Episode 262: Global Implications of the Alaskan Summit with David Dunn
Coordinated and Produced by Elisa Garbil
Today Dominic Bowen hosts David Dunn back on the podcast. They discuss the recent Alaskan Summit and its global implications. Find out more about the symbolic wins for Putin, and which ones they are exactly. The American unpreparedness and what its implications are, what the result is for Ukraine, how the EU decided to respond, transatlantic relations and how they are going to change, and much more!
David Dunn is Professor of International Politics and Director of Internationalisation for the College of Social Science at the University of Birmingham. David holds a MSc in International Studies and has a PhD in War Studies. He has diverse research interests that fit largely within the areas of US foreign and security policy, strategic and security studies, and diplomacy and statecraft. He has written extensively on the use of force, transatlantic relations and summit diplomacy. He has also published on the security impact of drone technology. His most recent book, co-authored with Nicholas J. Wheeler is: Drones, Force and Law: European Perspectives (Elements in International Relations) and came out in Jan 2024. Finally, David writes articles for the Conversation.
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Transcript:
[00:00:00]
David Dunn: And, famously, Trump is someone who on a whole variety of issues, is referred to as the chair. He bears the imprint of the last person who sat on them.
Elisa Garbil: Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organizations worldwide.
Dominic Bowen: Hi, I’m Dominic Bowen, host of the International, this podcast, and on the 15th of August, president Donald Trump met with President Putin in Anchorage. The conversation and the meetings ended without a ceasefire without concrete deal. It was heavy on optics, but perhaps it was light on substance. Now, the following week saw Kiev arrive in Washington with a huge amount of European leaders in tow to shore up security guarantees.
Really ease. Some of the concerns that occurred because of the Alaska Summit. There’s quite a few topics that we need to unpack today to really understand happened in Alaska and what were the implications of it. And to do that, we’re joined by David Dunn. He’s a professor of international politics at the University of Birmingham.
He’s got a master’s in international [00:01:00] studies and a PhD in war studies. He’s got a diverse range of research interests that largely fall within the areas of US foreign and security policy, strategic and security studies, and diplomacy and state craft. He’s written extensively on these topics in his most recent book from January, 2024 with Nicholas Wheeler is Drones force and law, European Perspectives, and I’m really looking forward to the conversation with David today as we unpack the impacts and the results coming out of this summit in Alaska.
David Dunn, welcome back to the International Podcast.
Summits are usually something that’s negotiated before the summits even occur. What’s gonna be discussed, the likely outputs and, and the leaders that are largely there to sign on the dotted line sometimes. But a huge part of Summit Diplomacy is the perspectives and, what people see and how they interpret it . From your work, looking at the meeting between president.
What status did this confer on Russia? What are the implications of having a summit like this and even having a [00:02:00] summit like this on US soil when President Putin has arrest warrants for him from the international criminal court?
David Dunn: Yeah. I actually have written a book on summit diplomacy, called diplomacy at the highest level. And, in there I quote a diplomat as saying that, most of the, summit substance is precooked, and the actual meeting itself has just a final blast in the microwave. Was quite a nice phrase I thought he used. But this summit was entirely different. This summit was based on the premise, that, there was room for breakthrough.
the Stephen Witkoff came back from negotiations with the Russians for that actually was based on a misunderstanding. so from the start, it was based, on, misperception. but fundamentally the summit itself. Was, as you indicated, a huge concession, to Russia by virtue of the fact that, Vladimir Putin was invited a onto American soil, b to actually meet bilaterally with the, most powerful person, the world, the US president and c.
The way in which he was fated, the way in which actually President Trump applauded, as, Putin walked towards him. There was a, a huge [00:03:00] amount of symbolic warmth and status, given to Putin, for that. and actually that’s not just a casual thing. that is actually something which is hugely important because one of the reasons why Trump, did that was to do with the tele visuals.
