because in a lot of countries in the hell, this is something that has been really demanded. By local populations.

They wanted Russian assistance. They protested in the streets with Russian flags. And I think the removal of that assistance would, represent a neo colonialism in, some spheres. I think people would perceive it as, a removal of what, what the public wanted. so it’s, it’s problematic for many reasons that I think maybe not even desirable in a way.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, it’s quite interesting when we look at many of the coups that have occurred over the last couple of years, there’s been a, a springing up of Russian flags in the streets, more so than even national flags, which many people interpret as that. These coups and these, military regimes have actually been [00:15:00] supported, encouraged by the the Russian government.

As opposed to the population calling for that support from Russia. As someone who, who knows the region really well, how do you perceive it? Do you perceive which came first? Russia’s supports and, and indoctrination, or was it the population calling for that support and then Russia just being a, a, a good global citizen?

Dr. Jessica Moody: it is very difficult to say which came first. I think both existed. Primarily, I think something we hear a lot in the Sahel right now, and, particularly, I don’t wanna call anybody out, but particularly from the French people or French diplomats, French, foreign service personnel operating in the Sahel, is that, Russia manipulated this whole thing and.

France had historically been very popular and had been called upon many times by West African governments, which is true, to assist them with security crises. and that it was only because of Russia’s kind of increasing fake news and propaganda campaigns that France fell out of favor and Russia then kind.

Emerge to fill the gap. And I think it is a horrible way of looking [00:16:00] at it because it takes all of the agency away from people in those countries. and I think it also negates a really long history of anti French sentiment. I think, the first time I ever went to West Africa, a long, long time ago, I remember so many people saying to me.

this French influence. We hate the fact that we are a country that has, was in Togo. It was a country that we have been decolonized for a very long time. But it feels like we’re still under colonial rule because France has so much control over our, our policies and our currency and.

There’s just still so much French influence here and, and we don’t want it. we’re sick of this. and, shamefully for me, a lot of people saying like, actually we would’ve loved it if it had been a, British, imperial regime that we faced because at least they left and they, they went home.

And we are still kind of facing a lot of, French involvement in our, in our current affairs. and I think. What’s happened is that anti French sentiment has, continued and had been really strong for a long time. And then it started to seem like, oh, maybe there’s actually an [00:17:00] alternative to France.

And I think that’s where Russia came in. It kind of offered a, offered a happy alternative to what had been seen for a very long time to be a, a flawed way of operating. So I think Russia took advantage of the situation, but there was very much a sense in a lot of West Africa that they were done with. the Western involvement and support that they’d had and, and that it hadn’t been particularly effective.

Dominic Bowen: And, and do you see the current military regimes in Mali and, and Nigeria as transitional military regimes? Or is this something that’s going to stay And, and, and furthermore, do you see that it’s gonna possible for them to establish a level of legitimacy both domestically but also internationally? 

Dr. Jessica Moody: I think what we’re seeing now is that they’re likely to, barring a coup, they’re likely to remain in, in power.

I think, there’s no real sense that any of these governments are moving towards democracy or genuine elections. and I think as long as they can maintain power, they will do so. I think what will prevent that happening is. Is another coup probably caused by a major security incident, or a sense within [00:18:00] the military that they’re not tackling jihadist violence in the best way that they can.

in terms of legitimacy, I think it’s a really interesting question because I don’t think that, I mean, it’s hard to tell because these regimes are in large part authoritarian. but I think. I wouldn’t say that these regimes necessarily lack legitimacy. I think there’s a lot of support for them from local populations who have felt like they have finally responded to their demands for sovereignty.

I think what undermines that legitimacy is when the jihadist violence edges further towards capital cities and then the kind of elite that live in the capitals start to see. Okay. Actually, maybe this regime wasn’t legitimate when it said it was gonna do a better job of dealing with the, the security problems that this country faces.

and it’s a very smart strategy on the part of groups like Jane m to undermine that legitimacy that these governments have by coming closer to the capital and launching attacks that make it look like. The government has zero idea what it’s doing. I mean, we saw, last week in Niger that there was a, a kidnapping of an American citizen in Miami, [00:19:00] just next to almost the presidential palace.

