Fractured Ground: Rising Risks in Serbia’s Political Unrest and Ethnic Tensions

Written by Elisa Garbil – 05.11.2025

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Belgrade has been burning with frustration. What began as protests over corruption and governance failures has evolved into a broader reckoning with Serbia’s political direction, its democratic health, and its unresolved nationalist legacy. As thousands take to the streets demanding accountability and reform, the country faces a convergence of pressures: eroding institutional legitimacy, emboldened nationalist rhetoric, and deepening ethnic divides.

The risk is not simply another wave of unrest. It is the danger of a state sliding into a pattern of instability, where protest movements, repression, and ethnic narratives intertwine. Where a single miscalculation could ignite something far more volatile. Listen to Vjosa Musliu‘s episode to understand the Kosovar perspective.

From Anger to Confrontation

In recent months, Serbia has witnessed a series of large-scale demonstrations across Belgrade and other cities. Triggered by outrage over a deadly infrastructure collapse, which is seen as the result of corruption and negligence, the protests have drawn students, civic groups, and professionals into the streets. The movement quickly grew beyond a single issue, tapping into years of public frustration with government opacity, economic stagnation, and the tightening grip of political elites.

Reports describe chaotic scenes in the capital: clashes between protesters and riot police, tear gas hanging over Republic Square, and opposition figures denouncing what they call “the arrogance of unaccountable power”. Even the National Assembly was not spared the turbulence as smoke bombs and fistfights recently erupted inside parliament.

What makes the unrest so consequential is not merely its size, but what it reveals. For many Serbians, the government’s response, unfortunately, a mix of denial, force, and rhetoric, signals an entrenched leadership out of touch with the social mood. When trust in institutions crumbles, protest becomes not just an outlet for anger, but an act of resistance against an entire ruling order. This dynamic is particularly dangerous in a country where state institutions, courts, and media are already viewed with skepticism. The risk is not immediate collapse, but slow corrosion: a political rot that invites radicalism and foreign influence to fill the void.

Extremism in the Shadows: The Nationalist Undercurrent

Nationalism’s reawakening

While the protests are driven largely by civic grievances, nationalist and far-right narratives continue to circulate in Serbia’s public life, often weaponised by both state and opposition forces. The return of these themes is not new, but their intensity is striking. Within political debates, academia, and online spaces, an “us versus them” mentality has resurfaced, portraying Serbia as a besieged nation threatened by Albanians, the West, and internal traitors.

Research and reporting from the region show how this nationalist sentiment has been cultivated for decades. Some intellectuals and academics have propagated forms of Albanophobia, presenting Albanians as a hostile, inferior, or destabilising force. These ideas have seeped into cultural narratives and political discourse, shaping attitudes toward Kosovo and toward Serbia’s own Albanian minority.

This ideological revival has tangible consequences. It normalises hostility, legitimises discrimination, and provides fertile ground for extremist mobilisation. In moments of political turmoil, these sentiments can turn latent prejudice into open aggression.

The ecosystem of the far right

The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) report on violent right-wing extremism in the Western Balkans describes a volatile ecosystem of fringe groups, football ultras, and nationalist organisations. These groups often blend historical revisionism, xenophobia, and anti-Western sentiment with paramilitary nostalgia. Their activities, while sometimes marginal, represent a persistent undercurrent capable of influencing street movements or online campaigns.

Many operate in legal gray zones, which means that they are tolerated or ignored by authorities so long as they do not directly challenge the state. Yet their presence carries serious risk. In times of crisis, such actors infiltrate protests, provoke confrontations, and reframe civic discontent in nationalist or conspiratorial terms. This overlap between civic protest and radical ideology is what makes Serbia’s current moment especially precarious. When mass anger meets ideological extremism, the line between peaceful dissent and violent confrontation can blur quickly.

Ethnic Tensions and the Legacy of Albanophobia

Beyond Belgrade’s streets, another risk is simmering: one rooted in identity and history. Across southern Serbia and Kosovo, tensions between Serbs and Albanians remain deeply embedded in daily life and political rhetoric. Albanophobia has been a recurring motif in Serbia’s public sphere, reinforced through education, media, and nationalist politics. This phenomenon is not new and can be traced back to the 19th century. It became institutionalised during the Yugoslav era and weaponised during the Kosovo conflict. Today, it persists in subtle and overt forms: in stereotypes, hate speech, and discriminatory practices. 

The rise of nationalist commentary in Serbian media and academia, often framing Albanians as extremists or aggressors, mirrors the narratives circulating in Kosovo, where some actors promote anti-Serbian sentiment. Each side’s grievances reinforce the other, sustaining a cycle of fear and antagonism. 