He as a performer and likes all of that aspect of it. But as far as Putin’s concerned, that was hugely important because the reason why he invaded. Ukraine, Ukraine, and the reason why he’s regarded as a threat to European security is that Putin wants to rebuild the Soviet Union. Putin says that the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the last century as a demise of the Soviet Union.
cause, and he thinks that Russia oughts to be treated as a great power, a world power, a superpower, and therefore to f him as if he’s the equivalent of the United States. Reinforces that deluded idea of Russia being a great power. So symbolically, it was a major concession and a major faux part on the American part from the get go.
Dominic Bowen: Thanks very much for explaining that. And as you said if, the substance of the [00:04:00] summit isn’t already pre-cooked, the leaders are setting themself up for failure.
And I think that’s what many people came out with, that not only was this summit likely to end in, failure, but it could have ended a lot worse than what it actually did. But you talked about Stephen Whitcock mistakes and I, and I think, his inability to handle diplomacy well, I mean, just before the summit he couldn’t even name the.
Illegally occupied territories, the Lahan, Donia Kon, parts of Kiv, and of course crime that you know, is just really concerning that you’ve got Russia’s senior diplomat responsible for these negotiations demonstrating a complete failure to understand the, the complexity of it all. But this. Huge symbolic win that Putin got, as you said, plays into Putin’s desires to rebuild the Soviet Union, rebuild the Russian Empire.
And I wonder, when we look back over history, I’ve, I’ve struggled to find any analogies or similar occasions where something like this is, has occurred. Can you think of anywhere there might be a similar analogy that repeated or polluted what we just saw.
David Dunn: I suppose the, the, the nearest analogy is the, attempt, of [00:05:00] Britain and France, in 1950.
Six to reinve, the sewers canal, and to re repossess that from, attempt to nationalize that the sewers crisis, you know, imperial powers that were unwilling to recognize loss of empire. I suppose that comes closest, to it.
But in terms of in the modern world, is no e equivalent, to it. it would be rather like, Britain saying, okay, India speaks English and used to be part of the British Empire, we are going to declare that as part of our empire.
you or Australia for that matter, or anywhere else. I mean, it’s an extraordinary notion, but it’s a, a position that, that Vladimir Putin has worked himself in and has talked about and written about, for the last 20 years. So, in a sense. if you have talked to Russianist, they say that, you know, the writing was on the wall or the, or the writing was on the pamphlets that Putin, wrote, a long time ago.
So in a sense, he’s, he’s consistent with his worldview and as course, as part of that, that doesn’t just tell us why he has, invaded Ukraine. It tells us it has ambitions towards Moldova. And, to the Baltic Republics and indeed, perhaps, elsewhere as well because he’s talked about, anywhere that Russian forces have been, uh, that [00:06:00] is in a sense, a legitimate target for the recreation of the Russian Empire, and that is hugely problematic.
Dominic Bowen: It’s extremely problematic. And if we look at the Russian media, they’ve been portraying the meeting as a huge success. Interesting. They’ve been portraying Alaska as neutral grounds, even though it’s very clearly American territories. That’s quite interesting. And it really framed the absence of European officials and the absence of Ukrainian officials as a sign that Russia and US can negotiate as great powers together.
That Europe and, and Ukraine is actually marginalized when considering actually the future of Ukraine. It, potentially legitimized the Kremlin even further within, Russia. And as you said, you know, if there has been any failure to deliver peace talks, that’s Ukraine’s fault. That’s Europe’s fault.
Even though of course they weren’t even invited to the summit. What have you seen in since the summit? What’s the wins that Putin has taken away from being able to meet with President Trump in Alaska?
