Synthetic Biology, Global Risks and Benefits, and the Future of Engineering Life
Synthetic biology is increasingly recognised as one of the most consequential technological domains shaping global risk in the coming decade, with major implications highlighted in recent reports by the OECD and other international policy bodies. Advances in biological engineering are already transforming medicine, industrial production, and climate innovation, a trajectory documented in futures‑oriented assessments of the bioeconomy and synthetic biology applications. At the same time, policymakers, scientists, and security communities are grappling with how to govern technologies that evolve faster than existing legal and institutional frameworks, a challenge repeatedly noted in international governance analyses.
In a recent episode of The International Risk Podcast, Dr Tae Seok Moon joined Dominic Bowen to examine how synthetic biology is moving from a specialised research field into a strategic issue with implications for international security, governance, and risk management, echoing concerns raised in recent global governance studies on gene editing and synthetic biology. The discussion reflects a broader shift in how biological innovation is now understood, not only as a source of opportunity, but as an area where oversight, coordination, and restraint matter, in line with expert calls for “responsible innovation” and anticipatory regulation.
From laboratory science to systemic impact
Over the past two decades, synthetic biology has progressed from experimental research into practical application, moving along the trajectory described in technology‑foresight work on future trends in synthetic biology. Engineered biological systems are now used in vaccine development, biomanufacturing, environmental remediation, and agricultural innovation, as documented by OECD biotechnology updates.These developments are widely viewed as positive, particularly in areas such as public health and sustainability, including climate‑relevant and resource‑efficiency applications.
International organisations, including the OECD and scientific and biodiversity advisory bodies, have increasingly highlighted synthetic biology’s potential contribution to addressing climate change, pollution, and resource efficiency, embedding it within broader sustainability and biodiversity agendas. At the same time, they emphasise that the growing scale and accessibility of these technologies requires governance approaches that extend beyond traditional research oversight, including new forms of international coordination and standards.
Governance gaps and dual‑use concerns
A central challenge in synthetic biology governance is the issue of dual‑use risk, widely recognised and addressed by several scientific and engineering bodies such as the Engineering Biology Research Consortium (EBRC). Techniques designed to produce beneficial outcomes can, in theory, be repurposed in harmful ways, an observation repeatedly articulated in biosecurity and arms‑control discussions. This concern is not new, but it has become more prominent as tools for biological design, DNA synthesis, and automation have become more accessible and more powerful, as noted in analyses of AI‑enabled biosafety challenges and DNA synthesis governance.
Recent policy discussions within international institutions have pointed out that existing frameworks, including arms control and biosecurity agreements developed during the Cold War era, were not designed with contemporary synthetic biology in mind, leaving important regulatory and normative gaps. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) remains a cornerstone of global norms, but many analysts now argue that it requires complementary mechanisms, such as harmonised DNA screening, transparency measures, and new dialogue platforms, to address today’s technological realities.
Importantly, the prevailing view in the research and policy community is not that synthetic biology is inherently destabilising, but that governance has not kept pace with capability, a theme emphasised in both futures reports and recent global governance studies. Risk emerges less from deliberate misuse alone and more from uneven oversight, fragmented standards, and gaps between national regulatory systems, especially where voluntary industry measures substitute for binding international norms.
The role of AI and automation
Another widely discussed dimension is the growing interaction between artificial intelligence and biological engineering, particularly as highlighted in updated nucleic acid screening guidance and AI‑biosafety discussions. AI‑enabled tools are increasingly used to accelerate biological design, modelling, and optimisation, which improves efficiency and lowers costs but also complicates monitoring and control of emerging capabilities. While this improves efficiency and lowers costs, it also raises questions about how quickly new capabilities can spread and how difficult they may be to monitor, especially as automated design can help circumvent traditional screening strategies.
This convergence has been consistently framed as a governance challenge rather than an immediate security crisis, urging caution without endorsing alarmist narratives of imminent catastrophe. The emphasis is on ensuring that screening, verification, and professional norms evolve alongside technical capability, particularly as automation reduces the need for specialised expertise and lowers barriers to sophisticated biological work.
Managing risk without halting innovation
A consistent theme across international assessments is that the solution is not to restrict research wholesale, but to embed risk awareness into the development and deployment of new technologies through responsible innovation frameworks. This includes strengthening biosafety practices, improving DNA sequence screening, enhancing transparency in research collaboration, and supporting shared standards across borders, all of which feature prominently in recent policy proposals.
The discussion with Dr Moon reflects this consensus, mirroring expert arguments that synthetic biology should be governed rather than suppressed. Synthetic biology is widely seen as too important to abandon and too powerful to leave unmanaged, making institutional design, international cooperation, and professional responsibility more central than technological prohibition.
International collaboration as a stabilising force
Unlike many traditional security domains, biological innovation is inherently transnational. Pollution, disease, and environmental degradation do not respect borders, and neither do the benefits of technological solutions, which is why leading organisations such as the OECD, International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS), and Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) emphasise cross‑border cooperation and capacity‑building. For this reason, there is an emphasis on collaboration over competition as a core stabilising principle in managing synthetic biology.
Dr Moon highlights how international research networks, shared governance frameworks, and inclusive scientific communities can reduce asymmetries in access and oversight, echoing calls to address participation and capacity gaps in synthetic biology governance. In his view, global cooperation is not idealistic, but practical: fragmented governance increases risk, while coordinated standards, shared screening practices, and joint dialogues help contain it.
A domain of long‑term risk, not imminent catastrophe
Current expert consensus does not frame synthetic biology as an immediate existential threat, but rather as a domain of significant long‑term risk that depends heavily on governance choices made today. Experts stress that while extreme worst‑case scenarios cannot be ruled out, their probability remains low compared to more plausible systemic and regional impacts, making balanced risk framing crucial.
Dr Moon conveys a critical message: the challenge is to avoid both complacency and alarmism, a balance also advocated in global governance and responsible innovation literature. Synthetic biology will continue to expand into new sectors and regions, and whether it becomes a source of instability or resilience will depend less on the science itself than on how institutions, norms, and policies evolve around it, particularly in relation to equity, transparency, and oversight.
For governments, businesses, and international organisations, synthetic biology represents a test case for managing technological risk in an era where innovation outpaces regulation, as explicitly noted in analyses of emerging biotechnologies and AI‑enabled bio‑capabilities. The question is not whether these technologies will shape the future, but whether global governance can shape them responsibly through coordinated standards, adaptive institutions, and sustained international cooperation.
