Episode 274: Afghanistan under Taliban rule: what future for the country?

In this episode, Dominic Bowen and Dr. Arian Sharifi discuss the events leading to the fall of Kabul in August 2021 and the rise of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.  

Find out more about what the Taliban have implemented in the country, how they managed to secure most of the territory from terrorism, and set a record of complete control of the territory in 50 years since the departure of the US military forces from the country.

The conversation also addresses acute human rights violations against the Afghan population and the expected fall of the economy following the ban on opium production. Dominic and Arian also examine the security risks in the region emanating from different terrorist groups (especially the TTP, IS-El-K ) and the ongoing historical fight for dominion over Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Dr Sharifi assesses the way to a sustainable state through negotiations and Hibatullah Akhundzada’s change of heart regarding necessary reforms.

Dr. Arian Sharifi is an American-Afghan national security professional with two decades of high-level policy and academic experience. While serving as Assistant National Security Advisor for President Ghani of Afghanistan, he advised senior leaders on foreign and security affairs, led the development of over 20 national-level policies and strategies – including the National Security Policy and Counter-terrorism Strategy – and implemented numerous operations, programs, and projects in the security and intelligence sectors. Dr. Sharifi has taught graduate school at Princeton University, conducted specialized research for major organizations, and advised leading institutions including the UN, NATO, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, and others. Sharifi holds a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in International Security Studies from Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, a Master’s in Public Affairs (MPA) from Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs, and a Bachelor’s (BA) in Political Science from Wesleyan University. He has published widely in academic and policy journals, and is a frequent commentator on strategic and security issues in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia.

The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.

Dominic Bowen is the host of The International Risk Podcast and Europe’s leading expert on international risk and crisis management. As Head of Strategic Advisory and Partner at one of Europe’s leading risk management consulting firms, Dominic advises CEOs, boards, and senior executives across the continent on how to prepare for uncertainty and act with intent. He has spent decades working in war zones, advising multinational companies, and supporting Europe’s business leaders. Dominic is the go-to business advisor for leaders navigating risk, crisis, and strategy; trusted for his clarity, calmness under pressure, and ability to turn volatility into competitive advantage. Dominic equips today’s business leaders with the insight and confidence to lead through disruption and deliver sustained strategic advantage.

Transcript:

Arian Sharifi 00:00

The Taliban really have achieved over the past four years, full control of the territory. Security is much better. However, the Taliban then, really on any other indicators of governance, have had absolutely no progress.

Elisa Garbil  0:20

Welcome back to The International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest World News and significant events that impact businesses and organizations worldwide.

Dominic Bowen 0:30

Hi, I’m Dominic Bowen, and I’m the host of the International Risk Podcast. Afghanistan is back on the front page, and for the worst reasons. Two earthquakes since the 31st of August have killed over 1,400 people and flattened villages across the east of the country. And it’s also back on the world’s chessboard because of Russia’s actions, because of the formal recognition of the Taliban back in July. And similarly, ISIS-K is projecting violence into Iran and Russia and across the border with Pakistan. And, interestingly, the economy shows statistical stability whilst we know that poverty continues to deepen right across the communities. There’s about 23 million people in need of humanitarian assistance this year. Funding for Afghanistan humanitarian operations is falling. And this is all occurring at the same time as the macro data looks stable, low inflation, tiny growth, but there’s high poverty. And any deal made between the Afghanistan government or businesses in Afghanistan and foreign actors faces sanctions. And at the same time, opium output has collapsed by 95% after the Taliban ban. And so this will be really interesting to hear from our guests today about the impacts on local communities. And to join us today, we’re joined by Dr. Arian Sharifi. He’s the Chief Strategy Officer at PerkEdge Research. He was a lecturer and chair of the Master’s in Public Policy program at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs. And he’s the former Director General of the National Threat Assessment at the Office of National Security in the Government of Afghanistan. And he also served as a Senior Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Kabul. I’m really looking forward to our conversation with Dr Sharifi to understand the situation in Afghanistan today. Dr. Arian Sharifi, welcome to the International Risk Podcast.

Arian Sharifi 02:17

Thank you very much, Dominique. Glad to be here.

Dominic Bowen 02:21

In July, Moscow became the first to formally recognize the Taliban. The Supreme Court in Russia had already lifted the terrorist designation back in April, but formal recognition is another step towards legitimizing the current rulers in Afghanistan. What tangible changes actually follow with this recognition? Is it access to finance? Is it air links between Afghanistan and Russia? Is there more diplomatic channels? Or is this mainly about optics for Russia’s regional posture?

Arian Sharifi 02:50

I would think it’s the latter. It’s more … something in something in the public eye. Because the formal recognition by one country really does not lead to any tangible results, especially when it comes to diplomatic recognition. It’s basically, in terms of tangible results, countries are looking for mainly entrance into the Bretton Woods system, basically. And that has really three main pillars. They need representation at the United Nations, representations at the World Bank, and representation at the IMF. And none of that has happened. And none of that will happen unless the Taliban government is recognized by most of the countries, particularly the Western countries. So in terms of tangible results, Russia’s recognition so far has not really led to anything. I think the Russians were kind of hoping that, that as they step in, other countries would follow. But fast forward, at least two, three months has passed and nothing really has happened to that end yet.

