Episode 295: India’s Strategic Autonomy and Multialignment Approach in 2025 with Dominic Bowen

In a world where geopolitical camps are hardening, India continues to play by its own rules on the world stage. It buys oil from Russia, deepens technology and security ties with the US, while trading extensively with China and positions itself as a voice for the Global South – all while tensions simmer across its border, protectionism is on the rise and global power balances shift in an increasingly fractured world. What does strategic autonomy look like in 2025? And can India keep engaging everyone without choosing sides? I’m joined by a familiar voice, Dominic Bowen, the host you are used to listening to on this podcast, to discuss India’s multi-alignment strategy and its broader regional and global impacts. 

The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime, to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.

Dominic Bowen is the host of The International Risk Podcast and Europe’s leading expert on international risk and crisis management. As Head of Strategic Advisory and Partner at one of Europe’s leading risk management consulting firms, Dominic advises CEOs, boards, and senior executives across the continent on how to prepare for uncertainty and act with intent. He has spent decades working in war zones, advising multinational companies, and supporting Europe’s business leaders. Dominic is the go-to business advisor for leaders navigating risk, crisis, and strategy; trusted for his clarity, calmness under pressure, and ability to turn volatility into competitive advantage. Dominic equips today’s business leaders with the insight and confidence to lead through disruption and deliver sustained strategic advantage.

Transcript

You know, I think India is really just in simple terms, it’s hedging its bets, it’s riding different alliances. It has strong naval alliances with America, New Zealand and Australia, but at the same time it buys military supplies and funds Russia’s military. But as you said, it sells diesel to Ukraine at the same time.

Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organisations worldwide. Hi, my name is Anna Kummerstedt, and I’m a producer and researcher at the International Risk Podcast. But today, I’ll be taking on the role of host.

In a world where geopolitical camps are hardening, India continues to play by its own rules on the world stage. It buys oil from Russia, it’s deepening its technological and security ties with the US, trades extensively with China and positions itself as a voice for the global south. All while tensions simmer across its border, protectionism is on the rise, and global power balances are shifting in an increasingly fractured world.

So, what does strategic autonomy look like in 2025? And can India keep engaging everyone without choosing sides? Today, I’m joined by familiar voice, Dominic Bowen, the host who we’re used to listening to on this podcast to discuss India’s multi-alignment strategy and its broader regional and global impacts. Dominic, hello. Hi, Anna.

Great to be here with you today. It’s great to have this conversation with you, Anna. Thanks very much.

Dominic, we find you today in India. I am. I’m in New Delhi, which is absolutely beautiful.

I must say I’ve put on a few kilos. The food has been fantastic, but I’m not sure it’s paleo. Just from walking around over this past week, what is the mood being on in the ground? I know you spent time in India in the late 2000s.

What have you noticed that’s different from the last time you were there for an extensive period of time? I think as most of our listeners will know, India is an economic beast. The population size alone is phenomenal. And the development of the country just continues to expand, which brings a lot of positivity.

Economic growth is increasing, and we might talk about that during the conversation. But one of the downsides, the very visible downsides, before you even leave the airport, it just looks like there’s this fog over Delhi, and there literally is. The air pollution when I arrived about a week ago was 900 parts per million.

A healthy range is meant to be well below 100, and a dangerous range is 200. It really is quite toxic. And when you travel around the country, you see it go lower and higher in different parts.

But yeah, the pollution is really quite bad, which is a shame. It is a part we see in many countries as they’re going through increasing industrialisation and increased development. It feels like an almost inevitable cycle that many countries go through.

But yeah, it’s certainly something that’s affecting residents of India. But it’s still a beautiful place. People are still wonderfully warm and welcoming and friendly, and the food’s great.

So certainly a lot going for it. For sure. The same way Beijing has been known as the small capital of the world, transitioning to New Delhi represents the development transition that India’s going through.

Maybe not necessarily the most sustainable at the moment, but I think it’s fair to say that India has gone through a lot of change in the last few decades. And the external minister of India is famous for saying that now is the time to engage America, manage China, reassure Russia, cultivate Europe, and bring Japan into play. How does this encapsulate the shift from India’s Cold War non-alignment strategy that it was very famous for to today’s strategy of multi-alignment? What does India want to come out of this strategy? India has long recognised that the world is a very complex place.