And it just kind of, very much undermines the legitimacy of these, of these governments. Because if you can launch an attack like that in a capital city, then. that really, takes it away from them. but I think aside from that, they do have a lot of legitimacy.

Dominic Bowen: It’s very interesting and I’ll just take a moment, Jessica, to remind our listeners that full episodes of the International Risk Podcast are now available on YouTube. So if you go to YouTube, search for the International Risk Podcast and please subscribe to our episodes there on YouTube. But Jessica, you’ve had a look at a lot of these things and I think for a lot of our listeners in, Southeast Asia in, in North America and across Europe. They might find it hard to understand why are some of these groups like JM like our, oaa, offshoots and ISIS in, why are they so successful with recruitment? Why are they being welcomed by some communities? Why are they so successful in achieving, reasonable levels of legitimacy when, from a western perspective, from far away?

It just seems such a strange concept. Can you help us understand their success story? 

Dr. Jessica Moody: Sure. I think the most important thing to remember when we [00:20:00] look at jihadist recruitment in the Sahel is that for the vast majority of cases, it has nothing to do with religious extremism. and I think, you’d be hard pressed to find somebody in the Sahel who would say to you that they joined a jihadist group because they believed in establishing a caliphate in the region. The majority of times people join jihadist groups because they are fearful, they’re scared, or they lack employment opportunities. primarily I think a lot of the recruitment that goes on in the Sahel is linked to inter communal violence and tensions. so there’s one ethnic group, known as the Pearl.

Who are historically herders, nomadic herders, and they have been marginalized for a very long time and have been stigmatized for the fact that they are perceived to often trample on farmers’ crops when they undertake their nomadic herding. and they’re strongly disliked by many communities because of that. Interaction that they experience. an interaction that has become a lot worse with climate change and a kind of [00:21:00] increasing scarcity of, of resources. Um. The problem is that where the Pearl have been stigmatized, they’ve also been stigmatized by the state and they have been, unfairly treated. They would say by, state security forces who have often kind of arrested them or beaten them up for no real reason.

and because of that, and because of that fear that they felt from a lot of communities within the Sahel, they were very vulnerable to recruitment by jihadist groups who promised to protect them from. The discrimination they experienced at the hands of the state. And so the pearl community are very, widely perceived to be easily recruited into jihadist groups.

The problem being that the more that they are recruited into jihadist groups out of fear of persecution, the more that they are persecuted because they’re perceived as being jihadists. and so you have, you know, whole communities. I, when I was in Aboriginal a couple of years ago in, vo, I was speaking to some people who said.

You know, quite well educated people living in, the economic capital of, of one of the economic powerhouses in West Africa. And they said to me, hate the pearl because [00:22:00] they’re the ones who are responsible for all of this jihadist violence and they’re the ones that are causing the instability in this region.

And that level of, hatred and racism and xenophobia that’s being constructed makes their recruitment into jihadist groups even easier because there’s this division that’s formed. and jihadist groups have been very, effective at facilitating that kind of a dynamic. and they will go into communities and, and intentionally create divisions.

They’ll launch attacks on communities that create divisions between them and therefore facilitate further recruitment. The other thing to think about is the lack of development and the lack of, economic opportunities. Often outside of capital cities in the Sahel, there isn’t a lot of work. and if a jihadist group emerges and offers you a reasonable sum of money to, to join them, it’s often an opportunity that you can’t really turn down because in order to feed your family, that’s, that’s what you need to do.

And then. the third thing is the fear of the jihadist groups themselves. So often they will come and launch attacks and then say, unless you [00:23:00] join us, we’re gonna kill you. So, I mean, what are you gonna do? so I think the causes of recruitment are complex and then never really to do with ideological motivations.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, it’s very interesting the, the reasons you, whether it’s marginalization, employment opportunities and fear. You know, they’re the same recruitment things we see in Iraq, we see in Afghanistan, we see in parts of Yemen. these are not unique. recruitment tools that are being used.