Dominic Bowen 03:50

And the promise of the Taliban 2.0 was public order, was better governance. And these are things that the Taliban promised, reduction in corruption and better services and support for the people of Afghanistan. In practice, we’ve seen gender apartheid and we’ve had guests on the podcast to speak about that. We’ve seen clerical centralisation in Kandahar and Kabul. So from your vantage point, when you look at state capacity in Afghanistan in 1996 compared to 2001, compared to today, what’s improved in the country when it comes to capacity and ability to actually govern the country?

Arian Sharifi 04:27

I mean, the Taliban’s return to power, if we could say that, has had really one major positive thing and a lot of other negative issues. And that one major positive development is that almost after about half a century, now is the time when the central government, central authority basically has control over the entirety of the territory of the country. And that is really important. You know in the academic sense in political science we call that the basis of government and going back to Thomas Hobbes and you know as he called the really the the the foundation of a government is ah the creation of the monopoly over the use of legitimate violence. And so that is something that taliban really have achieved over the past four years, they’re in full control of the territory there are no other opposing forces that could challenge ah the the authority and the wrath of the central government. And as such, security is much better because the war has ended, incidents of security have diminished, you know, only a few here and there incidents of of terrorism sometimes do happen, and that is ISIL-K. But apart from that, security-wise and control-wise, things are much better. However, ah the Taliban then really on any other ah the indicators of governance have had absolutely no progress. I mean, the human rights records you mentioned, human rights records are abismal, you know, issues of women’s rights is really, really bad. Almost half, perhaps even more than half of the country’s population doesn’t have access to education or to work or to public life whatsoever. The type of government is completely authoritarian, very dictatorial, in fact, very theocratical. The government is really all of the government positions and and and institutions are filled up with Taliban and Taliban only. And so on all these other aspects, things are pretty bad. The economy is really bad. People are suffering from a lack of job, lack of food, lack of, you know, all the necessary things that they need to live.

So, if we could look back into the positive thing, that one positive issue that I mentioned is kind of paving the way, it has paved the way for the establishment and development of an effective state, but the Taliban really need to take actual steps in terms of forming a constitution-based government. In terms of a more inclusive and broad-based government, in terms of ensuring the basic rights of the citizens. And then eventually that would hopefully lead to the end of this total, almost total diplomatic isolation. The country can breathe again. But fast forward over the past four years, no step really has been taken towards these objectives.

Dominic Bowen 07:11

It’s particularly interesting, that the point you made. And when I was living and working in Afghanistan about a decade ago, it was very clear to me that you know Kabul and Kandahar were worlds away. And you know they might have been the central authorities, but they weren’t in control. No one no one in there in the in the remote parts of Afghanistan saw any politicians from Kandahar or or Kabul. And there was no infrastructure. And I remember speaking to some village elders in in the middle of Helmand province. And we said to them, well, when was last time you you spoke to any authorities? And they actually said, well, it was actually Westerners. And we went, oh, when was that? And they went, 2000… and 1. And we sort of giggled, but it was more of a giggle from embarrassment. um Out of interest, you know, we said, so, and and what was the conversation you had back in 2001? And it was, again, one of these things that was borderline funny, but borderline wanted to make you cry. And they were almost quoting Dick Cheney. And they said, well, you guys promised us education, you promised us democracy, you promised us schools. And then we looked around and all you could see for kilometres and kilometres and kilometres was dust and desert and a few mud houses. and And they just looked at you and their point was very clear. You know, 15 years ago, you guys promised us democracy, schools, hospitals, health care. All I see is desert and a few mud huts. And, you know, their their point was was was really clear. 

And so your response that the Taliban has managed to achieve this when no one has before them is quite an achievement. We speak a lot and the Western media almost exclusively talks about the negative aspects of the Taliban. And I think we all understand why. But from what I understand, so The Taliban has removed and they’ve cracked down on other militias and and other terrorist organizations. They’ve dismantled many of the roadblocks. They’ve repaired a lot of the infrastructure. There is more safety and in rural communities. What else? How have they managed to achieve this level of central control when it hadn’t been possible for any of the rulers or leaders of the country beforehand? 

Arian Sharifi 08:58

In fact, I was in a Afghanistan stone about a month ago on a research project and I visited Kabul. I spent about a week in Kabul and then went up to Herat in the West. That’s originally where I’m from. And so I spent another week in Herat, then came back to Kabul. And you could see some of these issues that you mentioned that you just mentioned. And in fact, in some of the meetings I had for the research purposes with some of the Taliban authorities, in fact, very high level authorities in Kabul, we talked about these issues. And you know in a genuine way, they were all even asking my opinion and that’s exactly what I told them time and again. You guys have achieved something that had not happened in 50 years and in in in Afghanistan and that is total control across the territory. But that is only the beginning of building a state. Other than that, you have achieved absolutely nothing and you’re really not working towards anything ah in terms of establishing a durable and an acceptable state in Afghanistan, something that most of the people, if not all, could actually see themselves in and could feel that they’re part of that government.

