Episode 268: Implications of the Suspension of the Indus Water Treaty

When we think about flashpoints between India and Pakistan, most people picture borders, bombs, or Kashmir. But the most strategic weapon in South Asia today may not be nuclear—it’s water.

The Indus Water Treaty has been called one of the world’s most successful peace agreements, surviving wars, nuclear standoffs, and decades of political hostility. But in April this year, India suspended the treaty after a terrorist attack in Kashmir, effectively threatening to choke off the lifeline of Pakistan’s agriculture and economy. For the first time in 65 years, the Indus—an ancient river system that sustains over 250 million people—has been turned into a tool of coercion.

This is more than a regional spat. It’s a live experiment in how climate stress, nationalism, and security fears can dismantle one of the last bastions of cooperation between nuclear rivals. And if water becomes a weapon here, what does it mean for other fragile river basins—the Nile, the Mekong, the Jordan—where upstream states already hold the cards?

Today, I’m joined by Ashok Swain, UNESCO Chair on International Water Cooperation, Professor and Head of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. He has authored and edited 20 books and more than 150 journal articles, and he is also the Founding Editor-in-Chief of the peer-reviewed journal Environment and Security, published by Sage. He has also served as a consultant on environmental and development issues, advising various international organisations, including UN agencies, OCSE, NATO, EU, IISS, the Arab League and Oxfam, as well as the governments of Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Singapore. Few people understand more about how rivers can both unite and divide nations. His work spans transboundary water politics, climate security, and conflict dynamics, and he has been one of the most vocal critics of India’s suspension of the Indus Water Treaty.

The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime, to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.

Dominic Bowen is the host of The International Risk Podcast and Europe’s leading expert on international risk and crisis management. As Head of Strategic Advisory and Partner at one of Europe’s leading risk management consulting firms, Dominic advises CEOs, boards, and senior executives across the continent on how to prepare for uncertainty and act with intent. He has spent decades working in war zones, advising multinational companies, and supporting Europe’s business leaders. Dominic is the go-to business advisor for leaders navigating risk, crisis, and strategy; trusted for his clarity, calmness under pressure, and ability to turn volatility into competitive advantage. Dominic equips today’s business leaders with the insight and confidence to lead through disruption and deliver sustained strategic advantage.

The International Risk Podcast – Reducing risk by increasing knowledge.

Follow us on LinkedIn and Subscribe for all our updates!

Tell us what you liked!

Transcript:

Ashok Swain  [0:02]  
The cancellation, or the, what you call the abeyance, of the Indus Water Treaty, is not anything which is practical, but it’s a very political so it’s a politically dividing these two countries and creating a huge mistrust. Just in May, these two countries were on the verge of a nuclear war. So anything can happen. 

Elisa Garbil  [0:21]  
Welcome back to The International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest World News and significant events that impact businesses and organizations worldwide. 

Dominic Bowen  [0:29]  
Hi. I’m Dominic Bowen, host of the International Risk Podcast. When we think of flash points between India and Pakistan, most people picture borders bombs and sometimes Kashmir, but the most strategic weapon in South Asia today may not be nuclear, but in fact, be water. The Indus Water Treaty has been called one of the world’s most successful peace agreements that survived wars nuclear standoff and decades of political hostility between these two neighbors. But in April of this year, India suspended the treaty after a terrorist attack in Kashmir and effectively threatened to choke off the lifeline of Pakistan’s agriculture and its economy. So for the first time in 65 years, the Indus, an ancient river system that sustains about two 50 million people, has been turned into a tool of coercion. Now this is more than just a regional spat. It’s an experiment about how climate stress, about nationalism and even how security fears can dismantle one of the last bastions of cooperations between countries. And if water becomes a weapon, we have to be asking what it means for other fragile areas, including along the Nile, along the Mekong and even along the Jordan. Today, we’re joined by Professor Ashok Swain. He’s the UNESCO chair on International Water cooperation, and he’s the head of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University. He’s authored and edited 20 books and more than 150 journal articles. And he’s also the founding editor in chief of the peer reviewed journal environment and security. Few people understand more about rivers and how they can unite and divide nations. His work spans trans boundary, water politics, climate security, conflict dynamics, and he’s been a real critic of the suspension of this important treaty. Professor Swain, welcome to the International risk podcast. 

