Episode 304: Debt as Leverage: Sovereign Lending and Geopolitical Influence with Dr Lev Breydo
*This episode was recorded in October 2025*
This episode with Dr Lev Breydo explores how sovereign debt has evolved into a strategic instrument of power in an era of heightened geopolitical risk. We examine how credit markets, financial infrastructure, and legal design now shape state behaviour, constrain autonomy, and function as tools of coercion below the threshold of open conflict. The discussion looks at political default, sanctions, and the weaponisation of finance, alongside record global debt levels and the growing risks facing emerging and frontier economies. We also unpack the role of the United States at the centre of the global credit system, and how domestic fiscal politics can generate international instability. Finally, the episode considers how artificial intelligence and digital finance may reshape sovereign risk, transparency, and future fault lines in the global financial order.
Dr Breydo is a scholar of law, finance, and technology whose research focuses on sovereign debt markets, financial institutions, digital assets, and artificial intelligence. His work examines how legal frameworks and market structures shape power, risk, and governance in the international system, with particular attention to debt distress, sanctions, and the strategic use of financial infrastructure. He engages regularly with policymakers, academics, and market participants on issues at the intersection of geopolitics, financial stability, and emerging technologies.
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Dominic Bowen is the host of The International Risk Podcast and Europe’s leading expert on international risk and crisis management. As Head of Strategic Advisory and Partner at one of Europe’s leading risk management consulting firms, Dominic advises CEOs, boards, and senior executives across the continent on how to prepare for uncertainty and act with intent. He has spent decades working in war zones, advising multinational companies, and supporting Europe’s business leaders. Dominic is the go-to business advisor for leaders navigating risk, crisis, and strategy; trusted for his clarity, calmness under pressure, and ability to turn volatility into competitive advantage. Dominic equips today’s business leaders with the insight and confidence to lead through disruption and deliver sustained strategic advantage.
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Transcript:
Lev Breydo: [00:00:00] My perspective is that, with the global economy, we really are in a very dangerous place. We’ve come to a very precarious juncture for a number of reasons. For the US, but really across the globe, borrowing levels are at record highs. It’s certainly a challenge for economies to grow into these capital structures.
Lev Breydo: I think there’s really no way around that.
Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organisations worldwide.
[00:00:30] This episode of the International Risk Podcast is brought to you by Conducttr. They’re an ISO 27001-certified crisis simulation platform that lets you rehearse real crises in a safe virtual environment. It includes realistic emails, social media, internal chats, company systems, and many other features. Conductor helps crisis teams practise how they actually work under pressure, not how they wish they worked. Go to conducttr.com to learn more about their software.
Dominic: Hi, I’m Dominic Bowen, and welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we unpack the risks that are shaping our world.
Dominic: Today we’re joined by Professor Lev Breydo. He’s a leading scholar of law, finance, and technology, and his research examines how credit markets and financial institutions, digital assets, and artificial intelligence are reshaping the global risk landscape, and how sovereign lending has become the new frontier of strategic power.
[00:01:30] Sovereign debt isn’t just a financial instrument anymore. It’s geopolitical currency. In 2025, global public debt has crossed 102 trillion US dollars, and over half of all low-income countries are either in debt distress or close to it. Many are now spending more on interest payments than on health or education.
Dominic: As credit markets tighten, debt servicing costs increase, and lending terms increasingly become tools of influence, we’re seeing nations forced to align, extract concessions, and sometimes constrain their own autonomy. These are significant international risks. So we welcome Professor Breydo to the International Risk Podcast to help us understand them.
Lev Breydo: Thank you so much for having me. I’m excited to be here, and excited for the conversation.
Dominic: Professor Breydo, you’ve written that sovereign debt contracts have quietly evolved into instruments of geopolitical leverage. You’ve also discussed Russia’s political default, which wasn’t just an economic collapse, but a strategic event.
[00:02:30] We’ve also seen infrastructure-linked loans and conditional finance used to steer national policy across many regions, from Africa to Southeast Asia. Can you start by telling us about Russia’s political default, and what we should have noticed there?
Lev Breydo: Absolutely. I think that’s a great starting point.
Lev Breydo: If we take a step back to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this was a unique event for many geopolitical reasons. From a market-structure perspective, there are really three distinct facets that help explain the default.