Now, the reason why they’ve been able to achieve this control is I would say, in a sense, it’s by chance and in a sense, it’s a result of the 20 years of the Afghan Republic. Because during the Republic, most of the former warlords, became part of this state. So over the past, over the two decades of the rule of the Republic, so the private militias kind of waned and they became weakened and they kind of were part of the government. And in fact, in latter years, most of those militias were brought in um you know, in terms of the the the the the actual armed forces of this state. And so with the collapse of the republic, the only other force that came into power, it was actually the Taliban fighters. So they swept across the country with almost no to very minimal resistance in, you know in different parts of the country. So once the republic went away, there was really no other power to challenge that. Now, nominally, we have quite a number of these smaller resistance groups, if you will, the National Resistance Front, the National Freedom Front and so on. But really, they are nominal, they have little to no presence in the country, and they’re not really able to stage any any meaningful resistance against the Taliban.

And you have to give this to them as well, because a lot of people, including myself, really four years ago, thought that perhaps the chance of the Taliban surviving as a unified group after they reached power for four years, that was something that was very difficult for me to fathom. But they have been able to really do that. And despite some of the differences of a opinion that exist among the leadership, and there’s quite a lot of that; nevertheless, they’ve been able to maintain that unity and unity of control. The problem is, the issue is, if you take sort of a larger look towards the future of the country, not only some of the issues they have with women, with freedoms, and with, human rights and all of that, those are very problematic, but this unitary one-sided forceful control, if it is not used effectively to build a durable state this cannot survive forever. Sooner or later, fragments will happen within the taliban, sooner or later resistance group will pop up because this cannot really turn into the permanent state of the country so my advice to them was “please seize the opportunity”.

After 50 years, the opportunity has come to really start building an Afghan state, an Afghan government, something that is in line with our tradition, with our religious belief, with our geography, with our politics, with our political culture, and most of all with our financial and economic means, something that we could build and something that could sustain. And you have the chance to do that. But if you wait too long, or if you really try to pursue and force this thing for too long, then you’re going to miss the chance. We will see what will happen in the near term, but right now i don’t see any indication of them really moving towards any reform.

Dominic Bowen 13:04

Very interesting. And there’s some geopolitical questions and domestic political questions I want to ask you, but I think some of our listeners will be quite annoyed if I don’t ask you the obvious question. You were part of the former government, but you were able to go back. How did you manage your own safety and security and risk when you were moving through Afghanistan? I assume the Taliban knew who you were and in your previous role in the government. There must have been significant risks to you personally.

Arian Sharifi 13:28

Well, they’re actually quite open to Afghans returning. In fact, not only are they open, they’re really asking for people. They have an entire commission, a long, large commission, whose task is really to reach out to Afghan politicians, to technocrats, to those who left the country, and they’re asking them to return. But to return, under one condition, that you do not engage in any political or security activity that would oppose the Taliban. So if you go there as a researcher, they’re open. I went there as an independent researcher. I was doing, i still do consulting work for a number of organizations. And so in that regard, they do ensure your safety, your security. They’re very open. I did not feel threatened at all. In fact, over the past four years, I’ve had two research trips, one about a year and a half ago and then one about a month ago. The first one, i was a little bit, you know, worried what’s going to happen, what’s not, especially in light of what I used to do in the government. and But then this last trip, I didn’t feel any any concerns at all. In fact, the trip I took to Herat was not even research related because I went to see my cousins, I went to see the extended family there. It was a complete personal trip and there was absolutely no problem. So as long as you do not do anything that would threaten them, then they are open. It’s not just me. In fact, Dominic, a large number of Afghans do keep going to Kabul, to other provinces. They come back. Some of them are engaged in private businesses. Others are running NGOs. Some are just going to you know see family. Others are going to to look after their properties, etc. And the Taliban are quite open to that. I don’t see any you know any threat to people who who just want to go and mind their own business and not really get directly into politics against the Taliban.

Dominic Bowen 15:11

It’s very interesting. And when you do research, and of course preparing for this interview, the team were doing extensive research on the current Taliban administration. And whenever you look at the Western media, and when you ask and researching about what the Taliban’s current focus is on, it talks about maintaining a harsh Islamic fundamentalist government, enforcing severe restrictions on women and girls, including bans on education and employment. It talks about the Taliban struggling to manage economics crisis, about managing internal factionalism and fighting against rival military groups. It paints a very, very dark, dire picture about what the Taliban is trying to do. You’ve been there, you’re speaking to people, you’re from Afghanistan and and you know the the politics very well there. What do you understand the Taliban’s agenda to be? Do they want to move? Do they want to have a constitution? What do you see as the Taliban’s roadmap for 2025 and beyond?