David Dunn: Well, just to pick up on, the summit itself again, and it goes back to your point about Witkoff.
the Americans were very badly prepared. I mean, wit’s famously [00:07:00] badly prepared, but also actually the, the American Administration, I isn’t. Operating like an ordinary American administration. There is no national security advisor. The job has been covered by Marco Rubio. there has been a, a huge lack of, staff, uh, appointed to the National Security Council, and they aren’t relying on Russian specialists.
so he takes with them a real estate mogul and his trade secretary. And his treasury secretary to Alaska. Rather than taking Russian specialists or negotiation specialists, he allows Putin to set the agenda. He allows Putin to actually go first at the press conference. That wasn’t the press conference.
Two third of the time is taken up by Putin, given a well-prepared speech where he says, let’s hope the, Europeans don’t meddle and wrangle in our affairs and spoil the progress that we’ve made. Trump himself, bumbles, can’t even remember Loff name.
The whole thing is massively unprofessional. And yeah, it’s symbolic of the win that Russia has got and the win. Is very real for, Russia in a variety of ways. Most obviously, Trump flies to Alaska saying, I’m going to demand a ceasefire. If I don’t get a ceasefire [00:08:00] within a day. There will be consequences, there will be consequences for Russia.
And the, suggestion is those consequences will be secondary sanctions, on Russia, for the export of oil. To the people who buy Russian oil or indeed other pressure, unspecified, that Trump suggests is going to be the consequence of non-compliance for Russia. But instead, what we have is that two and a half hours of Trump being bamboozled and Lectured by, the Russians on the, legitimacy of their cause. what happens is that Trump comes out and said, oh, we’re no longer going to press for a ceasefire and we’re going to give, Russia two weeks or more. to come up with further progress. Two weeks is Trump’s fism.
For kicking the can down the road to an unspecified time. Two weeks is rather like we have in tariffs where the things are constantly delayed. and ultimately, the whole idea of the tackle that Trump, always chickens out on pressure on China, on tariffs or whatever.
And, and it seems to be the case with regard to Russia. In this case, the two weeks will come and go. And there won’t be any more pressure. it’s a circular tion to avoid dealing with the issue at [00:09:00] the time. Trump has all these trope, these linguistic trope. We’ll see what happens as one of his often quoted line.
And what that means is I’m avoiding answering the question.
Dominic Bowen: So if we look at Ukraine, the country that, we’re all talking about, the country that, so many of us are, are very, very concerned about and interested in. Ukraine’s agency, its autonomy, its sovereignty, its security is certainly still not being, resolved as a result of this summit.
And given the reported Russian terms and this ongoing modelle over what a NATO style assurance might look like, what sort of credible security guarantees? What sort of a future can Ukraine expect based on what you’re currently seeing?
David Dunn: Well, this is the third aspect to why the summit in Alaska was a win for Russia because effectively what the, Trump, team, did was come outta this and say, okay, we accept that Ukraine has to, give territory, including Crimea, possibly even sovereignty of Crimea, to the Russians that, that Ukraine cannot expect to have.
A NATO membership as part of this, and indeed, the [00:10:00] suggestion that immediately afterwards, in the Hannity, interview on Fox News that Ukraine could end this war if it wanted to. The implications of that was that if they seceded to all Russian demands, including giving, Russia the territory that it hasn’t.
succeeded in taking militarily this war could be over. All of those suggests that actually the Americans had shifted to the Russian position, the Maximus position, on, the demands that they’re placing on Ukraine. And that, of course, is why the Europeans rushed to Washington and were keen to actually insist that the principle here is that, that any demands are not immediately accepted. and any concessions that, Ukraine makes are ones that, makes only, and only it makes and should not be bullied, by the Americans into accepting terms that are completely unacceptable, to the Ukrainians.
the third win that Russia got at the summit. And that’s the parallel position that, Ukraine found itself in immediately. And that’s why the European allies came to try and bolster Zelensky in [00:11:00] Washington to try and get, Trump to backtrack. And, famously, Trump is someone who on a whole variety of issues, is referred to as the chair. He bears the imprint of the last person who sat on them. and the Europeans were trying to be the last person in the room so that they actually could repeat their talking points and not, be, in the process of actually repeating the talking points that he received from his briefing from, put Putin in Alaska.
