Episode 308: The Arctic and the High North: Evolving Security Dynamics and Strategic Narratives with Dr Paal Hilde

This episode with Dr Paal Hilde explores how climate change, alliance dynamics, and geopolitical competition are reshaping the Arctic and the High North, and why this region is becoming increasingly significant in global risk calculations. We examine how melting sea ice is altering maritime access and infrastructure stress, while also challenging long-held assumptions about security, commercial opportunity, and militarisation in the Arctic. The discussion looks at NATO’s evolving posture in the European Arctic, the implications of Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, and the realities behind often exaggerated narratives of great power competition. We also unpack the environmental, societal, and operational risks associated with low infrastructure density, fragile ecosystems, and hybrid activity, as well as what the Arctic reveals about escalation management and restraint in contemporary geopolitics.

Dr Hilde is a defence scholar at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, with expertise in Arctic security, Russian and Northern European defence policy, and alliance strategy. His work focuses on how climate transformation, military posture, and geopolitical signalling intersect in the High North, and how risk in the Arctic is shaped as much by misperception and hype as by material capability. He regularly engages with policymakers, defence communities, and researchers on Arctic governance, NATO strategy, and the security implications of environmental change.

The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime, to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.

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Dominic Bowen is the host of The International Risk Podcast and Europe’s leading expert on international risk and crisis management. As Head of Strategic Advisory and Partner at one of Europe’s leading risk management consulting firms, Dominic advises CEOs, boards, and senior executives across the continent on how to prepare for uncertainty and act with intent. He has spent decades working in war zones, advising multinational companies, and supporting Europe’s business leaders. Dominic is the go-to business advisor for leaders navigating risk, crisis, and strategy; trusted for his clarity, calmness under pressure, and ability to turn volatility into competitive advantage. Dominic equips today’s business leaders with the insight and confidence to lead through disruption and deliver sustained strategic advantage.

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[00:00:01] Paal: You have the south of the Bering Strait, which is also primarily ice free. And this is where you’ve seen Chinese and Russian vessels cooperating together. What you’ve seen on the European side is Russia obviously rebuilding its military from 2007, 2008, and increasing its activity, which led to this perception of a Russian militarization of the Arctic.

[00:00:32] This episode of The International Risk Podcast is brought to you by Conducttr. They’re an ISO 27001‑certified crisis simulation platform that lets you rehearse real crises in a safe virtual environment. It has realistic emails, social media, internal chats, company systems, and many other features. And Conducttr really helps crisis teams practise how they actually work under pressure, not how they wish they worked. Go to conducttr.com to learn more about their software.

[00:01:04] Dominic: Hi, I’m Dominic Bowen, and welcome back to The International Risk Podcast, where we unpack the risks that are shaping our world.

[00:01:10] Dominic: Today we turn our attention to the Arctic and the High North, a region that’s become increasingly important in discussions about climate transformation, alliance strategy, geopolitical competition and, of course, international risk.

[00:01:22] Dominic: Sea ice is retreating at record rates and new maritime windows are emerging, and at the same time NATO’s footprint in the North has changed significantly in response to new threats. There are growing concerns about militarization, about commercialization and, of course, about resource races. So what is actually happening in the Arctic and the High North today?

[00:01:42] Dominic: Well, our guest today is Dr Paal Hilde. He’s a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. He’s got a master’s degree in Russia and Eastern European studies and a PhD in politics from the University of Oxford. And prior to joining the university, he worked at the Department of Security Policy at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Dr Paal Hilde, welcome to The International Risk Podcast.

[00:02:02] Paal: Good morning. Thank you for having me.

[00:02:04] Dominic: I’m really looking forward to this conversation. So whereabouts are you today?

[00:02:06] Paal: I’m in Oslo.

[00:02:08] Paal: A captain of the Arctic, some may claim.

[00:02:11] Dominic: Very much. Well, it’s a nice part of the world to be. I wonder, Paal, if we can set the scene. How should we be viewing this region?

[00:02:18] Dominic: When we talk about the Arctic, when we look at the High North, what are the strategic issues? What are the distinctions that matter for security policy, for alliance planning, for business leaders? What do we need to know? What’s happening today?