These tensions have real-world consequences. In southern Serbian towns with significant Albanian populations, protests have erupted against what local communities describe as systemic discrimination, where Albanian populations have limited access to public services, are underrepresented in administration, and have restrictions on language rights. The grievances are longstanding, but the political climate has made them more visible, and more combustible.

If left unaddressed, such localised discrimination can escalate into broader instability. It risks turning civic grievances into ethnic mobilisation, and ethnic mobilisation into intercommunal confrontation. In regions where history looms large, small sparks can ignite old fires.

The Kosovo question remains unresolved

The Kosovo issue remains the gravitational center of these dynamics. While Belgrade formally pursues EU membership, it continues to reject Kosovo’s independence and supports parallel Serb structures within its northern municipalities. Periodic flare-ups, such as the violent clashes in Zvečan and Leposavić in recent years, demonstrate how fragile the peace remains.

Each incident reverberates back into Serbia’s domestic politics, where hardliners use them to justify nationalist posturing. Conversely, Kosovo’s political rhetoric often frames Serbia as an unreformed aggressor, fueling mistrust. In this feedback loop, both societies remain hostages to the ghosts of the 1990s.

Repression, Corruption, and the Hollowing of Institutions

Beneath the visible unrest lies a deeper structural problem: the fragility of Serbia’s institutions. The country’s governance system has long been criticised for weak rule of law, politicised courts, and pervasive corruption. Investigations into major scandals, including infrastructure failures and procurement fraud, rarely result in high-level accountability.

This perception of impunity is corrosive. When citizens believe that laws serve the powerful rather than the public, institutional legitimacy collapses. It creates the perfect breeding ground for cynicism, populism, and radical alternatives.

As protests have intensified, so too has the state’s response. Reports from activist networks describe police violence, arbitrary detentions, and restrictions on press coverage. Independent media face intimidation and lawsuits; civic organisations critical of the government are smeared as foreign agents. This narrowing of civic space follows a familiar pattern seen across hybrid regimes: containment through selective repression rather than total closure. Yet the long-term effect is the same: citizens retreat from public life, leaving the arena to extremists and propagandists.

Extremism thrives in institutional vacuums

The RAN’s regional findings underscore that violent right-wing extremism flourishes where institutions are weak, trust is low, and economic prospects are limited, which we can see in several other European countries right now. Serbia exhibits all three conditions. In marginalised areas, particularly among unemployed youth, nationalist organisations offer identity, belonging, and a sense of purpose absent from state structures. The danger is that, as the state’s moral authority wanes, these movements gain legitimacy by default. They may not overthrow the system, but they can poison its atmosphere by normalising hate, amplifying polarisation, and turning legitimate anger into dangerous zeal.

The Risk Landscape: Possible Paths Ahead

Mitigating the Slide: What Can Be Done

1. Rebuilding trust through transparency : The cornerstone of any de-escalation strategy is restoring public trust. Transparent investigations into corruption and accountability for abuses must replace denial and spin. Without justice (for mismanagement, repression, and hate crimes) Serbia’s institutions will continue to hemorrhage legitimacy.
2. Opening dialogue, not deepening divides : Dialogue between government and civil society is crucial, but it must be genuine. Token gestures will not suffice, especially after the escalation of the protests. Student movements, journalists, and opposition figures should be engaged rather than vilified. At the same time, outreach to minority communities, especially Albanians, is essential to preventing local grievances from hardening into separatist sentiment.
3. Countering extremist narratives : Efforts to counter extremism must go beyond policing. They require education, media literacy, and community-level engagement. The RAN framework for preventing radicalisation in the Western Balkans offers a starting point, but it must be locally owned to be credible. In practice, that means empowering NGOs, educators, and youth leaders rather than relying solely on security agencies.
4. Protecting the right to dissent : A healthy society depends on the right to protest. Security forces must be trained and equipped to de-escalate rather than intimidate. Oversight mechanisms, like parliamentary committees, ombudsmen, and independent observers, should monitor police conduct during demonstrations. Every instance of violence against peaceful protesters chips away at the state’s legitimacy.

Conclusion: A Country at a Crossroads

Serbia stands at a dangerous intersection. On one side lies reform, accountability, and the slow rebuilding of democratic institutions. On the other lies repression, radicalisation, and renewed ethnic hostility. The country’s current trajectory, which is marked by corruption, authoritarian reflexes, and ideological polarisation, leans worryingly toward the latter.The protests in Belgrade are more than a political movement; they are a barometer of a nation’s moral health. Whether they lead to renewal or further decline depends on how Serbia’s leaders, institutions, and citizens choose to act in the months ahead. History offers a warning: when political systems lose credibility, and nationalism becomes a substitute for governance, the descent can be swift. Serbia has the capacity to avoid that fate, but only if it confronts its fractures honestly, and soon.