So that’s what happened, immediately after Alaska, whereby we had this meeting for Europeans in Washington.
Dominic Bowen: Well, I’d love to pick up on that, and I can’t help but wonder if this will be another one of Putin wins that you, list when I ask you this question. But that meeting between European leaders and and Donald Trump at the White House was just full of so many awkward and ultimately viral moments.
you know, we had Trump failing to recognize the finished President Alexander Stubb, who was seated directly in front of him. Despite you could see, the finished president and his advisors trying to get Trump’s attention. And, you know, ultimately Trump said, where is he? And then realized he was sitting right in front of him.
We had the, Italian Prime Minister, Georgio Maloney, who was caught rolling her eyes when the German, chancellor was speaking. She [00:12:00] also had that hot mic moment when she commented on how much Trump likes the press. We had, Trump’s just lack of awareness of some of his, peers. he, he was talking to Macron about his suntan. He didn’t seem to really thoroughly understand, cnce the murder’s, policies, positions, or how any in depth knowledge of him and said, referring to him as a strong man, these things really. Illustrate, perhaps a lack of preparation, but a lack of real relationships, and I think that’s what I’m really focused on, those important relationships between allies, between the leaders of allied countries.
How do you see the strength of that transatlantic relationship between Europe and America in the wake of these meetings?
David Dunn: Well, I think it’s worth picking up on, the, points you, make there because what we have is a situation whereby, the American president, by virtue of the fact that he hasn’t staffed his, closest team with experts, you know, to say there’s lots of gaps.
There is no national security advisor in place, and that they’ve purged any russianist. from the organization and the people they’ve appointed, like a Secretary of State for defense, they have, [00:13:00] no expertise, whatsoever, and whether an organization or indeed, in, understanding defense policy more broadly, but particularly on the, Russian side, what you have is, people who are there by virtue of their. Ability to talk on television and their loyalty to Trump rather than the expertise that they bring.
Combine that with a president who has a work habit whereby he will not take briefings. He is intellectually incapable of retaining knowledge and has no interest. In learning details and thinks miraculously that he can just by the force of his personality, come to deals rather than understanding the complexity of the issues means that you are dealing with, situation whereby it’s all down to chance.
happens as a consequence of the meetings that he has because he, he doesn’t even know the personalities he’s dealing with. after the, uh, meeting, in Alaska, he has mumbling, bumbling. Press conference. he said, oh, we recognize the, the team in the front row.
We recognized him there from being on all the newspapers. He was talking about Sergei l off, but he [00:14:00] couldn’t remember his name. And we see him in dealings with, k Starer. He refers to the Prime Minister. He can’t remember his name, this is partly lack of preparation, partly that he is very old, he’s 79 years old, and he is showing a mental decline and an inability.
to actually retain information, even if he bothered to learn it in the first place. So there is a real mercurial quality to Trump’s position and his approach to it. And at the same time as that he is someone. Who rather than taking, advice or sticking to the status quo position is, prone to actually make demands in policy terms all over the place between different positions, depending on what comes into his mind at any one time.
If you look at his two social tweets on a whole variety of topics from, Raz. to drug policy or, whatever it might be. they come outta thin air rather than any idea. So we’re dealing with a mercurial, declining, king at his court, and we have no clear idea where things go from here as a consequence of that, dealing with that.
A real challenge, and a one that [00:15:00] actually the Europeans were trying to get ’em back on track with, but we’re clearly showing signs of frustration at the inability to actually reason someone, for someone who doesn’t seem to be able to be reasoned with.
Dominic Bowen: So, as you said, dealing with that is a real challenge And noting that the transatlantic cohesion is under strained for all the reasons that you just mentioned, professor David. I wonder, if this Alaska Summit further widens the gap between the US and Europe and their preferences, but also I wonder if you had the opportunity to be advising.