Arian Sharifi 16:04

I mean, exactly as you said, once you’re in the country, you could see all of that. Yes, of course, girls are not going to school, women are not going to work. Public life for women in general, and also even for men, very, very limited. Music is kind of banned everywhere. Ordinary people don’t have to grow beard and wear turbans, but many people do. Those who do work in the government, they do have to have beards and wear turbans. All these restrictions are there. In my assessment, um both in talking to some of these Taliban leaders and also, spending some time and not only spending some time there, but even much of the work and much of the research I do, even when I’m in the United States, is really focused on that region, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, some work on Iran. But of course, Afghanistan is home and it’s a special place for me. And so much of my research is focused on that. So my assessment is that the majority of the Taliban leaders, at least those that are in Kabul, the majority of them have come to understand that what they’ve been doing over the past four years cannot and should not continue. 

A lot of them have come to realize that if they want the current state and the current regime to continue, that there has to be at least some limited reform, at least in three things: a Constitution; second, ensuring the basic rights of the citizens. Now, I’m not saying that they want the liberal democracy type of a state that we try to build during the republic. That, they’re not talking about, but at least the basic rights, you know, women’s right to education, women’s right to work, people’s personal freedoms to a good extent, as much as that is, you know, in line with Afghan traditions and Afghan religious beliefs. And mind you, this also, Dominic, that Afghanistan is overall a very traditional country. So even if the Taliban are not there, I would say the majority of our people are still very traditional, very, very religious. In line with those beliefs and those traditions, personal freedoms, this is the second thing. 

And the third, reform that most of these Taliban leaders that I see want is to share power, especially with the technocratic Afghans. Now, almost every single one that I’ve spoken to is opposed to sharing power with former warlords. Those who had their own private armies and, you know, they built empires and they, you know, became millionaires, some even billionaires. They do not, under any circumstances, want to share power with them. And I think that’s also, a positive thing to, as an Afghan, as citizen, to mention that. But to share power with a host of technocratic Afghans in different, you know government institutions, that is something that the majority of the Taliban have come to understand. That is a necessity if they wish for this regime to continue. The problem is the difference between those Taliban leaders that are in Kabul and those that are in Kandahar. And Qandahar, of course, their supreme leader, Mullah Hibatullah, and a small circle of clerics around him, they are very much opposed to any of this reform, they are still of the belief that it is possible for them that they would continue with their hardcore ideological stance on government. So this is the problem. In my talks when I was in Kabul this last month, every person that I spoke to, the Taliban, the international community, you know, some of the embassies that are there, the United Nations officials that are there, some journalists that are there, everybody seems to think that sooner or later, at least these three sets of reforms that I just mentioned is going to come. But the problem is, and the actual impediment is that Kandahar is at full power and Kandahar is really not open to any of this. Now, the question is, how and when will Kandahar be open to this? That is basically the million-dollar question.

Dominic Bowen 19:50

Yeah That’s particularly particularly interesting. And if we look at one of the threats that we’ve touched on a little bit, it’s around ISIS and their external operations. And I think their capability has been proven. And we also know that al-Qaeda remains quiet, but still resident within Afghanistan. The Taliban insists that it controls the threat from other militias and other terrorist groups within Afghanistan. But it’s reasonable to wonder how capable the Taliban is of actually containing these threats. And we know there’s been attacks in in Russia and attacks in Iran and attacks in Pakistan from groups originating in Afghanistan. What does that tell you about the the threats emanating from Afghanistan on neighbouring countries?

Arian Sharifi 20:28

I mean, I would think that the immediate threat is not high. Because if you look at the the the interplay of the groups that existed in Afghanistan, and still some do exist, so basically three categories of them, three categories of terrorist groups, if you will.

One is the “globally oriented terrorist groups”. And really there are two or three of them that have been in Afghanistan over the past few decades, actually. Al-Qaeda, the core, was there, has been there for a long time. Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent, which is a subgroup of Al-Qaeda that also had a presence in Afghanistan and it is said that still has some presence there. And then, of course, ISLK going back to the late 2014, early 2015. Since then, this is the first category, globally oriented terrorist groups with a global agenda.

Then the second one is what we used to call the “regionally oriented terrorist groups”, groups that don’t have a global agenda, but they’re also not focused on Afghanistan. Their agenda is in the region. And, three/four of them have been prominent in the past, and it is said that some of them do still exist. We have what they call the East Turkestan Islamic Movement or ETIM. These are the minority Chinese ouighours that are really mainly based in the Xinjiang province of China that is bordering Afghanistan. So ETIM has been there.

IMU or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These are some Uzbek desidens, Uzbek islamist group that has had a presence. The third is jama’at-e-Ansar-allah that is of tajikistan these are the tajiks. There used to be a fourth one jundullah which was basically the sunni part of Iran and they had an agenda in Iran. So this was basically the second category.

And then finally the third category was the Pakistani groups, and there has been a host of them, everything from the TTP, Tahrik Taliban in Pakistan, to Lashkar al-Tayyaba and al-Jangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammad and Sepahya Sabah, you name it. I have profiles for all of them. So these groups have existed and operated in Afghanistan on for decades. What has happened since the Taliban took over? 