[00:02:29] Paal: Well, first of all, as you said, the Arctic is changing, and one of the key drivers for that, or perhaps even the key driver, is climate change, and the melting sea ice is opening a new world ocean,

[00:02:39] Paal: which obviously has both opportunities but also challenges. At the same time, there is a lot of hype when it comes to what is actually going on in the Arctic, and I think we could dive into some of the myths, as I would call them, or what actually goes on there, in our conversation.

[00:02:54] Dominic: Yeah, that’s interesting. You talk about the hype, and I know that the Arctic is frequently described as this emerging area of great‑power competition. And if you just look at a map, it makes sense. It’s a narrative that I think bites quite quickly. But how observable are these trends, and are there popular narratives that are perhaps being exaggerated or misrepresented today?

[00:03:14] Paal: As I said, there is a lot of hype and exaggerated claims about the involvement of the great powers and how they’re trying to compete for the resources up there. But to start even more basically, there are several definitions of the Arctic, and one of the most commonly used is the geographic one, which is basically the polar circle,

[00:03:30] Paal: so the area above 66 degrees north. But then there are climatic ones and then political ones. And that term “High North” as well is often used interchangeably with the Arctic, but in some settings it has a particular meaning, and I think we’ll probably get to NATO later on. The High North in NATO does have a specific meaning, which is the European Arctic.

[00:03:55] Paal: And that is interesting because the Arctic is often—well, it’s good to see the Arctic as one region and useful to see it as one region—but very often it is not, because the differences between the regions of the Arctic are very, very big. The European Arctic is really the one that stands out,

[00:04:10] Paal: in the sense that there is a lot of human activity. There are a lot of people living in the European Arctic, whereas in the North American and Asian Arctic there are very, very few people. And the main reason for this is the different climate, as the European Arctic is relatively warm,

[00:04:25] Paal: due to the warm water that comes up from the Mexican Gulf through the North Atlantic and warms the waters in northern Europe, which means that it is actually habitable, as opposed to northern Canada and Siberia, for instance.

[00:04:37] Dominic: Well, you talked about the warmer waters, and I think climate‑driven shifts are really altering this physical environment faster than many people and many scientists have actually predicted.

[00:04:46] Dominic: Can you talk to us about how these climate‑driven changes are actually reshaping operational planning, maritime access and perhaps even infrastructure pressures in the Arctic?

[00:04:55] Paal: First of all, the new international attention to the Arctic that sort of emerged after the turn of the millennium had two key reasons.

[00:05:02] Paal: One, it was climate change and the opening of the Arctic, which made not only the resources there that you wouldn’t expect to find there relevant, but also the potential for using the emerging ocean, to call it that, as a new route for international shipping. But the second driver was, at least initially, this expectation that there is a lot of undiscovered or yet undiscovered oil and gas in the north, which has somewhat faded,

[00:05:26] Paal: primarily because of shale oil and shale gas that came in 2007, 2008, that took a lot of the commercial interest in Arctic oil and gas away. But the interest in shipping is still there. Now, that said, also when it comes to shipping, there have been a lot of exaggerated expectations, because so far the commercial interest in sailing through the Arctic has not been that big.

[00:05:48] Paal: For some time there was an increase, but now the traffic that actually goes there is primarily internal in Russia on the Asian side, and some ships between Russia and China on that side,

[00:06:00] Paal: and then on the other side, in the Canadian or North American Arctic, it is primarily internal traffic between ports in Canada and north of Alaska.

[00:06:06] Paal: Now, why is this so? Well, even with climate change, the Arctic is not going to be the Mediterranean. It is still going to be dark in winter, the weather is still going to be rough, and less sea‑ice coverage doesn’t mean that there’s no ice. You’ll still have floating ice,

[00:06:21] Paal: and this represents a risk for any vessels travelling there. So climate change, yes, is opening the Arctic, but it’s not like a normal world ocean yet. And one more point is that the melting Arctic also has an impact on land, in the sense that permafrost, which basically has been the solid foundation in the ground, is now melting as well, which means that you get a lot of coastal erosion, but also that infrastructure that was built on the permafrost is now becoming more unstable due to the ground softening, which is a problem in many regions.