European leaders in Brussels, in Paris, in London, Oslo, Stockholm. What are some concrete steps that you would be urging them to prioritize over the next few months in order to reduce dependence on Washington’s swing factor? We know that rebuilding defenses, we know that, creating the sort of stability that Europe requires will take more than a decade.
But what sort of action should Europe be taking now in order to limit the potential widening of the gap between the US and Europe?
David Dunn: Well, despite the awkwardness that the European allies [00:16:00] displayed in their discomfort of being sat in front of the resolute desk with Trump behind it. Again, he didn’t, actually have them around the cabinet table.
it was more like a head teacher talking to Naugh two pupils, and again, uh. Trump wanting the tele visuals of that rather than anything else. I couldn’t possibly treat them as equals. He sat, on his taller chair and behind his big desk and had them squirming in front of him. But despite all that the Europeans came away thinking that they’d actually had achieved something.
And what they had was they had stopped the pressure on Ukraine and Zelensky by shoring up their support. By the, so they came away pleased from it, but in turn, they came away, from that process by going there and, giving fatty to the king. it, it reminded me of act one, scene one of King Lear.
when, uh, declining, king asks of his daughters, who loves me the most. And they all sat around, you know, working out ways in which they could praise him. and that’s what he clearly, wants in his declining years, in his massive ego. And what you had as a consequence of that was that he now likes the Europeans.
they’re saying what he wants to [00:17:00] hear in terms of how marvelous he is and what a great peacemaker he is. They’re saying what he wants to hear in terms of, yes, we’re gonna spend 5% of GDP, on defense spending. we’re going to do the bulk of the heavy lifting in supporting, Ukraine, we’re going to backfill.
the fact that you haven’t given any new money, to Ukraine since the Biden money is, is now dwindling, So they’re saying all the things that he wants to hear in a way that is obsequious and is fawning and is as difficult for them to, to actually, hear themselves say, as, proud leaders of, of great nations.
But they recognize that this is what they need to do to keep. American president and therefore America as an ally, on site. and in terms of, the advice that I would give to them, I would say actually. What you’re doing is, prioritizing European security and the American commitment to European security over anything else.
The fact that the European Union and indeed the UK accepted, ing, Tariffs, on the export of, many of their goods and didn’t put in reciprocal tariffs as a [00:18:00] consequence of it, that they’d worked up as plans, shows that them prioritizing keeping Trump on site for the higher priority of European security and actually absorbing the pain of European tran Atlantic trade for fear that to do otherwise would actually result in him putting the plug on either Ukraine or in European security more broadly. So, and again, it’s how you placate and how you deal with how you appease someone who could be very dangerous to your wider first priority security interests. So that’s what’s going on there. At the same time of that, of course, is that 5% is not just designed to please Trump and to supplement America. What it is designed to do is to replace America with the European capacity to do it itself. Recognizing that under this administration and possibly under future administrations, Europe cannot rely on America and the way it thought it could for the last 80 years for its security because we’re dealing with an unreliable, America, that could not be, dependent on to come to [00:19:00] European’s, defense if it came to it. Because the whole focus of America first is such that actually, that cannot guaranteed.
Dominic Bowen: And David, you mentioned before that President Putin came away from the summit with quite a few wins under his belt, and I think we’ve discussed several of them. Are there other wins that we should be aware of that maybe aren’t necessarily sitting at the front of everyone’s mind?
David Dunn: I mean, the biggest win. And, and you can see this in the way in which, the, Russian press has picked up, criticizing Trump again, and about his mental frailty, about his physical illnesses, which are become more apparent, about his trouble with, the Epstein affair. a confidence there that, Trump will not put pressure on them to, make concessions, to come to the negotiating table to actually end the war in Ukraine.
It’s clear from the way in which the press talk about it came away recognizing the victory they had. the immediate sense of pressure on them has gone. In fact, the Russians have not only stuck to the 2022, uh, demands on Ukraine. They’ve even added to them.