ISLK, or ISIS-Khorasan province, as it’s called, has really been weakened. I mean, the Taliban have been able to drastically weaken the capabilities of ISLK in Afghanistan to the point where ISLK today does not control any territory. Now, during the Republic, no matter how much pressure we put on them, we still could not clear certain parts, at least in the east from ISIL-K, in the province of Qonar and Ngarhar and Nuristan, in the eastern part of Afghanistan. And there’s some cells in northern part of the country. We could not clear. The Taliban have been able to do that. They’ve completely taken over territory. So ISIL-K has basically moved from a territory-holding, semi-insurgent, semi-terrorist group into a full-fledged cell-based underground terrorist organization in Afghanistan. Their leader, Sana’u Allah Ghafari, is also known as Shahab al-Muhajir. He is believed to be in Pakistan, in the Balochistan area of Pakistan, not inside Afghanistan. But inside Afghanistan, ISILK still is believed to have some cells, underground small cells.

The second one that is still formidable is, of course, the Tahrik Taliban in Pakistan or TTP, which is really creating a huge, huge security threat to Pakistan. There may be, you know, hardly a day where one or two or several attacks do not happen in Pakistan against Pakistani security forces by the TTP. And TTP, of course, is believed to have safe heavens and presence in Afghanistan.The rest of the groups that I mentioned, many other the Pakistani groups and all of these other Central Asian groups, the Taliban basically claim that they are, well, first of all, their presence is very minimal, very, very minimal. And second, that they are completely under control. I challenge that because I do research on these things. So, if you that they are under control, show me. Tell me a single attack anywhere in Afghanistan or in the region over the past four years that has actually originated from ETIM or IMU or Ansar-allah or any of these other groups that you’re mentioning.

The TTP is something else, of course. ISLK, we’ve been hitting. But no single incident has really happened. And it seems to be corroborated to some extent. I mean, of course, I always have off-the-record conversations with some American, European officials as well. The United States, of course, since withdrawal from Afghanistan, they’ve been monitoring the situation through what they called “counter-terrorism over the horizon”. And so they constantly monitor the territory, mostly through the drones. And they also seem to be of the belief that none of these other groups pose any immediate threat to United States interests in the region or abroad. And they only A group that may be somewhat threatening is ISLK. This is the interplay, but this is sort of the immediate and current scenario. The mere presence of these groups and how they could potentially morph into the future and pose another threat, that’s a complete different story.

Dominic Bowen 25:34

Yeah that’s really interesting. And if we if we look across borders, ah the Kabul-Islamabad ties oscillate between mediation and sometimes mutual accusations. We have ISIS and we have TTP violence are these are definitely pressure points. If we look specifically at Balochistan in Pakistan, that’s a real hotbed of insurgency, including Afghan-based insurgency groups. Can you help us understand, what’s the interest in Balochistan in Pakistan? And how significant is this cross-border risk from Afghan groups, inside Pakistan?

Arian Sharifi 26:14

The Pakistani government really seem to be struggling with 2 of the four provinces. One is Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which is the former northwest frontier province that is bordering eastern part of Afghanistan,and the other one is, of course, Balochistan that is bordering Afghanistan and Iran. So in both of these two provinces, the Pakistani government is really struggling with maintaining control. And that has deep historical roots. Because Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used to be part of Afghanistan. It was then given to the British India, and then after 1947, the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the new formation of a new country like Pakistan, it became part of that, and that is what the Afghans have always had struggled with Pakistan in terms of the recognition of that border. Afghanistan has never recognized that. Because the majority of the people who live in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are Pashtuns, they’re Patans, they’re Afghans. They have really not been happy with the Pakistani government that is really, you know, by and large controlled by the Punjabis. The same thing is with Balochistan. The Baloch have had trouble accepting permanent control by the Punjabi government and Islamabad. And so that struggle is, it goes back decades and decades and decades. These days, it seems that both the Baloch Liberation Army, which is the larger, called the BLA Balochistan, has been able to stage a lot of attacks. It has been creating major problems for the Pakistani government, especially their security forces in Balochistan. And on the other hand, ah in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, you have the TTP, which is basically militant. And then you have the larger Pashtun parties and Pashtun movements that are pushing for a degree of self-governance.

Now, how much of that is related to Afghanistan? It seems at least the statistics show that since the takeover of the Taliban in Afghanistan, both attacks against the Pakistani government in Balochistan and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have really increased. Why? Because the BLA and the TTP are believed to have safe heavens and sort of a backyard in Afghanistan from which they can stage and conduct attacks there.

Dominic Bowen 28:26

Yeah, it’s particularly interesting. And I guess for our listeners who are business leaders and policy advisors across North America and and across Europe, ah there’s not too many business opportunities. And as I alluded to in the introduction, even if there was, they’re likely to come under sanctions. But Balochistan is probably the area where most businesses may, whether it’s um ah trading, importing, exporting from Karachi, very close to Balochistan, or of course, there’s significant mining interest, interesting including one of the largest um gold and copper mines, with about $78 billion that’s about to be opened, and that’s got American, European, British backing both government funding from financial institutions, and this mixture of, as you said, from the the Punjabi Central Administration. Is this something that’s likely to be the interest to… whether we say Afghan forces or Afghan militias or Baluchi, or do they see international actors as something that’s not relevant? Is it really more focused on the Punjabi versus the Baluchi, or is this something that could have an international dimension that our listeners should be considering?