And I think India does that even more so and manages these relationships even better than what they’ve done for a very long time. We discuss it, Anna, on the Internationalist podcast, and you’ve produced so many fantastic interviews where we’ve discussed the complexity of the world in 2025. And one of the things that really characterises the landscape that we work in and the internationalist landscape is this we can trust amongst traditional allies.

We also see it very practically in shifting supply chains. Many companies have moved their supply chains from China to India, and then now India’s actually suffering from higher tariffs than China. The energy market turbulence is a really big issue here.

I’ve discussed that with quite a few people over the last week, and no doubt we’ll unpack that about the American tariffs that have been levelled on India recently. Of course, India shares a border with China, an increasingly assertive China. This is something that India is really, really concerned about.

And I knew that there has obviously been, there’s been physical skirmishes with China, but also a lot on the trade front. India was one of the first countries to ban TikTok. But this assertive China policy and this, I guess, what India would characterise as an ever expanding China is something that’s really concerning here for certain governments and security agencies.

Then of course, India is not blind to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, but they’re very pragmatic about what it means for them. They hear the international calls for reforms. They recognise that there’s a need for a better international system, and India wants a better international system.

It’s got a huge economy, one of the world’s largest populations, yet the UN Security Council is dominated by the long-term powers, America, Russia, China, France, UK. And I think India is increasingly leaning on forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and of course, the BRICS and the BRICS+, to take advantage of this weakened trust amongst allies that we’re seeing today and all the other complexities, which I mentioned earlier. I guess a way of maybe synthesising this idea that India’s cultivating parallel relationships with these competing major powers and chosen to engage and not refuse to choose one relationship at the cost of the other through, for instance, the SCO, BRICS, but also on the other side, free trade agreements with the UK, many European countries, the quad dialogues with the US, Australia, and Japan.

But do you think now in this era with intensifying US-China great power competition and US-Russia relations at rock bottom, do you see that changing now? I think India was actually, at large, the political class was actually quite hurt and felt it was quite stupid to use the words I’ve heard used a little bit this week around America’s response. Now, I was able to discuss and have some quite frank conversations with some government officials about what option did the West have. India continues to fund Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.

The West couldn’t sit back as long as India continued to ignore sanctions against Russia. And for our listeners, the US-India relations hit a very significant diplomatic and trade crisis recently when the US imposed those tariffs on India’s exports up to 50% because India continued to import Russian oil and maybe less obvious, but India’s continued participation in the BRICS, the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa forum. Now, India denounced these moves.

And one of the arguments that India had is they don’t have another source of energy. Russia, one of the cheapest providers of oil and in large quantities. Defence cooperation has always been challenged with America.

America has been encouraging India to stop buying Russian weapons to which India responds with, fine, sell us your weapons, which the America hasn’t necessarily been willing to do in large quantities. And one thing that I’ve also heard said, which I think a lot of our listeners and I certainly found surprising is that Indians and Indian government officials will often say, you know, despite the different machinations of the West and coming and goings of different British and American presidents and prime ministers, Russia is the country that is consistently stood by India and consistently supported India, whatever the issues and challenges were. And I think this is a valid argument to make.

And India generally regards that relationship with Russia as a special and a privileged relationship. And the partnership with trade alone is close to $70 billion a year. Now, a big part of that is the crude oil and energy, but it’s a lot more.

This defence cooperation between Russia and India is a significant one. And you can understand, you know, sharing technology around missiles, rockets, planes, ships is a significant reason why countries like America are less inclined to share defence technology with India. But it’s not just about defence ties.

It’s not just about Russia and America. It’s also about India’s relationships with China. I mean, India’s relationship with China is a particularly complex one, and they’ve had many border skirmishes.

India has deliberately not developed its side of the border in order to slow any potential invasion of China down. But China has actually done the opposite and has built right up to the border, which has increased concerns amongst Indians that there is a possibility that China will one day invade Indian territory. But now that America has done these sanctions, India is now looking to China as a potential trading partner.