And, and so if we look at the other side of risk, which is, which is opportunity, I, I wonder if you’ve seen any successful, and it could be initiatives or technology. We hear a lot about the success and the, obviously the huge destruction, caused by drones. there was an interesting piece in Bloomberg just this morning about, how NATO is using new technology to, maybe, hopefully prevent, but then if that fails to, fight wars.

Are you seeing any successful initiatives, either, developments or, or technological being used, in the Sahel to help counter the influence of jihadist groups or to help strengthen governance and democracy across the region? 

Dr. Jessica Moody: sadly, not really. I think the situation is very much more [00:24:00] that in recent years we’ve seen a lot of drone acquisition in the Sahel, a lot of Turkish drones being acquired.

but unfortunately it doesn’t tend to have a huge impact. I think often the drones are not used particularly strategically. and there’s a lot of civilian deaths. and the problem is that you have a lot of militaries that are not particularly good at distinguishing between civilians and jihadists on the ground, let alone from the air.

and so the acquisition of drones was seen as, you know, maybe this would be a turning point in the war against. Organizations like Jane m and and Islamic State. But actually it, it hasn’t really made much of a difference. And these, post coup regimes have, have really struggled to prevent the expansion of jihadist violence despite the use of drones.

and we’re also starting to see an increasing use of, drone, Yeah, drones by jihadist groups as well. and so that kind of escalation and sophistication of violence means that it’s not necessarily proving to be particularly effective. and unfortunately we actually see a lot less sophistication on the part of [00:25:00] governments in the Sahel than we do from jihadist groups.

so we see things like recruitment strategies being used by governments in Burkina that revolve around, you know, dissident of dissidence and, and critics of the Burkin aey regime will be automatically conscripted into the armed forces and things that just don’t seem to be particularly well thought through, and particularly likely to have positive effects.

There isn’t, there isn’t really a turn to. Sophisticated technology or, or sophisticated strategy and attempt to deal with jihadist groups. There’s much more of a turn towards, very basic and poorly thought through strategies like massacring civilians. 

Dominic Bowen: So for political advisors, for politicians, for business leaders that are interested in the Sahel, when you look forward for the next 12 to 24 months, how do you see the, the security situation and the, the governance situation, evolving?

Dr. Jessica Moody: I would love to be optimistic, but I don’t think it’s possible. I think the situation at the moment is. Pretty terrible across Mali, [00:26:00] Burkina and Nija. I foresee particularly in Mali that the situation is only gonna get worse. I think you could see that the, the government might face further co attempts.

There’s been a kind of recent reshuffle of the military in an attempt to avoid, further military disruption. but I’m not sure that that’s. Going to do justice to how poor the situation is at the moment. and the more that bamako struggles, the more that the regime of a semi will struggle. and I think it’s, it’s highly probable that we’ll see a coup attempt or a coup, in the next year, particularly if you start to see more, sustained attacks in Bamako itself.

and or, you know, the, the city just completely collapses because there’s no supplies coming in. it’s not a, it’s not a pretty site, I’d say, across the cell, for the next 12, 24 months. I think once you see somewhere like Bamako start to struggle, I think you could then witness the same kind of thing happening in Waga.

Doga in, in Burkina. and as I say, this recent kind of kidnapping attack in Miami suggests that Islamic state is getting closer to the capital in in [00:27:00] Niger as well. so I think unless we see a much better security response, unless this kind of unified force that the Alliance of Health states have established is somehow miraculously very effective, and has a lot of backing.

Or you see an intervention by Ghana or Senegal or VO Nigeria kind of powerhouse within the region. boots on the ground kind of thing. I think you are not gonna see a significant change in the security situation. it would take something quite considerable. I heard some rumors that the US was looking to reestablish security relations with Mali potentially as a counter to Russia.