Ashok Swain  [2:13]  
Thank you. Thank you for having me 

Dominic Bowen  [2:14] 
Now, the Indus Water Treaty, as I said, is often described as one of the most durable water sharing agreements. But as a scholar of International Water cooperation and diplomacy, can you walk us through why it has lasted so long when so much between Pakistan and India has been just full of conflicts since the nations were born? 

Ashok Swain  [2:32]  
Yeah, you are right. This treaty has really withstood a number of wars between India and Pakistan. It has withstood the war in 1965, 1971, 1999 there was a border conflict in the Himalayas. Then the recent one also. But now it’s something very different has come in, and we will discuss that. Pakistan is a huge country of more than 200 million people. Food security is heavily, heavily dependent on the water which comes through the Indus River. What had happened 1947 India and Pakistan became two countries from the British Raj. That time, under the British rule that limited irrigation practices were carried out in the Indus system, but mostly the storage were available in the Indian side, whereas the agricultural field were on the Pakistan side. So immediately after the partition, on independence in 1947 1948 January, India started blocking the water to the Pakistan. It was almost five to six weeks the water was stopped. Then the World Bank realized that this has a huge potential of developing irrigation facilities, water storage facilities, flood control mechanism. And that’s why the World Bank played a major role and brought India and Pakistan to sign the agreement. So I think the World Bank has played a very significant role of not only bringing the Indus Water Treaty into what it is, but also continuation of it till now. 

Dominic Bowen  [4:03]  
Yeah, we’ll talk a little bit about the World Bank in a few minutes, but I’d like to talk about many political commentators in India have long argued that India has been too generous towards Pakistan under the treaty, and the suspension was generally seen by these groups as justified retribution against Pakistan. Professor Swain, did you see the suspension as a surprise, or has this been a ticking time bomb that’s been just waiting to go off? 

Ashok Swain  [4:26]  
It’s not surprise, given the sense that the present government, under Narendra Modi, is claiming to do it since 2016 so for the last nine years, this government has been telling about that it will be playing with the water treaty. What that 1960 treaty gave three Eastern flowing rivers to India completely whatever it can do with the water. It gave the three Western flowing rivers to Pakistan and the only India can use it for the non consumptive use it cannot make a big storage facilities. It will be, you know, kind of mostly using it for a hydro power or very small, limited irrigation of type, some sort, the why the Indian analysts say that India has not been treated well. Thing is, it’s a 33 million acre feet of water goes through the three Eastern flowing rivers, whereas this 130 3 million acre feet of water goes through the Western flowing rivers. Pakistan gets the four portions of water, while India gets 1% of water for a consumptive though the four portion of water India uses for the hydropower and all the drinking water, but not for the irrigation others, not for the water diverting or the storage. So that’s the reason. The issue is these western flowing rivers passes through the Indian side of the Caspian Indian control cross me and goes directly to the Ka Pakistan side. So the geography doesn’t allow India to divert that water to the mainland. So India, even if it will be given that water for India’s consumptive use, India will have no way to divert that water to Indian subcontinent, or where the Indian mainland, or northern part of India, because there is a Himalayas mountains there, you either have a underground pipeline of more than 100, 150 kilometers, or you have to take the water in the helicopter and put it on the other side. 