[00:03:00] There’s Russia’s sovereign reserves, which we’ll come back to. There’s the default itself, and, as you point out, the political nature of that default. And then there are the ripple effects in the region, including Ukraine, which has undergone multiple restructurings due to the conflict, and Belarus, which has also had to recut its debt as a result.
Lev Breydo: What’s really unique about this default, and I’ll try to keep this high-level, is that Russia’s debt itself is highly idiosyncratic.
[00:03:30] In my research, I’ve seen that starting around 2014, as Russia’s geopolitical posture shifted, particularly with respect to Ukraine, the terms and structure of its debt became increasingly aggressive.
Lev Breydo: It began incorporating provisions I hadn’t seen before in these kinds of contracts, and I’ve been studying them for most of my career. This included provisions allowing payment in roubles on bonds that were supposed to be dollar-denominated. That’s very strange. It suggests an element of pre-planning, if not outright premeditation, for conflict.
[00:04:00] Going into the war, Russia had total debt of around 300 billion dollars. Most of that was rouble-denominated local bonds, but a material portion, roughly 36 to 38 billion dollars, was dollar- or euro-denominated.
Lev Breydo: That’s really where the heart of the political default issue lies.
Lev Breydo: What’s also unusual is that, typically, when countries default, as we’ve seen with Argentina or Ecuador, it’s because they don’t have the money.
[00:04:30] Whether it’s a solvency or liquidity issue, the inability to pay is usually central. What was unprecedented here was that Russia had the money and wanted to pay. At times, it did almost everything possible to make payments, but was prevented from doing so.
Lev Breydo: That happened in part through the operation of global financial infrastructure, which underpins markets more broadly. It’s like electricity: you don’t think about it until something changes, and then it’s all you can think about.
[00:05:00] The use of sanctions and financial tools in this case was unprecedented, both in intensity and in the level of coordination between the US and European allies.
Dominic: After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, we saw an unprecedented financial response. Reserve seizures, market exclusion, and deliberate political default. You’ve described this as the weaponisation of sovereign debt, where credit systems are deliberately turned into instruments of coercion.
[00:05:30] Was this wrong? Should it not have occurred, or was it a reasonable use of financial instruments by the international community?
Lev Breydo: That’s a great question, and there are a couple of layers to it.
Lev Breydo: At a moral, legal, and international policy level, this was clearly unacceptable conduct. Invasions of another country are things Europe had hoped to leave behind, given its history.
[00:06:00] The question, though, is about first-order policy objectives. When I think about sanctions and the freezing of reserves, there’s a coherent narrative there. The goal is to pressure Russia, and there is some internal logic to those measures.
Lev Breydo: The default itself is trickier. On the one hand, this is money Russia has already borrowed. Preventing repayment doesn’t clearly harm Russia’s ability to conduct the war.
[00:06:30] It might marginally affect future borrowing, but Russia is already effectively locked out of global markets. It may complicate aspects of the energy trade, but there are more direct tools available to achieve those objectives.
Lev Breydo: So while, at a normative level, these actions feel justified given the scale of the conflict, the connection between the action and the policy objective, and the precedent it sets, raises concerns.
[00:07:00] With historically high debt levels across emerging markets, if this becomes part of the geopolitical toolkit, what does that mean for other countries? What happens under future regime changes in the US or other major sovereigns?
Lev Breydo: There are very real risks here that markets continue to underappreciate.
Dominic: That’s a really interesting point. I’d love to hear how the structures and clauses within sovereign lending agreements have changed in recent years, and what that reveals about how financial power and geopolitical power are now merging.
Lev Breydo: Great question. To answer that, it’s helpful to take a step back and look at the structure of sovereign credit markets more broadly. In the post-World War II period, one major shift was the establishment of multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, whose meetings I’m actually in Washington to attend now.
Lev Breydo: [00:08:00] The World Bank is broadly focused on development, while the IMF does many different things, but crisis response for emerging markets sits at the top of that list. From there, you can start to think about what the capital structure of a sovereign actually looks like.
Lev Breydo: At the top are the multilaterals, such as World Bank development financing and IMF crisis facilities. Then there are bilateral arrangements, which involve country-to-country lending. Beyond that, there are the historic official channels, whether through the Paris Club or the G20.