Some people have seen that the Trump tariffs have actually pushed India into the hands of China, which is quite interesting. There’s a lot to unpack there, Dominic, with what you’ve said. I want to go back to what you’re talking about with importing cheap crude oil from Russia, because I think it’s a very good example of showing India’s multi-alignment strategy in full display.

Because on the one hand, it’s the second largest importer of crude oil from Russia. But simultaneously, it’s the largest exporter of diesel to Ukraine. What does this reveal about India’s strategy? And is it risky? Or do you almost see it as the opposite? Is it a way to try and what people refer to as opportunistic hedging and minimising the risk and maximising the returns amid this high uncertainty? Or is it really quite a risky strategy? I think if this was a relationship between friends and enemies at the street or in the schoolyard or in the office, I think most people would call it a very unhealthy relationship.

But what you described as a risky relationship, many people would use terms like it’s an unethical relationship. But it’s not a person to person relationship. It’s a geopolitical relationship.

So it’s different. And we need to recognise that. India calls it strategic autonomy.

Throughout the 50s, 60s, 70s, 80s, and early 90s, they called it non-alignment. Many scholars and academics call it this balancing of great powers. I think India is really just in simple terms, it’s hedging its bets.

It’s riding different alliances. It has strong naval alliances with America, New Zealand, and Australia. But at the same time, it buys military supplies and funds Russia’s military.

But as you said, it sells diesel to Ukraine at the same time. President Modi was seen hugging President Putin recently at the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement. President Modi and President Xi have meetings coming up.

And all this is driven by one thing, and that’s India’s domestic policies. So we need to again, remember that geopolitics is a function of what serves country’s domestic interests. Domestically, I think India feels hard done by because it is a powerful country, but it doesn’t necessarily have the status internationally.

It is still treated like a poor or a second-class citizen. And so India really wants to focus on its growth, which is quite powerful. And it’s been really, really strong.

This year, GDP has been growing by between 6% and 7%. That’s expected to continue again to about 7% 2026. There’s a continued priority around technology.

I mean, I remember when I was at uni, not that long ago, writing essays about India’s ability to transform into an IT and a technology superpower. And it was possible, but there were significant investments needed in infrastructure, and these have occurred. But part of that investment in infrastructure is around energy security, which is why India places such a priority on securing energy, this time from Russia, and why India says and feels that it has no alternative because energy security is so important.

But it also wants to play more of a role in regional leadership. I think we talk about the Asia-Pacific region. India has been particularly comfortable and happy with the new framing of the Indo-Pacific region as the title we use more comfortably.

And as I said, this is all happening at a time that, to be honest, from a geopolitical point of view, is perfect for India. At a time when Trump has basically declared a trade war on everyone, including its closest allies, this is great for India. As supply chains are shifting out of China, this is great for India.

As there’s turbulence in the energy markets, this is great for India. And assertive China, again, makes India feel heard when they complain about China’s assertiveness along its border. And these growing international calls for reform within the United Nations, particularly within the United Nations Security Council, again, adds weight to something that India’s been calling for a long time.

So I think these things are all coming together at a time that really suit India and, as I said at the start, I think support India hedging its bets. And I know you’ve looked at India before. You’ve looked at some of its water treaties and various practises.

How do you see India’s relationship, Anna? Well, I guess pushing back on what you’re saying about India being in this geopolitical sweet spot right now, I think that in itself is maybe up for debate. After the Covid pandemic, it might have found itself in a sweet spot with US trade partnerships, technology investment booming, relations with China be on a security side, not great, with the border clashes, but economically pretty strong and Russia was pretty robust. Now this is all changing with the Russian invasion in Ukraine.

Russia is weakened, even though it’s trying to present itself as quite strong. And the Trump administration is back. US-China relations are very volatile.

And the reality is that India is one of the probably biggest victims of Trump’s tariff regime. In August, it got hit with two rounds of 25% tariffs, which scholars say, estimate that if these are in place for a prolonged period of time, will shave off as much as 0.8% of India’s GDP, which is pretty significant. It does make me think with the US turn to being a bit more disengaged, inward looking policy is what happens if relations with India and China were to deteriorate, what position would the US take? And I think with these trade agreements with the US and the tariff, it does raise questions of India’s dependency on the US.