They’ve said, we want, uh, Russian to be equal language. Ukrainian We want, [00:20:00] Ukraine to have elections so that the leader we deal with has legitimacy. claiming the zelensky is, is illegitimate because he didn’t have elections, even though the Ukrainian constitution, actually forbids elections during a national emergency, such as the invasion.
The Russians are actually, demanding whole raft of things, and I say including the territory they haven’t even, marched to, occupy militarily. and that shows the confidence they have, that they will either, gain those things militarily over the long term because that they recognize that the American commitment to Ukraine is weakening.
and the material coming from America is diminishing and the Europeans. ability to, backfill that is in some ways limited and entirely at the discretion of the Americans who could change their mind at any time. And therefore, the Russians feel emboldened, in the demands they make. They think they can win militarily and emboldened because ultimately they think that actually that America cannot be relied upon in the long term to support Ukraine and that put, Trump’s desire for a peace treaty or a, peace deal of some sort so he can get, the Nobel Peace Prize or his place in heaven [00:21:00] as he originally talked about as a consequence of being this great peacemaker, is such that Trump will ultimately pressure Ukraine and not Russia to fold and therefore the war will end on their terms.
So yes, the Russians feel absolutely that they’ve won this. rounded diplomacy at Alaska and subsequently.
Dominic Bowen: Yeah. Thanks for explaining that, David. And just a reminder to our listeners to go to the International Risk Podcast website and subscribe to our newsletter to make sure you’re getting all our latest analysis, news and podcasts directly in your inbox every second week.
Now, David Russia currently occupies about 20% of Ukrainian territory now that includes the entirety of crime. donk. Luhan mostly in the east of the country. Then you’ve got Zia and Kon mainly along the southeast and and south of the country. Russia has some, some small, tiny pockets in, Kiv, Sumi Lia.
They’re largely, largely static as it is today. Now we have to be clear. Russia’s invasion occupation of all parts of Ukraine constitutes clear violations of international law. It’s [00:22:00] driven a huge humanitarian catastrophe, and it’s ultimately reshaped European security dynamics. But that with Putin and Trump’s meeting in Alaska, some of the territorial gains, some of Russia’s actions are potentially being legitimized, and certainly Trump and others in his administration have talked about land swaps and making a deal, creating peace. How will other authoritarian powers around the world interpret this precedent? if Russia is given land that belongs to Ukraine and to the Ukrainian people.
David Dunn: That’s a very good point because, there are many people around the world and the most obvious one is China and Taiwan, that actually are looking at this and thinking, okay, the idea really going back to, the UN charter in 1945, that in viability, of, breach of sovereign borders.
As a principle of the international system seems to have gone out the window. and of course, it’s not just that the fact that Trump seems to be willing to seed the principle that actually, Russia should be able to, hang on to the 20% of the land that that’s illegally occupied, in [00:23:00] Ukraine.
But actually the fact when Trump talks about. his possible need to take Greenland, to actually occupy the Panama Canal, or that, Canada should be the 51st state, and it’s a natural thing to happen. If you look at the map of North America, all of these reinforce the notion that actually great powers should be able to do what they want in their sphere of influence.
And that emboldens, those in. Beijing who say actually, Taiwan is ours. Not just that, but the whole of the South China seas are ours. All the territorial disputes that we have with, Vietnam and the Philippines, and other countries in the region or Japan. are ones that should be resolved by military force and that we increasingly have the military might to do so.
And who’s going to stop us doing it if we do, if Trump is happy to secede? great power status and great power, activities. Russia, Russia. Then actually, do we think that America would, in any way defend, our invasion or, uniting, China by taking, Taiwan by force?
They think not, and actually they’re probably right. the whole America first dynamic, [00:24:00] is such that why should we involve ourselves in foreign conflict. Why should we support, our friends and allies, if that puts us at risk? What we are interested in is not the interest of foreigners.