That might make a difference. if you were to see much more effective US assistance to Mali, I think that that could change the situation. but really we are looking at some pretty sophisticated jihadist groups that are very adept at expanding narrow abrasions and know that they’re facing a massive security vacuum.

and I can’t see that situation improving anytime soon. Really. 

Dominic Bowen: And you talked about potential, [00:28:00] reengagement by the us. We know that, under the, the Trump administration, there’s a, a real pursuit of America first and, and pursuing relationships and activities that really benefit the us. it might be helpful for us to understand what would the US get out of that relationship other than countering Russian influence? Is there a strategic imperative for the US to get involved in the Sahel. 

Dr. Jessica Moody: No, I think the motivation might be more kind of, similar to Russian or Chinese motivation for operating in West Africa. the kind of more straightforward American foreign policy that’s based around America first, as you say, aligns the much more closely with the way that China and Russia invest in West Africa in terms of looking at kind of infrastructure projects and natural resources.

the important thing in particularly in Mali is that there is a, a considerable mining sector, a lot of gold, lithium a copper. There’s a, a series of minerals that are, worth getting access to, and I think would like to position itself as addressing climate change facilitator, in [00:29:00] terms of the minerals that it can provide and the way in which that might enable, climate change transition.

and so I think the US may be seeing it as, you know, if we can stabilize this country, we would have access to a huge amount of resources. And since Russia has already started that kind of a model in Mali, maybe it would be worth us doing the same. Aside from that, I can’t really see that there’s a, a huge strategic imperative for the us.

Dominic Bowen: And when you look more broadly around the world, Jessica, what are the international risks that concern you the most? 

Dr. Jessica Moody: well, I’m very much focused on West Africa. That’s my, my, day-to-day domain. and I think it’s actually struck me over the years that. The situation in West Africa has been so overlooked. I think the, the challenges that we see in the Sahel, that have been brewing since 2012. are really quite problematic for, for the world at large. I think, in the Saha in recent years, we’ve seen a proxy war essentially between Russia and the West, and I think that’s been hugely important.

Russia has [00:30:00] essentially used a lot of West Africa, and Central Africa as a way of. maintaining assistance at the un, but also maintaining access to resources and access to markets that it didn’t have because of sanctions. and I think the situation in West Africa has to be taken into account.

I think, we need to be aware of the dynamics. We need to be aware of the expansion of jihadist groups and the fact that this is impacting so many people. for numerous different reasons. I think there’s also the, the kind of migration angle that comes into play in terms of, as you mentioned earlier, the number of people that have been displaced in these crises, in the Sahel that have moved either into coastal West Africa or have tried to make it to Europe.

It’s all contributing to global dynamics that, the UK at the moment, we have endless conversations about migration and I think it’s all interconnected in terms of, you know, if you have that big of a security crisis in countries as large as you have in Al, that’s obviously gonna have ramifications around the world.

And I think going forwards we will probably see that, you know, Russia, China, the [00:31:00] US, Europe will all be competing for resources in West Africa. And so we can’t really ignore the dynamics that that take place there. 

Dominic Bowen: I appreciate that and thank you very much for coming on the International Risk Podcast today.

Dr. Jessica Moody: You are welcome. Thanks for having me. 

Dominic Bowen: Well, that was a really interesting conversation with Dr. Jessica Moody. Jessica’s a political risk, a due diligence and peace building consultant in West Africa, and I really appreciated hearing her thoughts on the security and the political situation across the Sahel.

Please go to the International Risk Podcast website and subscribe to our email list to get our biweekly newsletter in your inbox to get loads of useful information every second week. Today’s podcast was produced and coordinated by Elisa Garbil. I’m Dominic Bowen, your host. Thanks very much for listening.

We’ll speak again in the next couple of days.

Elisa Garbil: Thank you for listening to this episode of the International Risk Podcast. For more episodes and articles, visit the international risk podcast.com. Follow us on LinkedIn, blue Sky, and Instagram for the latest updates, and to ask your questions to our [00:32:00] host, Dominic Bowen. See you next time.