[00:06:54] Dominic: I understand that, whilst it’s not a particularly heavily populated area, there’s still about five million people, many Indigenous communities, that are living in that broader Arctic region. And they obviously rely on the food systems and the ecosystems that make up the Arctic for survival. And even if the current transportation is mainly domestic, you know, within Russia, so to speak,

[00:07:14] Dominic: then even if for now there’s no need to explore oil and gas, if these things do occur, and if there are spills, whether it’s from a ship or whether it’s oil exploration, the consequences would be quite devastating, because a response would be much more difficult, because, as you said, there is still floating ice.

[00:07:31] Paal: Yeah, yeah, clearly. And not only just that there’s floating ice, but there’s very, very little infrastructure up there. So reacting to an oil spill in the Arctic would be very difficult, because local resources are not there. Unlike, for instance, in the North Sea, where you’d have lots of infrastructure and available equipment in Britain, Norway and other countries. So, no, it is definitely a big challenge. And what you do see now, which wasn’t the case before, is that the Russian export of oil from the Baltic Sea to China with the so‑called shadow fleet, during the summer months or the sailing season

[00:08:02] Paal: in the Arctic, a lot of those go through the Arctic, and these are not modern, well‑equipped ships. So the chances of something going wrong are much, much bigger. We, collectively – including Russia – do not have the resources available to actually limit and deal with such a spill, which obviously would then have massive environmental consequences.

[00:08:22] Paal: And also, another point on the changing climate is that a lot of the Indigenous people are reliant on animals, as in hunting and gathering. And the animals that live there are used to having the ice and moving around on the ice. And obviously, when the ice melts and the climate changes, these animals would have to move north or it would change the local habitat, which could be a problem as well for Indigenous people.

[00:08:44] Dominic: Very much. You spoke about commercial shipping. What about military shipping? I understand from speaking with security officials that there is now more presence from many militaries, including Russia and China, that historically we may not have seen transiting through the areas. Is that something you are seeing and tracking and aware of?

[00:08:59] Paal: Yeah, there is. But again, we have to talk about regions in the Arctic. The European Arctic has seen the largest increase, and the natural explanation for that is that the European Arctic is primarily ice free, as most of it is ice free all year,

[00:09:17] Paal: when it comes to the areas north of Norway and north of the Kola Peninsula. And then, on the other side, you have the south of the Bering Strait, which is also primarily ice free, and this is where you’ve seen Chinese and Russian vessels cooperating together. What you’ve seen on the European side is Russia obviously rebuilding its military from 2007, 2008, and increasing its activity, which led to this perception of a Russian militarization of the Arctic.

[00:09:40] Paal: But from 2014 gradually, and particularly in the last sort of half decade, from 2020, you’ve seen also an increased number of allied, as in NATO, vessels sailing up into the Barents Sea – Royal Navy, US Navy – sailing there just to show a presence and signal to Russia that the NATO allies are there to deter and defend if they were to think of something silly.

[00:10:02] Dominic: And I wonder, with Finland joining NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the alliance’s northern posture has altered substantially, I think both in their reach, their readiness and maybe even the resources that are available. How has this changed, and how has the inclusion of Finland and Sweden into the NATO alliance changed the dynamics, changed surveillance capability and, I guess, everyday operational realities across the Arctic?

[00:10:24] Paal: Two points. One, the political point is that with the inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO, now you have seven of the eight Arctic countries being NATO members, which makes discussions about Arctic security easier in the sense that these seven countries can now gather in Brussels or elsewhere and discuss things, even at the classified level, due to their shared NATO membership.

[00:10:43] Paal: Now, that said, Sweden and Finland are Arctic states, but they’re not Arctic coastal states. So they don’t really have any capabilities or big interest in engaging in what is really the core Arctic topic, which is the Arctic Ocean and surveying and keeping track of what goes on there.

[00:11:02] Paal: And this is primarily an area where you see the Arctic coastal states, plus some outside powers including China, being active and having interests. So in that sense, Finland and Sweden coming into NATO doesn’t make much of a difference. It makes a difference for the European North and the land domain, in the sense that previously Norway was a small island in NATO in the North.

[00:11:24] Paal: Now we’re a big island together with Sweden and Finland, which changes things obviously, but it has less to do with the Arctic than with northern Europe.