We’re interested in the interest of America. All of those things together create a potential instability in the international system whereby fixed borders that we thought were protected by agreed rules of the system are undermined by the concessions made to Russia and Ukraine.
Dominic Bowen: I wonder, David, Russia and the Soviet Union before, it has long prioritized quantity over quality, especially when it comes to military production, and certainly over the period of the Soviet Union’s power. We saw that there was this significant leveraging of partnerships with other nation states and this ramping up of.
Defense spending, winning competition with another power. I wonder today in 2025 and looking forward to 2026 and beyond, to what extent do you think and do you assess that Russia can sustain its global ambitions without exposing its [00:25:00] economic and military limitations?
David Dunn: Well, there’s several aspects of that. I mean, one, one of the reasons why the Russian economy is able to be sustained, and to avoid the impact of the, various rounds of sanctions that the Europeans and others have placed upon it is the fact that it is, Able to sell, its, oil, to China, but also to Turkey. and the Chinese are happy to supply, semiconductors and other components, for its weapons programs.
In order to sustain the war, and China does this explicitly as a way of trying to, exhaust the, American supplies of weaponry as they’re being used, in Ukraine, so that if it was to actually take Taiwan, it would be. fighting an American force. If the Americans decided to fight, that was diminished in its capacity to do that because it’s war stocks, their defense missiles like patriot or its slander attack weapons like high Mars, are diminished by virtue of the fact that they have been used up, in the war in Europe.
So the Chinese, as well as forging a [00:26:00] strategic relationship with, Russia and an economic relationship with Russia, whereby it gets lots of cheap oil, because it’s been sold at a discounted level. It’s also a strategic calculation about, its relationship, with the United States and potential future relationship with the United States and a conflict over Taiwan.
the, and. Russian economy is now entirely on a war footing. And actually the demand creators as the keying effect of actually having the state control of every aspect of the economy is such that it’s producing a huge amount. Of material for the war effort.
And the fact, that it is getting its hydrocarbon sold means that actually its economy is doing better. it’s also linked to the way in which the ruble floats and to the price of oil. their economists are being quite clever and making sure that the Russian people.
In the short term, don’t feel the economic costs of it. I mean, Russia had built up a sovereign wealth fund and, that’s been entirely exhausted. they’ve spent not only their present but their future, on this war. but in doing so, they’ve actually managed to maintain a level of, mobilization that is [00:27:00] serving their purposes just now and the long term, the Russian economy.
Is in a very paradise situation because the Europeans have started to buy, American, liquified natural gas, and unsigned long, long contracts, for that. So even if the war were to end and the Russians would expect the Europeans to start by their gas and oil again, that’s not going to happen.
There are, no replacement markets for those. And once the wealth fund is spent that The Russian economy is going to be in dire straits, but in the short term, they’re able to actually benefit from, particularly the sale of, oil to India and, China
Dominic Bowen: and David, you’re a professor of international politics.
I’m particularly keen to hear your view of the world that we live in, we work in and, and we do business in. When you look around the world, what are the international risks that concern you the most?
David Dunn: unfortunately the list’s long. the most obvious two, are the ones we’ve talked about today. what you have is an America that has abdicated its position of leadership from the international system. but that’s only part of it. America is also dismantling the liberalism and the support for [00:28:00] democracy.
Both at home and abroad, that were the cornerstone of an international system built on liberal principles on democratic support for, democratic regimes and. for, a rules based international order. What you have now a situation in America whereby the president and the administration is dismantling, the democratic principles, the way in which is encouraging gerrymandering in Texas, challenging electoral laws, the way in which Trump didn’t accept that he lost the 2020 election. and makes jokes about, oh, if I’m at war when the next election comes around, maybe I won’t have to have elections like Ukraine. All those undermined faith in American democracy, American liberalism. the whole nature of checks and balances is that the way in which that the Supreme Court and Congress have actually just fallen in line with America, the way in which American Press is doing deals and and offering money to members of his family.