Lev Breydo: Then you have non–Paris Club lenders, where China’s Belt and Road Initiative represents a large share, although other countries, such as India, have become more active as well. Finally, there is commercial debt, primarily the bond markets, which have expanded significantly for emerging and frontier sovereigns over the last couple of decades.
[00:08:30]
Lev Breydo: For some countries that historically couldn’t borrow from private markets, this expansion has been meaningful. In some respects, that isn’t a bad thing. But it fundamentally changes the nature and structure of borrowing.
Lev Breydo: If the creditor is a hedge fund or a mutual fund, their incentives and objectives are very different from those of the World Bank or another sovereign. There are pros and cons to that shift. It becomes more of a commercial relationship, which isn’t necessarily negative, but behaviour changes significantly when countries face distress or difficult periods.
[00:09:00]
Lev Breydo: That’s one aspect. Another is how the documentation itself looks. In bond markets, over time, we’ve seen greater standardisation of terms, which I broadly view as constructive, particularly given the challenge of resolving distress.
[00:09:30]
Lev Breydo: When I think about credit, the starting point is often: what happens if this goes sideways? What happens if a country can’t pay? In the US and in Europe, we have well-developed bankruptcy systems. For sovereigns, there is no centralised court or formal process to resolve distress.
Lev Breydo: As a result, much of this has had to be addressed through contract design, and that structure has evolved considerably. That doesn’t mean standardisation exists across the board. Russia is a clear example, where bonds moved from being relatively market-standard before 2014 to becoming increasingly idiosyncratic.
[00:10:00]
Lev Breydo: There are many examples of countries that still have bonds with terms that are far from market norms. These differences often only become apparent when borrowers get into trouble. That’s when people really start scrutinising the documents.
Lev Breydo: The structure of bilateral and multilateral borrowing is also interesting because, in some cases, it is surprisingly informal. Take US Treasuries, for example. This is a 30 trillion dollar market, the largest single-asset market in the world.
[00:10:30]
Lev Breydo: You would expect it to be documented in extraordinary detail. In reality, it’s remarkably informal. In a recent paper I wrote with a colleague, we show that the rules governing US Treasuries are a mix of legislation, market practice, and what are effectively back-of-the-napkin arrangements.
Lev Breydo: This massive market underpins the global economy. Sovereign credit, in some ways, is becoming more formalised and organised, but in many respects it remains remarkably informal and operates much as it did decades ago.
[00:11:00]
Dominic: I think that’s really interesting. If we look at practical examples, developing countries in 2025 will face around seven trillion US dollars in bond and loan repayments this year alone. Yet, as you said, there’s no formal bankruptcy mechanism for sovereigns that can’t meet their obligations.
[00:11:30]
Dominic: What does that look like in practice? How does it play out when nation states can’t pay their debts, both for those countries themselves and for the global economy?
Lev Breydo: At a high level, Argentina is a useful reference point, for better or worse, simply because of the number of data points we have.
Lev Breydo: In reality, for the country itself, default is a deeply traumatic event. Not just in policy or macroeconomic terms, but in very real human terms. It often sets development back years, sometimes decades.
[00:12:00]
Lev Breydo: In the 1980s, Latin America experienced what economists call the “lost decade,” when roughly half a generation of growth was wiped out through a series of messy defaults. I see that as the worst possible outcome, particularly when multiple sovereigns are in trouble at the same time.
Lev Breydo: The IMF is well resourced, but its resources are not infinite.
Lev Breydo: On the private sector side, there is a community of advisers and investors who operate in distressed sovereign debt, but capacity there also reaches its limits quickly, especially when large sovereigns like Argentina or Ecuador are involved.
[00:12:30]
Lev Breydo: These situations are hardest when multiple crises occur simultaneously. Even at the margin, that tends to worsen outcomes across the board. From a policy perspective, avoiding that scenario is critical.
Lev Breydo: At the level of the individual country, and in very simplified terms, the IMF often acts as a lender of last resort. In Argentina’s most recent programme, it provided a facility of over 50 billion dollars, the largest in IMF history, to help stabilise the country and get it through negotiations with private creditors.