And I think it’s an important question to bring back to you in the sense of the multi-alignment strategy, it’s presented itself or the argument in favour of it is to prevent over-dependency on one country. But do you think that the tariffs and the impacts that this is going to have on India, alongside the shifts in the US visa policies, which really is a massive repercussion on India, given that I think 75% of these visas are granted to Indians. How is this impacting India? Follow-up question.

Do you think India is an ally or an adversary of the US? That’s a great question. I giggle because it’s actually quite a very difficult question. Indian politics and I think the Indian state has always been very pragmatic.

And it’s this blend of pragmatism with resilience and I think strategic foresight. And just to clarify, when we talk about strategic foresight, we’re not talking about predicting the future. We’re talking about considering what are a range of possibilities and what do those different possibilities mean for me.

So it’s about thinking about what are some possible futures that could exist and what do those mean for India. And I think India has been very good at understanding those future possibles and then positioning itself in a way to take advantage of whichever one it tends to eventuate. And as you mentioned, this is about diversifying partnerships.

So having partnerships with China, it was amazing how fast within a few days of Trump announcing the tariffs on India, India was already engaging with China. And in a record time, President Xi from China and President Modi from India have already organised their first meeting. So I think these partnerships at a state level, but also technological partnerships, infrastructure partnerships, encouraging greater regional cooperation.

So trying to pull some of the power away from Geneva, from Brussels, from London, from New York, trying to bring that power back to the Indo-Pacific region. But also I think India is navigating these complexities and what really today is great power competition, primarily between America and China. Maybe you want to include Russia into that mix.

I’m not sure they can be called a great power anymore, but certainly China is navigating itself from what were once great powers and what are today’s great powers, but really keeping its national interests at the front of it. Global governance is going to need to evolve. I think the US dollar will remain the global currency, but still India is positioning itself as a key player.

Whether we reform the UN system, whether the BRICS become a larger power, I’m doubtful of that. But nevertheless, they are going to have a greater say in whatever the world looks like in 2035. I’d like to move on to sort of the India-China relation dynamic.

On the one hand, China is one of India’s top trading partners, but it is also its primary strategic rival. And in 2020, there was the border clashes in the Galwan Valley. And then for a few years, there was no communication or state visits between the two.

But then, as you mentioned, following the tariffs, it was quick communication between the two. And Prime Minister Modi chose to attend the Chinese-organised Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit, which marked the first time that Modi visited China since this border clash. However, it notably skipped the Victory Day parade.

And I’m curious, what message is India signalling to Beijing through this act of attending one of these events that was more to do with economy, cooperation, and another event that was more defence, military-based? What message was it portraying? I think the message is very clear. To have President Putin, Xi, and Modi walking on the red carpet hand-in-hand on their arrival, they all knew what they were doing. That was a very clear statement to the world that the American-German-French-British alliance is not as strong, or may not be as strong, or may have a counterweight in the form of a Russia-Chinese-India alliance.

And that is very, very significant and a very, very important message that we all need to hear and see. But the fact that Modi then skipped the victory parade, the military parade, the parade where China shows its military strength and shows off with fighter jets and missiles and rockets, really highlights that there is still very, very clear military competition between those two countries. The countries are still vying for competition in things like artificial intelligence.

I’ve had so many conversations with people in India about artificial intelligence and India’s desire to be leading in that, but also things like quantum computing and also digital infrastructure. These are areas where India is not stepping down. And these are also areas where China wants to be a global leader.

And I think as China’s foreign policy continues to become more and more assertive, and as China continues to seek to influence right across, not just Africa and Asia, but also Latin America through the technological, the economic, and also the military means. Let’s keep in mind that 48 out of 54 countries in Africa have either Chinese or Russian military personnel or military equipment in their countries. And then closer to home, Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea, its Belt and Road Initiative, its control over critical resources concerns India significantly.

It concerns many countries across the Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific region. So I think these issues around regional stability, around global governance, significantly concern India, and China is the big part of that. Now, India’s responding, it’s building its partnerships, it’s strengthening its military and its internal demand.

It’s investing significantly in trying to modernise its military and modernise its defence, at the same time as promoting these alternative forms of development in order to be able to strengthen itself domestically, so thus feeding that economic and then feeding its ability to develop its military. I think if anything, it really just demonstrates India’s strategic autonomy. It’s picking to go to one summit and then saying, no, I’m not attending the other one, I’m going back home.