Dominic Bowen  [6:21]  
So I’m keen to explore with you why the suspension matters, not now, and not just for India and Pakistan, but for global stability. You mentioned the World Bank earlier, and the World Bank actually projects that by 2050 South Asia could lose up to 6% of its GDP annually due to water related losses. That’s floods, droughts and erratic water flows. Now that’s about $270 billion now that’s the entire GDP of Finland or Portugal that could be lost due to water related losses. Now, as I said before, we often think of conflict in terms of trade or territory or sometimes even ideology. What can we learn from this Indus water crisis, and what does it tell us about how climate stress and water and resource scarcity are reshaping the security landscape globally?

Ashok Swain  [7:08]  
Why India and Pakistan needs the Indus water treaty? The reason is because the River Treaty, I don’t call it a water treaty. I call it a partition. Water partition means three rivers have been given to Pakistan, three rivers have been given to India. So that is very little cooperation goes on over the water there. It’s a partition. Let me put it very bluntly, that India, Pakistan, needs to work together, trust each other, then they can really develop these water resources much better. And as you know, Pakistan is going through a serious flood in the northern part now, and Pakistan is experiencing massive floods since 2010 and, of course, also Indian side. So this is what a recurring matter. What they can do, if they could work together, they can really create the water storage facilities which can stop the flood and create a huge hydro power. So they can really do this, that hydro power generation, as well as the management of flood, besides irrigation, because the storage are possible in the Kashmir side, because Kashmir has a much better environment, because it’s much cooler than Punjab or the sind or the Pakistan side. So they can really store the water in the Kashmir, and they can really use it as the hydropower as well as the flood control. But for that, the two countries need to have a better trust worthy working relationship. Otherwise, Pakistan will never trust that India’s dams will not be used against Pakistan. You need to build trust first to develop the water in other cases, what happens? We say, Look, you sign an water agreement, they need to lead to mutual trust. But I think here in India, Pakistan case, you need to build mutual trust fast, then you can develop the water resources, particularly in those water resources, of course, India and Pakistan, there has been some economic development in Indian side, more than the Pakistan side. But also the population growth that has become much more compared to the 1950s and 60s. The population growth has been maximum. So agricultural need has become much more the food need. But on climate change, climate change has brought the serious, serious water issues to this region. We had never witnessed the kind of fast flaw taking place in the Himalayas, the kind of prolonged drought taking place in that part. So I think it’s a high time for both countries to come together to really improve that agreement. Instead of improving agreement, instead of getting a better deal, when you cancel this deal, when you are put in abeyance, it creates a huge, huge trust deficit. It brings the survival issue to the Pakistan side, particularly. And the third thing is, there is a very little at present India can do. It creates a very difficult scenario in the regional level, because I don’t think India has the capability to stop the water immediately, India has to build the dam in the Kashmir side. And Kashmir, being the Kashmir province, is not easy to build the dams. And if it will be, this will be also subject to all kinds of attack. Kstan has the capability to directly attack those dams if India builds it, the cancelation, or the, what you call the abeyance of the Indus water treaty is not anything which is practical, but it’s a very political so it’s a politically dividing these two countries and creating a huge mistrust. Just in May, these two countries were on the verge of a nuclear war. So anything can happen. 

Dominic Bowen  10:35  
Yeah, and I think that’s really important. I think I said this earlier, that the Indus Basin already supports over 250 million people across India and Pakistan, and it’s important to remember that 90% of Pakistan’s agriculture depends on the water coming from the Indus Pakistan is ranked as one of the world’s most water stressed countries already. Soon after the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, Pakistan’s defense minister warned that any attempt to stop or divert flows would be considered an act of war. Now, given both countries nuclear capabilities, the recent significant increase in tensions and the protracted history of conflict between the two neighbors, how concerned should we be about the possibility for escalating conflict? 

