Hypersonic Missiles and Global Strategy: Implications for Hegemony, Arms Control, and Systemic Security

Hypersonic missiles are typically defined as a missile which travels at Mach 5 and above for a sustained period of time and is manoeuvrable during its flight within the Earth’s atmosphere. While speed is often the headline feature, it is the combination of velocity, manoeuvrability, and atmospheric flight that distinguishes these systems from traditional ballistic or cruise missiles. The relatively low and unpredictable flight path, combined with intense speeds, is key to understanding hypersonic missiles and vital in differentiating them from more conventional missiles.

Traditional ballistic missiles follow a largely predictable arc: boost phase, midcourse in space, and terminal descent. By contrast, hypersonic systems compress detection timelines and complicate interception calculations. Their trajectories are less stable, their manoeuvres more dynamic, and their flight profiles designed to exploit gaps in existing missile defence architectures.

There are two types of hypersonic missiles which use different propulsion methods to achieve their over Mach 5 speed. The first and more complex of the two is the hypersonic cruise missile. These operate with scramjet technology which uses atmospheric oxygen at high velocity (roughly Mach 5); this is then combined and ignited with the fuel to create propulsion. Unlike traditional rocket engines, scramjets do not carry oxidiser onboard, relying instead on the compression of incoming air at extreme speed. The specific benefits of this method are its high speed, wide range, high manoeuvrability, and flexible launch and deployment methods. In theory, such systems can be launched from aircraft, ships, or ground platforms, integrating into existing force structures with relative ease.

The second, and relatively more straightforward method is re-entry and gliding. Here the missile is initially propelled into the atmosphere by a conventional rocket booster, which then separates and allows the missile to glide back into the atmosphere and use its aerodynamic shape to carry out the rest of its journey. These hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) do not rely on continuous propulsion once released. Instead, they exploit altitude, speed, and lift to manoeuvre laterally and vertically, making interception more complex than against a traditional ballistic re-entry vehicle.

Country Programmes and Operational Status

Understanding this technological distinction is essential before turning to state programmes. The strategic implications of hypersonic weapons are inseparable from who possesses them, how mature those capabilities are, and whether they function as advertised.

China’s most prominent hypersonic missile is the Dong-Feng 17. The Dong-Feng 17 is a road mobile, glide vehicle with a range of 1800–2500 km, and it is deemed essential in China’s strategic aims in the South China Sea. Operational since 2020 and equipped with a tactical ballistic missile booster, it is seen as the key hypersonic weapon in protecting Chinese interests in contested maritime zones. Despite the lack of clear information due to the secret nature of many programmes, China is widely seen as leading the way on this technology. China has carried out significantly more tests on these weapons than many of its competitors. 

The United States has pursued several different hypersonic missiles, two of the most prominent being ‘Dark Eagle’ and the ‘ARRW’, both glide vehicles. However, they both failed in the testing phase, highlighting the challenges and uncertainties that surround this technology. Hypersonic systems demand precision engineering under extreme thermal and aerodynamic stress; marginal design flaws can produce catastrophic failure. Following setbacks, the U.S. shifted focus to the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), planned for operational deployment by 2027. HACM uses scramjet technology and will likely be fitted to existing bombers such as the B-52, signalling an intent to integrate hypersonic capability into established delivery platforms rather than construct entirely new fleets.

Russia presents a slightly different profile. It has three main hypersonic missiles: the Kinzhal and the Tsirkon (Zircon) are cruise missiles, and the Avangard is a glide vehicle. The Avangard is considered Russia’s most potent system, as it is able to be launched from pre-existing intercontinental ballistic missiles, reducing operational costs and leveraging existing infrastructure. Furthermore, during its unpredictable flight path it has been reported to reach speeds of Mach 20, complicating missile defence efforts.

The  Kinzhal missile has been used in combat, with Russia first deploying it to strike a weapons depot in Ukraine on 19 March 2022. The combat use of hypersonic systems is significant; it moves them from demonstrative capability to operational employment. There were, however, credible claims that these missiles were able to be shot down by the U.S.-developed Patriot defence system. If accurate, this challenges the narrative that hypersonic missiles are inherently unstoppable. The Zircon has also reportedly been used in February 2024. Some reportedly missed intended targets, with one landing in an open field outside Kyiv. Ukrainian officials further stated that they did not reach the Mach 8 speeds claimed by Russia. These discrepancies underline a broader point: performance claims in wartime are often inflated, and verification remains difficult.

Defending Against Hypersonic Threats

Key to hypersonic missiles’ hype is the claim that they can circumvent current missile defence systems. This assertion rests on two pillars: speed and manoeuvrability. By flying lower than traditional ballistic missiles and adjusting course unpredictably, hypersonic systems compress reaction time and degrade radar tracking solutions.

However, current defences are not static. There are credible reports that Ukrainian forces used the U.S.-developed Patriot system to intercept a Kinzhal missile. Certainty is difficult to ascertain in wartime, but if accurate it suggests that while missile defence technology is not watertight, it is not entirely obsolete. The gap may be narrowing.

From an arms control perspective, the landscape remains underdeveloped. There are currently no specific international arms control measures relating directly to hypersonic missiles. This is further complicated by their dual-use nature; they can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads. Ambiguity regarding payload increases escalation risks, particularly in crisis scenarios where states may assume worst-case intent.

Existing frameworks such as the Missile Technology Control Regime act as partial barriers to proliferation by restricting technology transfer. However, they do not specifically regulate hypersonic glide vehicles or scramjet-powered cruise missiles as discrete categories. Only a handful of countries are expected to deploy operational hypersonic systems in the near term. While effective agreements would eventually need to include multiple states, the number of participants in a hypersonic-specific treaty would be far smaller than global regimes like the MTCR. Even a bilateral arrangement between the principal powers would represent a meaningful first step.Hypersonic missiles represent a significant technological evolution, but not a revolutionary break from strategic logic. They alter timelines, complicate defences, and intensify competition among major powers. Yet they remain constrained by physics, cost, and countermeasures. The narrative of invincibility surrounding hypersonic weapons is overstated. Their development marks an escalation in the offence–defence cycle rather than its conclusion.