[00:13:00]
Lev Breydo: Even then, restructurings can be extremely messy. In one case, an Argentine naval vessel was seized on behalf of a hedge fund, Elliott Management.
Lev Breydo: If you step back, it’s quite extraordinary. It’s almost like a war scenario, with sailors detained on behalf of financiers based in midtown Manhattan. From their perspective, they are pursuing assets wherever they can.
[00:13:30]
Lev Breydo: But it runs directly into the normative boundaries of sovereignty. What does it mean to be a country? What kinds of protections and privileges should sovereigns have relative to private actors?
Lev Breydo: With the increase in bond borrowing, we’re likely to see more of these conflicts. There will be tension between the legitimate fiduciary obligations of creditors and the limits imposed by sovereignty.
Lev Breydo: That tension creates a range of unresolved challenges.
[00:14:00]
Dominic: You’ve described some of those unresolved challenges in developing and less powerful economies. But the United States sits at the centre of the global credit system, and you’re speaking from Washington today.
Dominic: US debt is both a source of strength and a potential structural vulnerability for the global economy.
[00:14:30]
Dominic: At last count, US debt stood at around 35 trillion dollars, exceeding 120 percent of GDP. Interest payments are projected to surpass defence spending either this year or next, yet US Treasury securities remain the backbone of global reserves.
Dominic: That suggests fiscal turbulence in Washington, debt ceiling standoffs, credit downgrades, or monetisation can translate into international risk very quickly.
[00:15:00]
Dominic: I’d like to hear your thoughts on executive leverage in the United States, and the authority the president retains to influence debt repayment or prioritisation in a crisis.
Dominic: Given how central US Treasuries are to global stability, the boundary between domestic politics and global risk seems razor thin. Is this something we should be paying closer attention to?
Lev Breydo: It’s a great question. You hit the nail on the head. You’re absolutely right. Given the unique role of the United States, domestic policy choices and policy errors will ripple across the global economy. There’s really no question about it.
Lev Breydo: At the end of the day, the way people think about risk for particular assets is a function of how much riskier those assets are relative to US Treasuries, the baseline risk-free rate.
Lev Breydo: When there’s volatility in that market, it inherently creates challenges downstream. That’s true for larger developed markets as well as emerging markets.
[00:16:00]
Lev Breydo: When thinking about the executive in the US, whether this is viewed as a consideration or an active risk is somewhat in the eye of the beholder and dependent on how events unfold. But I think it’s very real, particularly given the fairly regular brinkmanship around the debt ceiling.
Lev Breydo: As the US fiscal position becomes more constrained, there’s really no way around the fact that US debt has increased in an almost linear fashion since the 2008 crisis. It’s been one of the few areas of bipartisan consensus, borrowing more, and it represents a real fiscal challenge domestically.
[00:16:30]
Lev Breydo: By its nature, this becomes an international risk issue. In terms of executive leverage, there are several vectors through which this could play out.
Lev Breydo: One is the current debt ceiling standoff and the risk of government shutdowns, where the executive has a critical role in either resolving or prolonging the situation.
Lev Breydo: More broadly, there are proposals that have been circulating, including the so-called Mar-a-Lago Accords, [00:17:00] which, in loose terms, involve recutting US terms of trade and, as a consequence, restructuring US Treasuries.
Lev Breydo: Even discussion of these ideas can have adverse effects. It’s an open question whether we’re already seeing this reflected in elevated borrowing costs at the long end of the yield curve, but I think there is at least some evidence of that.
Lev Breydo: If these ideas move from discussion to concrete policy proposals, the risk is vastly magnified. It’s hard to see this as a purely domestic US issue, because it will almost inevitably affect other countries.
[00:17:30]
Dominic: Can you help us understand how some of this jigsaw puzzle fits together? Many of our listeners are based across North America and Europe. They are policy advisers to government officials and senior business leaders.
Dominic: To give a recent example, on Friday the 10th of October, I was travelling with my son to Copenhagen. We were looking through Bloomberg and talking about the stock market.
[00:18:00]
Dominic: We looked at the S&P, the Nasdaq, and the Dow, and everything was red. It was a painful combination of headwinds, including China discussing restrictions on rare earth minerals.
