Interference in Orbit: Legal Ambiguity, Strategic Risk, and the Future of Space Governance
In an increasingly congested and contested domain, the question of whether interference with satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constitutes an act of war is no longer theoretical. The proliferation of satellite constellations, the strategic entanglement of civilian and military uses, and the rise of ambiguous state behaviour in orbit have created an unstable environment — one where existing legal frameworks strain to keep pace with emerging threats.
Space-based infrastructure now forms the backbone of critical national functions, from military operations and banking systems to disaster response and agricultural forecasting. However, the governance mechanisms underpinning these technologies have not evolved in parallel. According to Professor Kai-Uwe Schrogl, President of the International Institute of Space Law and Special Advisor at the European Space Agency, we have already entered a phase in which the normative foundations of peaceful cooperation in space are being openly challenged by state actors. The consequences of this erosion are growing more acute with each passing year.
Interference with space systems, including jamming, spoofing, and proximity operations, has become not only more common, but more deliberate. Such actions are increasingly deployed in geopolitical flashpoints, where the intention is to create disruption without triggering overt retaliation. The absence of clear legal thresholds defining when such interference transitions from nuisance to hostility has given rise to a dangerous permissiveness. Rather than being an unfortunate oversight, this legal ambiguity is now being actively leveraged for strategic advantage.
Legal Frameworks Under Strain
International space law, much of which was drafted in the early decades of the Cold War, was never designed to govern the complexities of the current orbital environment. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, for example, prohibits weapons of mass destruction in orbit but is largely silent on conventional arms, cyber operations, or interference tactics. Telecommunications law similarly attempts to regulate the use of frequency spectrum, but enforcement remains fragmented and politically fraught.
The result is a governance vacuum where adversarial activities occur just below the threshold of open conflict. Crucially, the challenge is not the absence of international principles — many of which remain relevant — but the lack of enforceable mechanisms and real-time frameworks for coordination and accountability. Definitions remain elusive, and in key diplomatic forums, such as the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, consensus on what constitutes a “space weapon” continues to stall. In practice, any manoeuvrable satellite can be directed toward another as a kinetic threat, rendering traditional distinctions between offensive and benign use increasingly obsolete.
This inability to define or constrain space-based threats contributes to a strategic grey zone in which escalation risks are high, but the legal tools to mitigate them are underdeveloped. Without transparency, notification protocols, or binding verification mechanisms, even accidental collisions or system failures can be misread as hostile actions — a scenario with serious potential for escalation.
Strategic Ambiguity and the Escalation Risk
The current environment allows powerful states to test boundaries without clear consequence. During the war in Ukraine, for example, interference with satellite communications — particularly the jamming of Starlink terminals — illustrated just how vulnerable civil and military systems are to disruption. Meanwhile, Chinese satellites have engaged in proximity operations that, while not explicitly aggressive, are nonetheless difficult to interpret as benign. These cases are not anomalies; they are symptomatic of a broader trend in which interference is used strategically, particularly in conflict zones, with little international consensus on how to respond.
The ambiguity surrounding such actions creates a significant risk of misperception. In the absence of clear rules or agreed-upon thresholds, one state’s disruption may be interpreted by another as a precursor to conflict. If the intent of an action is uncertain, the probability of miscalculation rises. This creates a fragile deterrence landscape in which misunderstandings — rather than intent — may drive escalation.
The Commercial Complication
A particularly acute risk lies in the cumulative effects of such ambiguities. If interference activities continue to proliferate without legal clarity or diplomatic redress, near-Earth orbit may eventually become functionally unusable — not due to deliberate sabotage, but as a consequence of inertia, regulatory failure, and unmanaged escalation dynamics.
Compounding these risks is the accelerating commercialisation of space. Satellite constellations operated by private companies — such as SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper — are redefining the scale and speed of orbital development. Thousands of satellites are being launched annually, many under the regulatory oversight of a single state authority. This expansion, while technologically impressive, has rapidly outpaced global governance.
Although private operators remain subject to national licensing requirements, the international community has yet to agree on a binding framework for space traffic management. There are no universal rules for collision avoidance, spectrum allocation, or liability in the event of accidental interference. The density of orbital traffic is increasing, but the systems needed to coordinate and deconflict that traffic remain largely conceptual.
The implications extend beyond safety. In a highly congested environment, interference between commercial constellations and national security assets becomes more likely — whether accidental or intentional. Without robust coordination and regulation, the commercial race to occupy LEO could destabilise the broader strategic equilibrium. The challenge is not simply one of congestion, but of governance capacity and legal preparedness.
Toward Transparency and Governance
Despite these trends, there remains a path forward — albeit one that demands political will and legal innovation. Enhancing transparency is essential. Confidence-building measures, such as shared orbital data, pre-launch notifications, and coordinated traffic protocols, could reduce misinterpretation and improve attribution. These mechanisms are not without precedent; similar approaches have long been used in arms control and maritime security.
Crucially, responsibility cannot be confined to states alone. Commercial actors must also recognise their role in ensuring the sustainability and security of the space environment. Long-term stability depends on reframing space not as an arena of unconstrained opportunity, but as a shared domain governed by collective norms. Short-term strategic or commercial advantage achieved through regulatory avoidance will ultimately generate long-term vulnerability — for all actors.
Governments, in turn, must resist the temptation to view commercial flexibility as a substitute for legal clarity. In the absence of enforceable obligations, market forces alone will not produce the kinds of strategic restraint needed to manage a complex, contested domain. Regulation must be proactive, not reactive, and informed by realistic assessments of both threat and capability.
A Critical Juncture for Policy
Space is no longer a neutral or purely scientific domain. It has become an extension of terrestrial geopolitical competition — a domain where strategic ambiguity, legal inertia, and commercial acceleration are converging. The risks are not limited to confrontation between major powers. They encompass broader threats to stability, sustainability, and civilian resilience.
The international community must act before the window for cooperative governance closes. Regulatory and diplomatic mechanisms that could have been implemented a decade ago are now more difficult — but no less essential. The goal must be to restore predictability, preserve functionality, and reduce the incentives for strategic provocation.
This is not simply a legal challenge. It is a test of foresight and collective responsibility in an environment where the cost of inaction may ultimately be paid in the form of irreversible degradation — both of the orbital commons and the international order that depends on it.