[00:11:32] Dominic: Yeah, interesting. And do we actually see a difference in the presence? Like, are we seeing more NATO freedom of movement or more ships transiting the area?

[00:11:39] Dominic: Are we seeing increased levels of surveillance? Is there any observable change in NATO’s posture?

[00:11:43] Paal: Yeah, definitely. We’ve seen the Royal Navy, US Navy, but also other vessels – French and others – and also Norwegian vessels being more active in the North.

[00:11:52] Paal: You’ve seen US strategic bombers flying in the Barents Sea and across other parts of Finland and Sweden, their areas in the Arctic. So definitely you’ve seen more activity from the West, and also surveillance and intelligence interest in the European part of the Arctic has increased with what goes on with Russia and its full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

[00:12:08] Paal: Also, on the other side, as in the Pacific side of the Arctic, you’ve seen a lot of attention now to the joint Chinese‑Russian activity there. That draws a lot of attention in the US and really also plays into the perception in the United States of China and Russia trying to take over the Arctic, which is very often exaggerated, but they do do things together.

[00:12:32] Dominic: And is this part of Donald Trump’s rationale for wanting Greenland?

[00:12:35] Paal: Yes. He’s sort of openly said that, criticising Denmark for not taking Greenland’s security seriously enough, and that there are Russian and Chinese vessels sailing around in droves, if you believe him, which is obviously not the case.

[00:12:49] Paal: But, yeah, the perception that Greenland is a key piece in securing the security of North America is not unfounded; it is just exaggerated in the way that Trump presents it.

[00:13:00] Dominic: So I wonder, if we’ve got this expanded NATO interest in the region, balance of power and the resources being allocated, it’s unlikely that Russia or China would just sit back and accept that, which obviously brings the potential risk of miscalculation in the North.

[00:13:12] Dominic: And I wonder, with that significant attempt to avoid escalation in many theatres across the Indo‑Pacific, across certainly making things worse in Ukraine, even the Middle East,

[00:13:24] Dominic: what do we need to consider when it comes to avoiding escalation but, at the same time, making sure NATO and Europe and North America’s interests are being defended across the region?

[00:13:34] Paal: I would actually say that Russia shows every sign of wanting to keep tensions in the Arctic low as well.

[00:13:40] Paal: There are probably two key reasons for that. One is that in the European part, on the Kola Peninsula, it has its strategic submarines – submarines with nuclear, as in strategic nuclear, missiles – and everything suggests that Russia does not want to draw attention to this and increase allied presence around these very important strategic military assets.

[00:14:01] Paal: Second, Russia is interested in keeping economic activity in the North and actually, I guess, at least when the war ends, to draw investments and earn money from what goes on in the Arctic, which would not… there is no incentive for Russia to stir trouble in the Arctic.

[00:14:17] Paal: So in that sense, the Russian posture in the Arctic has been much more careful than it has obviously been in the Black Sea, because of the ongoing war. But even in the Baltic Sea you’ve seen much fewer violations of airspace and other such activities or occurrences in the North than you’ve seen elsewhere.

[00:14:35] Paal: Also from the Western side, you’ve seen – the best example is the Arctic Council, which is this intergovernmental platform for discussing Arctic issues – where the non‑Russian members have shown an openness to try to keep the Arctic Council alive by allowing low‑level participation of Russia in its activities, even now, after the 2022 full‑scale invasion. So again, on both sides you see this interest in actually staying in touch and working on issues where you have a shared interest.

[00:15:06] Paal: So in that sense, the Arctic has a lower tension than some other areas in the relation between East and West.

[00:15:12] Dominic: I wonder, Paal, you mentioned that Russia doesn’t have an interest or value in shaking things up, but as you know, living in Norway, there’s been hybrid attacks in Norway with dams opened, and this has been seen across Sweden, Poland, the UK, France, Germany, with attacks that are generally attributable to the Russian state.

[00:15:28] Paal: Yep.

[00:15:28] Dominic: So I think the cynic might say, well, Russia doesn’t have an interest in stirring things up in many locations where it’s stirring things up. You know, last week one of the Russian spy ships again was off the coast of the UK, and the head of MI6 made some statements around that.