And I think there’s been a lot of rhetoric in the news of this idea of strategic autonomy, but also it’s playing its cards well. It doesn’t want to be perceived as anti-Western and completely adhering to this new alternative world order presented by China. It’s dabbling its toes in both worlds and presenting itself as non-Western and non-alternative order, but not anti either.

You also mentioned before, I thought it was an interesting point that this constant between India and Russia, their relationship really has been a constant. And even the external ministers referred to it as the India-Russia relationship is the only constant in world politics in the last 50 years. There’s a lot of history behind their relationship that dates back to Russian support to India in the India-Pakistan wars, Russian’s use of its veto power in the UN Security Council regarding resolutions on the issue of Kashmir.

India’s benefited a lot from its partnership with Russia, as we’ve already discussed in this podcast through the energy security ideas, nuclear cooperation, economic, and to an extent it has also been seen as this counterbalance to China, as China is still India’s main rival. However, Russia is also beginning to align itself with China and we are seeing ties also with Pakistan and the Pakistan Prime Minister visited Moscow just after the invasion of Ukraine. There’s been joint military exercises and energy discussions between Pakistan and Russia.

And so my question to you is, for India, is it starting to think about how reliable Moscow is as a partner for India and how does this complicate India’s long-held perception of Russia as a constant? I think that internally, India sees Russia as a forever partner. They recognise that Russia is a declining power. It’s been declining since the late 80s and it’s Russia’s more recent expansionist activities into Georgia.

Obviously, it’s continued expansion in Moldova and then the violent conflict in Ukraine since 2014 are very overt signs of an empire that’s shrinking and desperately attacking its neighbours. But India still sees Russia as a forever friend and I don’t think that it’s going to move away. And I think India also recognises that America has a history, whilst it can be a great partner to many countries, it has a history of turning its back on its friends at times.

It’s one of the weaknesses of democracy, isn’t it? That political leaders today can reverse the promises made by the last leadership group, depending if the pendulum swings to the left or right. That is one of the weaknesses of democracy. Now, we hope that our political class, whatever side of the aisle they sit on, will continue to advance our interests.

But we know that means sometimes they reverse treaties. We’ve seen that with America and the Paris Climate Treaty, and we’ve seen it in many other cases. And India recognises this.

Russia, of course, is not a democracy and India recognises that. That means that they are likely to be a more stable partner. And even if they’re a declining power, they’re still probably going to be a worthwhile partner.

Now, India’s attempting to grow its trade. It aims to have about $1 trillion worth of exports by next year. And part of that is to countries like South Africa, China, but also Russia.

Russia still has a large population, a large consumer base, and India would be hoping to export significantly to Russia as well. And whilst India’s economic growth is going to be underpinned by domestic demand, it’s going to have to rely on international exports. And Russia is going to be a big part of that market.

Dominic, hypothetical question. If tensions were to escalate between China and India on the South Asia continent, which is not completely out of the question, there has been territorial disputes. There’s the question of the succession of the Dalai Lama, and also the water dispute between India and China, especially now that China is building what will be, if it happens, the world’s biggest hydropower dam.

What will Russia do if India and China were to go to war? Would it take a side? What do you think? You’re asking me some incredibly difficult questions today, Anna. I love it. What would Russia do in that situation? I mean, I think Russia would be doing a lot of backdoor diplomacy.

And I think everyone recognises that Russia right now is the smaller partner when it comes to the China-Russia relationship. Russia gets technology from China. It gets a lot of political and geopolitical cover from China.

It’s certainly able to export weapons from countries like North Korea, from Iran, from South Africa. But its relationship, one, is an income generator. So, Russia is able to sell energy, sell military equipment to India.

Would China demand? I would suspect that if there was conflict between India and China, that China would demand that Russia stop supplying India with that material. And Russia, I would suggest, being a fair weather friend, and as we all know, is in a very, very fragile political, economic, and military situation today, would most likely say to China, well, that’s fine. We can stop selling to India.