Arian Sharifi 29:23

I mean, the international dimension of that could be assessed both in terms of the business interests and in terms of the further strategic security interests as well. Now, in terms of the business interests, as you very correctly mentioned, of course, Balochistan, but not only Balochistan, Afghanistan itself is super rich with mineral resources. Now, the issues of sanctions, of course, is a problem. But many countries are already working in the mining. So the Chinese, of course, are pretty big. Over the past four years, China signed over 300 mining contracts with the Taliban government. So the Chinese conduct their business, there in the mining sector. Other countries in the region, including Iran and the Central Asian states, and some Pakistanis also do their business in terms of mining. And even Western countries, the Turks, the turks have, Turkey has quite a lot of business interests in Afghanistan, both in terms of import and export, but also in terms of mining. Exports, I heard from Turkey to Afghanistan is over $3 billion dollars per year. So that’s pretty tangible for Turkey. Even Western countries are becoming ah kind of interested in the mineral resources there because it’s rich, it’s untapped, and it’s really ripe and ready for exploitation. So the business dimension, of course, has a major international angle to it to be mindful of. But also when we come to Pakistan, to sort of if we take a regional look into it, when we come to Pakistan, it’s a country that has over 200 million population It’s a country that is highly armed. It’s a country that has, it’s a nuclear power. It’s a nuclear country. And inside Pakistan, fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism is really, really deep rooted. I mean, historically so, going back to the British India time, but also since 1970s with General Zia’s so-called “Islamization program”. So Islamic fundamentalism is highly highly deep-rooted inside Pakistan. On the other hand, you have the nuclear weapon. So the West, the international community in general, but the West has always been worried about what would happen in terms of a scenario where the Islamabad-based government could lose control and that, something similar to Afghanistan or something chaotic would happen. What would happen to a nuclear weapon? What would happen to one point, almost 1.5 million standing army of Pakistan? With all those weapons. So it it it does have a strategic ah angle to it as well when we come to international players.

But the problem is that the West, particularly of course at the head of the West, if you will, the United States has shifted its interest completely from the region to by and large. I remember when I was when i entered my PhD program in 2012 at the Fletcher School, everybody was talking about counterinsurgency, counterterrorism. That was the buzzword. And hence, I did my PhD in the same field. Lots and lots of courses offered, lot of conferences offered. Everyone is talking about it. Today, my three years at Princeton, completely the opposite. Nobody really wants to take a course in counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. Those small wars, proxy wars, or even that region, South Asia, Central Asia region. So the buzzword now regionally, of course, is China and the Pacific. and then to a second degree, Russia. And then functionally, it’s all about great power competition. So the United States is gearing up for a long competition with China and to a certain extent with Russia. And what we are going to see, I mean, what we saw the last couple of days The leaders of China and India and and Iran and Russia and North Korea kind of ganging up in Beijing and… what would come out of that would also be interesting to see in terms of the global power politics. In light of all of this, despite the fact that there is business interest in all region of the world and there is some strategic interest, the focus of the West has shifted elsewhere. and So it’s difficult really to bring in some emphasis in terms of the larger political players. Nevertheless, I don’t think the United States or Western countries, European powers and American, Northern American powers, I don’t think they have completely forgotten about that. They are watching it. But the importance they attach to that region and what is really going on in that region is, I would say, at best secondary to all these other big issues that they are they’re they’re dealing with.

Dominic Bowen 33:43

And if we keep looking internationally and some of the risks originating in Afghanistan, we know that opium cultivation really crashed in 2022. And that was because of the Taliban’s ban on the production of opium. And I think most people would go, “that’s a good thing”. A part of that wasn’t just the Taliban’s ban on opium, but it was also Europeans’ demand for it. Obviously, it’s a supply and demand issue as well. And as European drug users and European partygoers have started moving towards synthetic drugs, there’s actually much less demand for the opium originally coming out of Afghanistan. And I wonder, Arian, how sustainable is this ban, both politically but economically? And what does the ban on opium production mean economically for the farmers and for low-income families that have relied on this illegal but financially important trade that occurred across the country?