[00:15:42] Dominic: How confident can we be that Russia has no interest in stirring things up in the Arctic, but it still has a history of stirring things up anyway? How confident should we be that that won’t occur in the Arctic Ocean as well?

[00:15:53] Paal: We shouldn’t trust Russia in any way. I’m not saying that. I’m just saying that, as I read the picture, Russia is being more careful in the Arctic than elsewhere.

[00:16:02] Paal: And you haven’t seen the same sort of hybrid activity, to use that term, going on there as well. But it has not been as provocative or as frequent or as big as elsewhere. And again, my reading of that is that Russia is being careful and not wanting to draw too much attention to this region.

[00:16:22] Paal: And also I think one should be careful not to over‑interpret everything that goes on. There is a tendency to interpret everything that happens as Russian hybrid warfare, and it is not necessarily that. I was at a conference in Canada recently, and I said that one should not underestimate the explanatory power of incompetence when it comes to Russian actions. There are many reasons why things can happen, and one of them is that, for instance, Russia now has inexperienced pilots because they’ve lost a number of them in Ukraine, and that could be a factor in the airspace violations, for instance.

[00:17:01] Dominic: Yep. No, it’s certainly worth considering. I’ll take the opportunity just to remind our listeners, Paal, that if they prefer to watch their podcast, The International Risk Podcast is now available on YouTube. So, to our listeners, you can go to YouTube and search for The International Risk Podcast, and please subscribe and like our content there – that’s really important for our success.

[00:17:19] Dominic: Paal, if we look at it from a different angle now, I’d be really interested to know about the commercial interests. How interested, how concerned are member states about the potential safety and sustainability issues when it comes to the Arctic and new sea lanes opening up?

[00:17:33] Dominic: Is that a big concern today?

[00:17:35] Paal: Well, we’ve touched on it already. There was a lot of commercial interest because of the big expectations when it came to both oil and gas and other resources, but also shipping. But nothing suggests that industry has really gone for this.

[00:17:50] Paal: I mentioned shale oil and shale gas, which basically took a lot of the Arctic resources off the scope of, or from the interest of, international companies. My best example is a big gas field in the Barents Sea called Shtokman.

[00:18:04] Paal: If you go back to 2007, 2008, a lot of the international oil and gas companies were vying to get in on that, as Gazprom was going to lead it from the Russian side. And then you had BP, Shell, a lot of companies wanting to be their partners. In the end, Gazprom chose Total of France and what was then called Hydro here in Norway as their partners.

[00:18:26] Paal: But then years went by and nothing happened. And then in 2019 the whole thing was shelved because there was no longer commercial interest. And this is a common picture on the oil and gas side, and also when it comes to shipping. There was a gradual increase for some years, but again, you’ve not seen the big international shipping companies really going for this.

[00:18:47] Paal: After 2014, most European shipping companies withdrew, and that was partly because of the first sanctions against Russia. And then after 2022, even the big Chinese companies, like for instance COSCO, have stopped sailing through the Arctic, most probably because they’re afraid of secondary sanctions, because Russia makes commercial vessels that sail through the Northern Sea Route pay for services, which would be a violation of sanctions.

[00:19:13] Paal: So the point is that, yes, the Arctic Ocean as a shipping route is very interesting, but it’s probably much further into the future than we’ve thought so far. The really interesting route is the one straight through the Arctic Ocean, just straight across. But that will require a long enough sailing season that is ice‑free for it to make commercial sense.

[00:19:34] Paal: And we are not there yet. It’s going to be at least a decade, two or three, before we are there. And again, the sign of that is that with the trouble now in the Red Sea with Yemen, etc., a lot of ships could have to go another route because of the risk there.

[00:19:48] Paal: Where do they go? They don’t go through the Arctic. They go south of Africa, around Africa.

[00:19:52] Paal: Which suggests that it is much easier to go the traditional route rather than through the Arctic.

[00:19:57] Dominic: Yeah, it’s very interesting when companies are having these conversations and assessing the routes.

[00:20:01] Dominic: Because, of course, heading south via the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa adds a significant amount of time to the shipping routes. But when companies are looking and discussing, and governments are discussing the potential of sailing through and moving through the Arctic, do you hear or do you see risks that are not being considered properly, or that are being underestimated?