But then we need to balance that with what we sell to you or donations or development programmes or support from you, which I think China would be willing to do if that meant India was not financed. India does see that China is a real threat. We talk about a lot of threats around the world in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region, and most of them are focused on China heading towards its neighbours, eastbound neighbours, countries like Taiwan, countries like the Philippines.

Those countries are particularly concerned, countries like Brunei, other islands in the Indo-Pacific region. India is definitely concerned about China and China’s potential expansion. So, your question is not just a mere hypothetical.

I think it is a realistic question. The people in India and the military in India definitely take seriously and they definitely prepare for such an activity. But yeah, Russia is certainly sitting on the fence between those two countries, and I think some very significant geopolitical manoeuvring would be required if that was to occur.

We’ll have to see, and hopefully it doesn’t occur. But moving now to the domestic angle, and we’ve spoken a bit about the domestic and foreign policy. I think on the one hand, India is seen as the largest democracy in the world.

But at the same time, many people would question that. My question to you is, when we’re talking about the multi-alignment doctrine and strategic autonomy, are we seeing this trickle down into the domestic policy too, where it presents itself as a democracy, but it’s very much its own form of democracy? There are widespread internet shutdowns, I was reading. It actually leads the world in internet shutdowns.

Journalist visas have been revoked. Corruption, social media accounts were blocked when there were protests by farmers earlier this year. So, how do these two, this idea of strategic autonomy, intersect between these two dimensions, domestic and foreign policy? I think unquestionably, technically, India is a democracy.

But as we know, and we’ve discussed this on the International Risk Podcast several times, over the last 20 years, every single year by multiple different indices, the strength of democracies around the world are shrinking. And India is a contributor to that shrinking. There has been activities by the Indian government, the state, to limit freedoms and to limit opposition.

And I’ve certainly heard from a couple of people, very anecdotally, who roll their eyes and giggle when you refer to India as a democracy. And I think there’s some validity to that. It’s a different style of democracy.

Civil society, non-government organisations are not as active and vibrant as you see in many other countries across the Asian continent. And I think part of that could be because of the style of democracy that we see in India. I think I would love to see a more vibrant opposition.

I would love to see more vibrant political debates between political parties in India. But I think that’s the case in so many countries today. So, I don’t think India is alone there.

But I think there certainly is scope for India to be practising perhaps a more open and more generous and more forgiving style of democracy. And I think there’s comments and lots of discussions about Hindu nationalism. I don’t think all of that is as fair as what some people are saying.

I’ve certainly met Christians here, met Jews here, met Buddhists here. Of course, I’ve met Hindus. It is a very vibrant country when you consider the huge array of demography and groups and religious groups and ethnic communities here.

But it’s not this picture perfect story that we would all hope India to be. I mean, yourself, you’ve spent some time in India at different periods of your life. And the current Prime Minister Modi, he first came into power in 2014.

And in 2024, he was elected again, the third time. India’s grown a lot in these past 10 years. It’s also gone through a lot of change, positive and negative.

Its pollution crisis, as you mentioned at the start, has only got worse. What are the things you’ve noticed the most that have changed in India since Modi came into power and where we find ourselves today in 2025? Yeah, I think Modi’s style of presidency and leadership is very different to the previous. And I think one thing that I’ve really noticed more and more recently is, I think internationally, we see Gandhi, the former leader in India, as this wonderful leader, someone that’s often talked about in MBA courses and leadership courses about what a fantastic style of leadership here.

I’m not sure if it’s revisionists or if it’s just a new generation, but people now don’t necessarily view Gandhi in the same light. Now, he’s been in power since 2014, so 11 years. And in that time, India has gone through significant economic, social and political changes.

And that’s because of the reforms that Modi’s done. And these have been positive. There’s been more welfare initiatives, but there’s been a shift in governance style.

And that’s what perhaps some people would argue is not the positive ones. We’ve seen Modi introduce a new goods and services tax back in 2017. This was a significant income earner for the government.

It also simplified compliance with tech laws, which might seem quite boring to many of our listeners, but how the government earns its income is very significant. And then what the government can do. And India really is a shining light when you consider the national disaster management agencies, the state disaster management agencies, the inclusion, perhaps not the best move, but the inclusion of the military and the police in disaster response and building up security and safety within communities.