Arian Sharifi 34:34

Well, first, let me ah mention that based on some of the statistics I have seen from various organizations that work in the issue of drugs, especially UNODC, over the past four years, despite the fact that opium cultivation and production has dropped, as you said, by 90% or more, 95%, exports of opium and heroin have actually sustained more or less the same level. And you might ask yourself, why is that and how could that be? It is that the excess production from all those years before, you know, production and supply was much more than demand outside. So there’s a major, major, reservoirs of opium and heroin inside of Afghanistan that is now being exported at much higher prices. And prices have gone up at least six times, both of opium and heroin. So the supply has actually continued more or less the same over the past few years, over the past four years, while production has dipped. But that supply also cannot continue if production continues at these lower rates. So, you know, that is basically a question of timing. Now, back to your question in terms of how sustainable this issue is, I doubt that it could be sustainable unless there is alternative livelihood programs for the farmers. Because as you know, I mean, it’s not about a small number of farmers here and there. It was the majority of the farmers, the Afghan farmers, in the south, many of them in the east, and many also of them in the north. That was something that they were used to doing for years and years and years. And all of a sudden, this ban has really devastated a lot of farmers. And in the absence of assistance, in the absence of alternative means that could support the farmers, this is basically, I would say, a time bomb. In fact, we are already seeing quite a lot of resistance from the farmers. Of course, Helmand was the province that would used to produce over 80% of the entire poppy crop, and now very, very little, if any, is being produced in Helmand. So there’s a lot of resistance we could see from the farmers in Helmand, but the Taliban thus far have been able to forcefully keep that in check. How long they could they can use this forceful check is just a matter of time. At the same time, in the north, we see clashes over the past two years, consistent clashes against the Taliban we see in Tahrar and especially in Badakhshan province because people don’t really have any other means and especially in the north, since you know the territory is kind of mountainous, Badakhshan is very mountainous, it doesn’t have a lot of large flat land to be used for other crops. So high yield crops like opium was really the main thing that the farmers were used to.

Again, to wrap up my talk, I think in the short term, this forceful ban and enforcement of that by the sheer use of force may be something that people can live with. But in the long run, if this is going to continue, of course, there has to be assistance. There has to be openness. There has to be more opportunity, business opportunities, farming opportunities for the country and for the farmers. And that cannot happen so long as the country remains in absolute diplomatic isolation and under heavy sanctions.

Dominic Bowen 37:54

Arian, I’d love to hear from you. As a member who, a member of the former administration in the Afghan government, and I understand you speak regularly to the former president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, who was the leader of Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover. There’s been many comparisons drawn over the years about the West spent 20 years trying to build up governance, trying to build up an effective defence force in Afghanistan. And then it seemingly collapsed quite quickly without many shots even being fired. And comparisons with Ukraine that I guess was able to stand firm, even when Russia invaded and it almost encircled Kiev, Zelensky famously stayed and all his politicians stayed in in the country. Can you help us understand what did it what did it look like when the Taliban was was quickly advancing across Afghanistan in 2021? How did it make you feel personally as an Afghan and as someone who was close to the government and had family in Afghanistan? And why did it happen? Why did it happen like it happened? Why wasn’t there more pushback? Help our listeners understand the situation and what it looked like to you and maybe to others.

Arian Sharifi 38:59

Well, to be clear, since the fall, I have not spoken to President Ashraf Ghani. The last time I spoke to him was exactly two weeks before the fall of Kabul. To be precise, that was July 2021. And exactly 15 days, 14 days later, Kabul fell. When I spoke to President Ghani, I was in Atlanta, Georgia, with my family, and his office reached out they said, “the president wants to talk to you”. And so a Zoom call was set up later, and I had a very long conversation with President Ghani one-on-one over a Zoom call. Until that day, out of the 34 provinces, only three provincial capitals had fallen to the Taliban. 31 provincial capital was still being held by then Afghan government. Of course, most of the districts and the countryside had already gone, but the government was still holding 31 out of 34 provincial capitals. President Ghani asked my opinion on what needs to be done. He went, I mean, of course, he speaks very, point by point. He basically told me the situation is that our morale is very, very low. The security of forces are not taking ownership of war, our communications is problematic, our intelligence is problematic, logistics is problematic. All of these issues exist there. And he also mentioned that by now we’ve realized, his words, “we have realized that we cannot win this war by sheer military force, that we have to make peace with the Taliban”. But the Taliban right now are not ready for that because they think they can win militarily. So in order for us to bring them to the negotiating table, we need to prove to them that we can sustain the government no matter how much territory they win, but at least the core of the government can sustain, will sustain, and they cannot win that militarily. Now, what do you suggest, he asked me? What I thought at that very critical time, could have been a solution. I basically made a population-centric defense kind of strategy where at least 10 provincial capitals, 10 provinces… because in terms of population, Kabul at the time and even today roughly holds about 20% of the Afghan population, 20% only in Kabul. And if you add to that eight to nine other provinces, you easily cover about 70% of the population. So my argument, my suggestion to President Ghani was to withdraw all forces from all across the country, focus them around nine to 10 provinces, and three highways that connect these provinces together and connect them to the outside of the country. If you can do that, you can probably sustain it for another two to three months. This is July, end of July/beginning of August. We reached winter, and of course, winter gives you a window of two to three months where large-scale offensives are not possible. Then you get yourself six months there, During the six months, work on a plan to sustain it for another six months. And if you can sustain for a whole year without the presence of a single American or NATO troops in the country, the Taliban will actually recalculate. And probably they can come back to the negotiating table and a negotiated settlement would be possible so that at least this government, the institutions we built, with so much support, and so much, you kno, assistance, and so much work for 20 years would not actually collapse. But again, I mean, as we know, things did not work that way. He asked me, by the way, during that conversation to come and join the war again as deputy defense minister. To which I said, sure. And it took me 13 days to renew, my American passport was getting expired, so I had to renew my passport to go back. It took me about two weeks, and on the day of the fall, I was on a plane and landed in Istanbul. Of course, that didn’t happen, and not sure even if I were there, could have done, you know, anything, because things had really gone bad. So, my assessment is that why it fell, it was basically a political defeat, Dominic. Not a military defeat on the side of the Afghan government. It was a political defeat because the security forces did not want to fight. Did not want to fight because they were not sure if the political leadership had the commitment to stay. The political leadership had the commitment to sustain and make a government. Issues of corruption for years, really, really bad, high level corruption, had really diminished any sense of ownership the security forces had. The fact that the United States and NATO packed up and lived, that had a big impact on the morale and the thinking of the security forces. The forces simply decided not to fight because they were not sure, in my assessment again, they were not sure that the political leadership had the actual commitment to sustain. 