All of those undermine the American democracy in its broader sense. If America is no longer. a force for democracy at home. That it’s not a force for democracy abroad. [00:29:00] It’s no longer promoting democracy in human rights abroad. It’s no longer using American money to support, it’s aid, budget and aid of, either humanitarian or democratic projects a home.
the dismantling of American liberalism and American democracy changes the nature of the international system, fundamentally. So that is a major change. If that were to happen by itself, that would still be a major seismic change in the international system over the last 80 years.
Add to that, a Revist Russia. Potentially Revo just China in terms of their foreign policy ambitions. And that’s clear. And the South China seas, not just in the around, Taiwan from China, but also the way in which China is active in, large parts of Africa. The way in which, Russia is active in the Sahel, it means that that actually we have, forces for instability on a global scale.
Two more things to add. Global warming, warm will, will change the nature of, the ability to grow crops and how crops are grown. That will, stem at the other major threat to the international system [00:30:00] for the remainder of my lifetime. In the next 50 years which is, migration. You have, a huge population growth in Africa in particular. the, population of Africa has doubled from about 1980 to about 2000. From about 2000 to 20. Where we are now is doubled again, and it’s likely to double again. the growth of population in Africa is enormous. That’s a problem for Africa in terms of sustainability, but it’s also a problem for world in general.
I mean, people who are displaced by climate change and lack of economic activity in Africa are on the move. And on the move, on a global scale. Migration and how that’s dealt with is another challenge you can add to that, I suppose, nuclear proliferation, you know, Trump’s bombing of Iran didn’t solve the problem how Iran responds to that is, an open question because it was clear that the uranium that they had enriched was moved from the sites before they were bomb. Partly ’cause Trump gave them forewarning that he was going to bomb the sites so he didn’t kill people, so he didn’t lose his Nobel Peace prize, aspirations.
And Iran’s [00:31:00] got two ways to go, it can rejoin. An international verification process. Or it can actually secretly move towards building a breakout of a nuclear capability, declare itself a nuclear state, and hope to actually deter any future military tax on it by doing that. it could pursue both simultaneously.
Pretend to do one and not, the other. because it’s nothing, I’ll let inspectors in any, time soon, even if it’s talking about, agreeing to, curbs on its, actual production of additional nuclear material. If Iran goes nuclear or even if it’s the perception that Iran goes nuclear, that could spread the desire for nuclear weapons, elsewhere, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and actually the whole question of whether. America is a reliable ally in Europe. Poland has talked about in nuclear weapons. there’s a renewed debate in Germany, because of the lack of support in Asia. There is talk in Japan, there’s an active debate. Australia about whether they should gain a nuclear weapon.
So the whole question of nuclear proliferation is back on the table as we move into a different world. One where American security guarantees and [00:32:00] international, attempts through verification and the non-proliferation regime keeps a lid on nuclear weapons. And, as we move away from that framework of international politics, the pressure for nuclear proliferation is also an aspect of the new international order.
Dominic Bowen: That was very, sorry, Bri, but very insightful. Thank you very much for explaining that and thanks very much for coming on the International Risk Podcast today, David.
David Dunn: It’s, been interesting. Thank you very much.
Dominic Bowen: Well, that was a great conversation with Professor David Dunn. He’s a professor of international politics at the University of Birmingham, and I really appreciated hearing his thoughts on the impacts of the August Summit between Putin and Trump, as well as a variety of other international risks.
Please subscribe to our mailing list on the International Risk Podcast website to get our newsletter in your inbox every second week. Today’s podcast was produced and coordinated by Elisa Garbil. I’m Dominic Bowen, your host. Thanks very much for listening. We’ll speak again in a few days.
Elisa Garbil: Thank you for listening to this episode of the International Risk Podcast. For more episodes and articles, visit the international risk podcast.com. Follow us on [00:33:00] LinkedIn, blue Sky, and Instagram for the latest updates, and to ask your questions to our host, Dominic Bowen. See you next time.