Ashok Swain  [11:17]  
Very good question. I think, what had happened for the last stone are particularly since 1998 when the both the countries officially openly declared to be the nuclear power after that, there was overall acceptance that India has the conventional military capability higher than, or better than the Pakistan. There has been issues that there will be no nuclear or the fast strike by Indian side, Pakistan side, and agreed to it. But I think there have been some sort of, at least there was a willingness that as long as India has conventional military upper hand, then it will not go for nuclear, or the Pakistan side will be use it at the very last level. But unfortunately, in the last few years, the threat of use of nuclear weapons have become very common by Indians, and Pakistan is to both sides. So what happened in the last conflict in May, which is took place at least three and a half days of conflict, Indians later on said that they brought down five Pakistani aircraft. What Pakistanis have been claiming that they have brought down six aircraft Indian aircrafts, Pakistan has declared victory at the conventional war terms over India. How much truth is it? But there is somehow some sort of opinion within the Pakistani side, at least, and in internationally, that India doesn’t have the similar conventional, strategic or military upper hand anymore, and the reason is because for the last several years, China has been the major arms supplier and the intelligence supplier to Pakistan. So the last conflict which took place in May, it was a Chinese fighter jets and Chinese missiles which attacked Indian fighter jets. And not only that, China also shares the intelligence operations, everything. So what China is not directly fighting vis a vis India. China has been strengthening Pakistan’s conventional nuclear capability to come a parity, or even better, sometimes, in some cases, with vis a vis by India. So given that while both the countries are in confusion, who has the upper hand in the conventional side, and both have equally prepared for the nuclear war, so there is no such thing which deters these two countries. Okay, so this is where the things becomes much more problematic, if any leader, and unfortunately, both the leadership in India and Pakistan. Pakistan leader is virtually the military general who declared himself Field Marshal after the May. And the India has a Hindu nationalist who is an autocrat also leading the country. So I think this is where we don’t know the kind of reactions they will have if either of them, for their own political survival, can really jump into any sort of a war, and that war, unless it stops, it can also take the nuclear ship. So this is a much bigger threat. All kinds of possibilities are there because of the political reasons and because of the strategic reasons and because of the international alliances are going in that direction, and particularly when you have a Trump, though he is claiming to end the war, but during his six past six months, there have been six countries which had never fought the war. In the last 20 years, they have also fought war. So we have to see how this goes. 

Dominic Bowen  [14:42]  
And all this makes me just wonder Ashok, how does water move from being a resource, something that’s life saving, to being a weapon, and what risks does this create for businesses, for economies and governments that depend on predictable access to natural resources? What are some of the lessons that policy advisors, organizers and business leaders should be taking from this? 

Ashok Swain  [15:02]  
We talk about natural resources or climate change leading to the international conflict, but I think we need to see that the two areas which are supposed to create the international conflict, or international power and conflict, is the resources which move. The forests don’t move, the drought doesn’t move. The sea level rise will displace people, but they cannot fight a war against the sea. What moves is the transboundary water. Pakistan is as dependent of the water coming from outside their territory, like Egypt as well. So transboundary water and migration, these are the two resources, or the two things which move from one border to another border, and that’s where the problem comes in. There are many countries, countries like Egypt, countries like Hungary, countries like Pakistan, countries like Netherlands, they are highly dependent on the water coming from the other countries to their river system. So I think we need to realize that this is a challenge. Of course, the population growth, industrialization, bad management, all these things have complicated the issue, but the climate change has brought a serious problematic to it, because what we have seen in the 90s, we saw many major river signing agreements, but we haven’t seen major river signing agreement in the last 20 years. Now it is becoming a major issue that the countries are not exactly comfortable of what their water security will be in the context of climate change. I mean, we are seeing major drought, we are seeing major flood, and the water availability in the river system has also fluctuating from the different time period. So it’s becoming very difficult to sign agreement. And all these agreements get signed, which we have seen in the past, most of these agreements signed either on the basis of building dams or in the promise of building dams. But because of the climate change, we are also facing problematic how to plant big dams look we have talked about the Nile River, the dam which Ethiopia is building, the grand Ethiopian Renaissance dam, which doesn’t really take the water from the system, but it controls the water. It can store the water because it’s a hydropower dam. But the problem is, Egypt is not comfortable. Of Ethiopia storing the water, because Egypt can really any difficult circumstances. Egypt has a storage possibility, particularly for a year or so. But if the drought period is more than one year, and Ethiopia controls the water in the upstream Egypt, will be in deep trouble. That’s what it is happening now happening because of the climate change related uncertainties that how long these dry seasons will be, how long these bad monsoons, or the bad rainfall seasons will come, and how far this water demands and water supplies will fluctuate, that has really not only stopped rivers agreement to be signed, but also creating major challenges for existing river agreement. So we are in a very difficult situation. In that sense, existing agreements are not good enough, and we are not signing new agreements, and we are not able to build the dams and reservoirs, which are actually part of the incentive for the countries to sign the agreements. We did a study for Oxfam on the Ganges River, Ganges Brahmaputra River, one direct cost for not cooperating because of the climate change related challenges, and it’s at least 14 to $15 billion every year, and that’s a big amount for countries like Nepal or Bangladesh.