Dominic: Trump tweeting that he might add another 100 percent in tariffs against China, concerns about the upcoming earnings season, the ongoing US government shutdown, and developments in Treasury markets.
Dominic: How do all these factors come together? When we look at equity markets, debt servicing, and sovereign debt around the world, and when we consider the difficulty the US Federal Reserve faces in balancing inflation and labour market pressures, how should we read the tea leaves?
[00:18:30]
Dominic: What does all of this mean when we put it together for our listeners?
Lev Breydo: That’s the trillion-dollar question. I wish I had a silver bullet answer, but my perspective is that, with the global economy, we really are in a very dangerous place.
[00:19:00]
Lev Breydo: We’ve reached a very precarious juncture for a number of reasons. For the US, but really across the globe, borrowing levels are at record highs. It’s a significant challenge for economies to grow into these capital structures.
Lev Breydo: There’s really no way around that. And it’s hard to imagine a world where there aren’t some defaults and restructurings in emerging markets.
Lev Breydo: Some level of restructuring is healthy. The key is ensuring it doesn’t become a full-blown crisis and remains contained to individual sovereigns.
Lev Breydo: When I think about domestic equities, there’s a lot to worry about. By most measures, we’re at record highs, comparable to or exceeding levels seen during the dot-com era.
[00:19:30]
Lev Breydo: As someone who studies AI and believes strongly in the technology, it’s still difficult not to worry about concentration risk.
Lev Breydo: The ten largest companies now account for around 40 percent of US equity markets. With the exception of Berkshire Hathaway, this is very much an AI-driven story.
Lev Breydo: If one of these firms were to stumble, the impact could be dramatic, particularly given how interconnected they are and how much business they do with one another.
[00:20:00]
Lev Breydo: I increasingly think about systemic risk in this sector, which isn’t typically associated with that kind of contagion.
Lev Breydo: We saw something similar in the crypto space. When FTX collapsed, the level of interconnectedness caused a cascade of failures.
Lev Breydo: There was also an interesting piece discussing what might happen if OpenAI were to face serious challenges. For any one of the dozen or so leading AI firms in the US, it’s hard to see how a major problem would be contained.
[00:20:30]
Lev Breydo: All of this is a long way of saying that I see a lot of potential risks on the horizon. When I think about where markets might be a year from now, it’s hard to imagine a scenario where conditions improve organically.
Lev Breydo: It’s much easier to imagine a scenario where one of many possible shocks occurs and triggers broader problems downstream.
Dominic: Looking back at the dot-com bubble, the S&P 500 price-to-book ratio now exceeds what we saw in March 2000.
[00:21:00]
Dominic: As you mentioned, many AI startups are booming and driving much of the growth in global equity markets, particularly in the US.
Dominic: We’re seeing valuations of 25 to 30 times earnings, and sometimes up to 50 times revenue, even when income models remain very tenuous.
Dominic: You’ve spoken about concentration risk and the extent to which a small number of companies are influencing large parts of the market.
[00:21:30]
Dominic: When you hear that MIT recently found that 95 percent of surveyed firms have yet to see a material return on their AI investments, does that raise concerns about a potential bubble?
Lev Breydo: It’s hard not to be at least somewhat worried. Even people within the industry have acknowledged that.
Lev Breydo: There are many AI tools that I use in my day-to-day work, as do many others. This is clearly a real theme with the potential to be impactful across industries.
[00:22:00]
Lev Breydo: I wouldn’t yet say it’s as transformative as the internet, but there is a plausible story there, and it will certainly have a significant impact. The question is whether we are overpricing that potential.
Lev Breydo: When you look at the earnings power companies need to grow into to justify current valuations, it’s challenging.
Lev Breydo: Capital expenditure, in particular, worries me.
[00:22:30]
Lev Breydo: Companies like Meta and Google historically had relatively low capital intensity, but they are now planning to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on data centres and infrastructure.
Lev Breydo: Given chip cycles involving firms like Nvidia and AMD, there is a real risk that companies will invest billions in assets that become obsolete within 24 months.
[00:23:00]
Lev Breydo: These businesses have historically been valuable because they were able to scale while maintaining very strong margins.
Lev Breydo: If operations become more capital intensive, margin structures will change, and it’s hard to see how that represents an improvement over the past.