I don’t think it is fair to blame the Afghan security forces at all because the Afghan security forces did fight.  It was at the end that… People just were not sure if the political leadership had the will to continue.

Dominic Bowen 43:47

Yeah, and I think a lot of what you said is consistent with what we discussed on the podcast, actually, back in 2022. And I guess the analysis of many of us that this command paralysis in Kabul, different rumours, different orders, conflicting information coming out of Kabul, ah checkpoints flipping quite quickly, and a lot of it being really telephone diplomacy and surrenders by phone as opposed to, you know, these battles at the gates of of big cities, which, I think, as you said, left a lot of officers and soldiers feeling abandoned by central authorities and confused. And yeah as you said, choosing to live, albeit under a Taliban, as opposed to fighting and not living another day. So certainly very complex and very difficult for us to understand sitting remotely. But I appreciate you unpacking that for us. And perhaps if I can ask you just one final question, Arian, if there was one thing that you could have changed or that you could have influenced at the time, if maybe you had your passport a little bit faster or if you had more influence in the government in the months leading up to it, is, is there one thing that you would have liked to have seen the government do that you think could have made a change, a positive change?

Arian Sharifi 44:49

I mean, one thing might be difficult to really single out. But if I were to single out that one thing, would have been a realization and a commitment to the survival of the state through a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, when it became clear that the United States was going to withdraw. Now, this is something that is difficult for me as an African-American, as a person who lived in this country for almost three decades. I am an African and I’m American. I know this society rather well and I know that society rather well. It is difficult for me to fathom that the Afghan leadership at the time continued to refuse the truth that one day America will leave. America was not there forever. NATO was not going to stay forever. Many of the Afghan leadership, they thought, well, the United States, since during World War II, has maintained presence in Japan. They have maintained presence in South Korea. They have maintained presence in Europe. So they might actually, they will continue presence here because, this is a really strategic ground. I think an overemphasis on the strategic importance of Afghanistan to the West and particularly to the United States was in the analysis of many of the leadership. And that led them towards really denying the very fact that the United States was not there for long-term security and strategic interests, that it you know it was a different scenario, and then one day they’re going to pack. So if President Ghani realized this about, I would say, two years before the fall, and made a commitment, for a power transition through a negotiated settlement, I would think that at least the state ah that was built over two decades to which to defend which thousands, tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers died, thousands of American soldiers, European, British soldiers died and and lost their limbs, billions of dollars was spent, that state would have at least survived in such that there would have been a settlement, there would have been some Taliban, there would have been some non-Taliban, at least something that could have worked and we would not have had what we have today, complete isolation, complete demolishing of literally all government institutions, harsh theoratic theocratic rule by the Taliban and an absolute isolation of the country. This could have been avoided. So if I could single out one issue, I would basically you know, advise President Ghani two years before the fall to really come to that conclusion and take steps toward the realization of that.

Dominic Bowen 47:18

Very interesting, Arian. Thank you very much for explaining that to us. And thank you very much for coming on the International West podcast today.

Arian Sharifi 47:24

You’re very welcome, and thank you for the invitation.

Dominic Bowen 47:26

Well that was a really insightful conversation with Dr. Arian Sharifi. I really appreciated hearing his thoughts on the place that the Taliban now occupy, both on the international scene but within Afghanistan, as well as the risks that are emerging and occurring from the activities in Afghanistan and also the positions adopted by the international community. Please remember to subscribe to our emailing list to get our bi-weekly newsletter in your inbox every second week. Today’s episode was produced and coordinated by Melanie Meimoun. I’m Dominic Bowen, your host. Thanks very much for listening. Thanks very much for listening. We’ll speak again in the next few days.

Elisa Garbil  48:02

Thank you for listening to this episode of The International Risk Podcast. For more episodes and articles, visit the InternationalRiskPodcast.com. Follow us on LinkedIn, BlueSky and Instagram for the latest updates and to ask your questions to our host, Dominic Bowen. See you next time !