Dominic Bowen  [18:27]  
I wonder if we look a bit broader. If we look at China, for example, you recently wrote a piece explaining why suspending the Indus water treaty is a bad idea, and you you warned that India’s suspension could open a Pandora’s box, and this is the idea that upstream states can unilaterally restrict or divert water, ultimately using water as a coercion tool. And Concerningly, as we saw with Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and many other geopolitical events lately, it’s this act that these previously unthought of acts now become normalized. Could this give China a rationale to leverage its upstream position on India, on both the Indus and other headwaters in Tibet, against India in future confrontation. And I wonder more broadly, if this sets a precedent for other river basins in Asia and the Middle East, where there is these asymmetries of power and geopolitical instability, if this could lead to future confrontation, future normalization of using water as a tool of coercion?

Ashok Swain  [19:25]  
China controls Tibet, and the Tibet is the water tower for Asia. Many of the International rivers originate from the Himalayan side, from the Tibetan side, like Mekong River, which China is the upper riparian the saloon? Which China is operating, Brahmaputra, which is called Alun in the Tibet side, that is also upper Indus, originates from China side India. China has also small dam on the Indus upstream, but it’s very small amount of water there. Why I’m saying this? We need to understand China’s position on the transboundary water. China has always from the very beginning, put a point that upstream countries do maintain the right to use the water of the transboundary River as they like. So it’s not any way that they will be be considerate about the downstream countries. So China has maintained that, and there is a UN Convention on non navigational use of international water course, which signed in the 1997 98 and the UN General Assembly the three countries which opposed it. One of them was China. There was last year the UN Security Council was well discussing the Ethiopia, Egypt issue on the grand elect. One should listen to this. China again repeats what I said in the beginning, that the upstream countries have the right to use the water as they like. It goes against the international norms and regulations. China first started building dams on the Mekong upstream. There is a Mekong River Commission where the Scandinavian countries have contributed quite a lot, but China is not a member. China Myanmar are not a member. Similarly, saloon River, China has the upstream, but China wants to build the dams in the Myanmar, whereas the Brahmaputra River, where the upstream is the alum Brahmaputra is, comes from the northeastern part of India, then goes to Bangladesh, and Ganges comes from the Nepal side, from the Indian side and joins both the rivers joints in the Bangladesh. So we need to know that China has not been interested in the hydropower for a long time in the upstream Indian water, because the Tibet has not developed. China had not industrialized that time. So China never had the necessary or the economic resources to build the dams in the rivers which coming to India from Tibet. So India has been since 1947 after its independence, or even before that onto the British has acted as upstream country, whereas India has not an upstream country. China is the upstream country, but China has never used that upstream location before, but what is it doing now? China has started building major dams. China built dams in the upstream of Mekong. China has already built three dams on the upstream of Brahmaputra. Now it is China building the dam with a massive dam the world has never seen. It’s again in the name of climate change, because China has committed to move from the fossil fuel based energy production to the renewable energy production, the leadership says that we need to move to the big dam. This dam will be three times bigger than the three girls dam, which is the world’s largest dam now. So it’s a huge, huge dam will be built where the river comes from, the Tibetan side and turns to the Indian northeastern side. It’s just on the corner they are building this big dam. And if that dam is built, China will have a huge storage possibilities there. And with that, China will control the Brahmaputra water. And Brahmaputra water is very critical for the Indian Northeastern part. And also Bangladesh and China has also different schemes than has built the pipeline from the south to north, diverting the water from the south to north, even if they are not diverting the water. At present, these largest dam they are going to build just outside Indian territory. It will be a huge, huge challenge again, India. China trust factor is not much. China has not signed any water sharing agreement with anyone. Forget about India and China. As I mentioned before, China, Pakistan have become they call it iron brothers. Their friendship is stronger than the iron. So that’s what they mean. But if the China has really coming to rescue or supporting Pakistan militarily, using Pakistan to lay or to get the conventional military capability parity with India. If India uses water vis a vis Pakistan, China will take the plea that it will use the water on the other side of Indian border against India. That’s why I call it Pandora’s box. If you open this you use the water as a weapon, that will be a huge problem. It’s not only that, though. It will be huge, huge disaster in any sense. If Pakistan and India goes to war over water, if they start really attacking each other’s dams, forget about nuclear war. If they attack each other’s dam in Punjab and Kashmir, the whole subcontinent will be going through a food insecurity or food crisis for at least 10 to 15 years now. 