There’s been a liberalisation over the last 11 years of foreign-directed investment, which has meant there’s been a lot more foreign currency and foreign investment coming into India, which is largely seen as a positive. There’s been a lot more made in India since 2014, trying to boost domestic manufacturing to create jobs in India. This is unique.

We see the same thing in Australia. We see it in Vietnam. We see it in China.

We see it in America, of course, with the tariffs today. So this is not an India-unique initiative, but it’s something that Modi has been pushing for over a decade now. And also the Indian state has been much more disciplined in its budget discipline, reducing budget deficits, increasing foreign exchange reserves to be able to avoid fluctuations, recognising that the world is dominated by the US dollar.

But I think these welfare and social initiatives trying to lift more people out of positive have to be recognised and have to be recognised as a positive development in India. There’s a long way to go. But certainly there has been a significant improvement. And part of that is also the ease of doing business. It’s a lot easier now for foreign actors to do business in Asia. And the the ranking of India from about 2014 improved significantly when you consider it on the the way of doing business and the way of foreign actors being able to do business. So there’s been a lot of political, there’s been a lot of social shifts. And as a result, India is much more of an economic powerhouse today. I think this is good internationally and it’s good domestically.

For sure. And just honing into this idea of the future of India, what do you see as the wild cards that will impact where India is in the coming years? And how should investors, foreign policy actors, civil society observers think about India?

I think I feel fairly comfortable and it’s fairly safe to predict that India will be a global economic powerhouse within the next 10 years. By 2035, you know, the Germanys, Americas of this world will will be sitting at the table with their peers from from India. I think it’s potential within the next decade, India will be contributing about 20% of global growth. It’ll be the third, definitely the fourth, but if not the third largest global economic power.

I think GDP forecasters by various estimates are going to be sitting at above $10 trillion dollars per year within the next decade. i think India is going to continue to grow its manufacturing base and it’s going to develop hopefully for less pollution, less pollutive industries, become more climate friendly, which to be honest, isn’t a significant priority here today.

I think as it moves towards more technology and services, maybe even more global capacity centers here, we’re going to see India become much more a part of the global value chain. And I think that’s a really positive one.

I think India’s large youthful population is a real positive today for it, Anna, and I think this will help drive the dynamism that we’ve already seen over the last decade or so, but I think that’s going to continue even more as as large economies like China ageing, as Japan are ageing, as Europe is ageing. I think this is going to put India in a really positive position. So I think the story is largely a positive one for India. But as you asked earlier in how it plays its cards, geopolitically is going to be a big factor in that.

I wonder, Anna, when you when you look at India, do you when you look to the future, do you feel like it’s a all roses and a positive story? Or have you got concerns that you worry about?

I think there are a lot of positive stories that shouldn’t be ignored, the youthful population for sure. If it’s able to manage a green transition, that could also be very promising. I mean, it does try to represent itself as a voice of the global south and also a voice of climate change trying to make progress on these international fora on climate actions, even though it might not necessarily be echoed in its domestic policies.

However, i guess some of the implications or risks I do see with its sort of unique multi-alignment strategy is what is the underlying assumption that’s grounding it and I think in part is it sees itself as a valuable counterbalance to China in Asia um I think that to an extent a mutual consensus between India and the US that US sees India as this counterbalance to China and India recognises that this is a bargaining chip for for itself and it can play this strategy I think only time will tell but What will be interesting to see is what if this underlying assumption changes and this global balance shifts, what are the risks to India’s position then?

And especially also in its regional neighborhood. On the one hand it’s trying to present itself as creating alliances with all and even engaging with adversaries but it’s also creating quite a sour relationship with a lot of its local neighbors including Pakistan with the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, the Maldives, Nepal. Only time will tell.

But Dominic, thank you so much for joining me on the podcast today and for what I thought was a very enriching conversation into where India is today, where it was and where it’s going.

Well, thanks very much for having me on and for these really great questions, Anna.

Well that was a great episode with Dominic Bowen, and we hope you enjoyed listening to it. Please subscribe to our mails, to get out bi-weekly newsletter in your inbox. This episode was produced by me, Anna Kummelstedt, thank you for listening and we will speak again next week.