Lev Breydo: That raises the question of how much larger these businesses need to become to justify current valuations.
Lev Breydo: I can imagine a scenario where some of these firms emerge as clear AI winners and grow into their valuations.
[00:23:30]
Lev Breydo: But it’s hard to imagine a scenario where all of them succeed simultaneously.
Lev Breydo: If firms are telling shareholders they need to spend aggressively because this is a winner-takes-all market, it becomes difficult to price in how everyone still wins.
Lev Breydo: That, to me, is a very real challenge that markets may be underestimating.
Dominic: That’s a very valid analysis. When we talk about risk, we also need to remember that the other side of risk is opportunity.
[00:24:00]
Dominic: Given your background in financial law and emerging technologies, I’d love to hear your thoughts on how artificial intelligence and digital assets intersect with sovereign risk.
Dominic: Do these technologies offer greater transparency and efficiency, or do they introduce new vectors for instability and manipulation?
Lev Breydo: AI, in particular, offers tremendous opportunity for countries to leap forward in growth and to build regional leadership and ecosystems.
[00:24:30]
Lev Breydo: When I think about what Ukraine could look like post-conflict, in a best-case scenario, I would love to see a South Korea-style outcome. Despite the devastation of conflict, South Korea became a remarkable growth success story.
Lev Breydo: That’s the kind of long-term trajectory I hope Ukraine can achieve.
Lev Breydo: With digital assets, especially in emerging markets, the value proposition is often clearer than it is in the US.
[00:25:00]
Lev Breydo: In the US, payment systems and credit markets are relatively robust, so digital assets don’t always feel like a first-order issue.
Lev Breydo: In frontier and fast-growing emerging markets, however, it’s a very different story.
Lev Breydo: Financial infrastructure in these countries often lags behind public expectations.
[00:25:30]
Lev Breydo: Digital assets and blockchain-related tools offer enormous potential to build more efficient, effective, and transparent systems than legacy infrastructure allows.
Lev Breydo: That potential is exciting, but implementation is much harder in practice.
Lev Breydo: Legal systems, governance, and coordination all need to come together for this to work.
[00:26:00]
Lev Breydo: There are certainly risks as well. That’s why transparency and international coordination are so important.
Lev Breydo: The goal should be a race to the top toward robust global standards, not a race to the bottom.
Dominic: Oh, thanks for unpacking that. I think that was really good analysis. When you look around the world, you lecture, you research, and you speak to many people. What are the international risks that concern you the most?
[00:26:30]
Lev Breydo: For quite some time, I’ve been worried about an issue we’ve touched on already, the rapid run-up in emerging market debt. I’m particularly concerned about the risk of multiple crises occurring simultaneously, or near-simultaneously.
Lev Breydo: By some measures, emerging market borrowing has almost doubled from pre-COVID levels to now. That’s a very fast increase, even for countries with robust systems and solid growth. It’s a lot to manage, and ensuring that borrowing remains sustainable without hurting growth is a serious challenge.
[00:27:00]
Lev Breydo: I think this is a very real risk, and one that has significant downstream effects. This is especially concerning as we appear to be entering a new phase in the global trade regime, which is something that worries me greatly.
Lev Breydo: Volatility around trade policy is another example of what is often framed as a domestic issue in the United States. Given the US role in the global economy, tariff decisions have consequences far beyond national borders.
[00:27:30]
Lev Breydo: When I think about the negative impact on countries like Vietnam, which, from my observations and conversations, have acted in good faith to play by the rules and develop their domestic systems, the potential negative externalities are enormous.
Lev Breydo: These impacts are often underappreciated in domestic policy debates, even though they have the potential to set millions of people back an entire generation. That would be, normatively speaking, a deeply troubling outcome.
Dominic: Yes, absolutely. Thank you very much for raising that, and thank you for coming on the podcast today, Lev.
[00:28:00]
Lev Breydo: Thank you for having me. This was great. I appreciate it.
Dominic: That was a fascinating conversation with Professor Lev Breydo, whose work on law, finance, and technology helps us understand how credit markets and financial instruments shape global power and international risk.
Dominic: Please remember that you can now watch and listen to the International Risk Podcast on YouTube, so please subscribe and like our content there.
[00:28:30]
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