Dominic Bowen  [24:29]  
There’s certainly a lot of Pandora Box issues that are contributing to international risks around the world Ashok and when you look around the world, what are the international risks that concern you the most?

Ashok Swain  [24:39]  
 I think we do have a lack of an international order. To be honest, we are in a situation of not only the climate change uncertainty, but also the changing international politics. There is no international norms anymore. Anyone can do anything, as you mentioned, what will happen in Ukraine or what is happening. You know, there is no bigger power which is anymore to show that this is what’s supposed to be done internationally. This is not supposed to be done. Those things have really broken down. And given this political uncertainty and the political changes when the existing superpower United States and the emerging superpowers China have not been able to create an order of their own, and competing for their power. Who will become more powerful? Climate change is bringing this all sort of serious uncertainties about in general, but also about the water supply. And I think that’s where I do see that we are getting into this serious situation because we have been doing research in our department looking at how to use water as a weapon, has developed as a concept or as a norm, and it has become a taboo to use water as a weapon, but that we wrote to in 2020 but not anymore. It’s not that anymore those kind of taboos or those kind of international norms have broken down in general and in the context of water in particular. So I think this is what really bothers me most, that it’s not only the climate change, but the changing global politics is also making things much more difficult, much more uncertain and much more critical for the how we should really get out of not only the climate crisis, but this global crisis in general. 

Dominic Bowen  [26:27]  
Yeah, I totally agree with you Ashok. So thank you very much for articulating that, and thank you very much for coming on the international risk podcast. 

Ashok Swain  [26:34]  
It’s my pleasure. Thank you. 

Dominic Bowen  26:36  
Well, that was a great conversation with Ashok Swain. He’s the UNESCO chair on International Water cooperation and the head of the department of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University. I really appreciated hearing his thoughts on the significance of the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, what it means for the future of India, Pakistan relations, and the wider implications for regional stability, global security and international risk. Please go to wherever you download your podcast and subscribe to ensure you get all future episodes into your feed. This is really critical for our success. Today’s podcast was produced and coordinated by Anna kummelstedt. I’m Dominic Bowen, your host. Thanks very much for listening. We’ll speak again next week. 

Elisa Garbil  [27:16]  
Thank you for listening to this episode of The International Risk Podcast. For more episodes and articles, visit the InternationalRiskPodcast.com follow us on LinkedIn, BlueSky and Instagram for the latest updates and to ask your questions to our host, Dominic Bowen, see you next time you.