[00:20:19] Paal: I’m sort of not an expert on shipping, but my sense is that shipping companies are very aware of the risks that are there. And as I touched on, the Arctic is opening up as a new world ocean, but it’s a very challenging ocean in many senses, in terms of navigation and weather,

[00:20:36] Paal: etc., etc. Just to name some factors, a lot of global communication and maritime communication and navigation is done via geostationary communication satellites or GPS, those types of systems, and those have the worst coverage in the polar regions because they are either geostationary or on an inclination to the equator that gives them less coverage in the North and South. Now, that is being addressed by the launch of new satellites in a polar orbit, but still, there are challenges there. And given that the Arctic is sort of unknown and there are new risks, insurance costs are also much higher in the North than

[00:21:16] Paal: on traditional routes where the risks are much better known. Another factor is the lack of infrastructure that I touched on in the Arctic. If you sail a big cargo vessel from, say, south of Japan, down through the traditional route, there are always ports on the way,

[00:21:34] Paal: and there are also always a lot of ships around. Whereas if you go north, there is basically nothing for a very, very long stretch and very few other vessels around. So if you run into trouble, you are in much deeper trouble, to put it like that, up there than you would be on the traditional routes. And all these factors, I presume, are weighed when shipping companies think about using the Arctic as a shipping route.

[00:21:56] Paal: Finally – and I’ll stop there – in 2019 the International Maritime Organization, which basically is a UN organisation that includes all countries in the world, agreed on mandatory guidelines for vessels travelling in polar regions, the Polar Code as it is called, and that sets specific requirements for vessels, for the crew, for the kind of equipment that these vessels should have.

[00:22:20] Paal: Meaning that you have to have specially designed ships to sail in the Arctic, which makes the whole thing more expensive.

[00:22:26] Dominic: Yeah. Thanks for clarifying all those points, Paal. And when you look around the world, when you look globally – I know you travel quite widely and obviously you are educated quite widely as well –

[00:22:34] Dominic: when you look around the world, what are the international risks that concern you the most?

[00:22:38] Paal: Globally? Oh, well, the big one is obvious. From a European perspective now, it’s Ukraine and what goes on there, and what will be the end result. And on the wider scale,

[00:22:49] Paal: it’s China and what the rise of China would imply. To bring it back to the Arctic as the key, the key thing from an Arctic perspective would be the future relation between Russia and China, because China is obviously interested also in the Arctic. China is a global power by now, and it’s involved in Africa and South America and basically everywhere,

[00:23:05] Paal: and also in the Arctic. Now, given that most, if not all, of the non‑Russian Arctic countries have become much more wary and careful in dealing with China and allowing Chinese investments, the really only way that China can establish itself as a stakeholder or a big actor in Arctic affairs is through Russia.

[00:23:24] Paal: And this will be the interesting thing to follow: given the now greater Russian reliance and dependence on China.

[00:23:30] Paal: China could perhaps force Russia to give it some concessions in the Arctic, allowing it to establish ports or sell its infrastructure or allow it to start extracting oil and gas or minerals, whatever, in the Arctic as compensation for the support it gives it in its war against Ukraine. And this might change things in the Arctic, which is something I presume all the Arctic countries are following very closely.

[00:23:54] Dominic: Yeah. Thanks for unpacking that, Paal. And thank you very much for coming on The International Risk Podcast today.

[00:23:58] Paal: Thank you for having me.

[00:24:00] Dominic: That was an interesting conversation with Dr Paal Hilde, whose work I think really provides clarity on the Arctic region. And I really appreciated hearing his thoughts on the shifting dynamics in the High North. Today’s episode was produced and coordinated by Katerina Mazzucchelli, and our video content was coordinated and produced by Stephen Penny.

[00:24:17] Dominic: I’m Dominic Bowen, your host. Thanks very much for listening to The International Risk Podcast, and we’ll speak again in the next couple of days.

[00:24:22] Thanks for joining us on The International Risk Podcast. This episode was sponsored by Conducttr, the crisis exercise platform that turns crisis plans into lived experiences with tailored scenarios, decision logs and realistic social media and news feeds. Conducttr helps organizations learn from their mistakes in a simulation, not during the real crisis.

Have a look at the Conducttr website to learn more about their services and products.