Episode 254: Current Updates on the Russia-Ukraine War with Stefan Wolff

Coordinated and Produced by Elisa Garbil

Dominic Bowen hosts Stefan Wolff back on the podcast to discuss the Russia-Ukraine war. They dive into the current state of the war, how Trump’s ultimatum affects diplomatic tensions and whether this will actually change anything. Moreover they discuss Russia’s hybrid warfare and the challenges these bring to peace talks. Find out more about Russia’s long-term strategic objectives and the internal political stability in Ukraine, and more!

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security in Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Birmingham. A political scientist by background, he specialises in the management of contemporary security challenges, especially in the prevention and settlement of ethnic conflicts, in post-conflict state-building in deeply divided and war-torn societies, and in contemporary geopolitics and great-power rivalry. Wolff has extensive expertise in the post-Soviet space and has also worked on a wide range of other conflicts elsewhere, including in the Middle East and North Africa, in Central Asia, and in sub-Saharan Africa. 

With almost three decades of experience in UK higher education, Wolff has a publication record that includes almost 100 journal articles and book chapters, as well as 20 books. He is the founding editor of Ethnopolitics, co-founder of Navigating the Vortex, and a regular international affairs contributor to The Conversation. 

Bridging the divide between academia and policymaking, Wolff regularly advises governments and international organisations and has been involved in various phases of conflict settlement processes, including in the disputed territories in Iraq, in Transnistria and Gagauzia (Moldova), in Ukraine, Syria, and Yemen. 

Wolff holds degrees from the University of Leipzig (Erstes Staatsexamen), the University of Cambridge (M.Phil.), and the LSE (Ph.D.).

The International Risk Podcast is a weekly podcast for senior executives, board members, and risk advisors. In these podcasts, we speak with experts in a variety of fields to explore international relations. Our host is Dominic Bowen, Head of Strategic Advisory at one of Europe’s leading risk consulting firms. Dominic is a regular public and corporate event speaker, and visiting lecturer at several universities. Having spent the last 20 years successfully establishing large and complex operations in the world’s highest-risk areas and conflict zones, Dominic now joins you to speak with exciting guests around the world to discuss international risk.

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Transcript:

Stefan Wolff: [00:00:00] I think there is a very clear mismatch between Russia’s ambitions and Russia’s capabilities. And

Elisa Garbil: Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organizations worldwide.

Dominic Bowen: Hi, I’m Dominic Bowen and welcome back to the International Risk Podcast. today’s guest is someone who needs no introduction to our long-term listeners, professor Stefan Wolf. He’s one of the world’s foremost experts on international security and conflict resolution. first joined us on the International Risk Podcast at episode 187, we explored the dynamics of frozen conflicts and the architecture of post-conflict states.

today we’re bringing it back. Because the risks we’ve discussed then have not just persisted, but they’ve grown. Stefan is a professor at the University of Birmingham and a seasoned advisor to some of the world’s most fragile and divided regions from Kirkuk to Kosovo and mold over to Sudan. his work doesn’t just sit on academic shelves, it sits on negotiating tables and in foreign ministries.

as the Russia, Ukraine War grinds into its fourth summer, [00:01:00] we’re really at a dangerous threshold there. Diplomacy is stalled. Air raids are relentless. Beneath the battlefield, a deeper erosion is occurring on many levels. and just today, you know, the heartbreaking story of a a 23-year-old woman who was seven months pregnant, was killed when, Russia attacked a maternity hospital, Kaminsky.

So the, the war really has a very human face as, as well as what we’re seeing at the strategic level. today’s conversation with Stefan, we’ll look at. Russia’s endurance and what its strategy really looks like. How Ukraine’s internal fragility is, holding up and international support and many other topics.

Stefan Wolf, welcome back to the International Risk Podcast.

Stefan Wolff: you very much for having me again.

Dominic Bowen: So today we saw that Trump has drastically shortened his ceasefire deadline for Russia cutting a previously announced 50 day window, down to just more vague 10 to 12 days. And Trump has cited frustration over continued missile attacks.

The. Despite diplomatic gestures, and Trump specifically said that he was very disappointed in Vladimir Putin and demanded faster [00:02:00] progress or else threatened secondary sanctions and tariffs if no breakthrough occurs. And meanwhile, in Moscow, former Russian president, Dimitri Medvedev has responded by warning that Trump’s new ultimatum risks escalating into a broader conflict.

Even involving the United States directly. So Stefan, I wonder how serious is this ultimatum from President Trump? Also nicknamed Tacho, ‘ cause he always chickens out. And is Putin’s likely to concede under pressure or is this just high stakes and high decibel posturing actual limited outcome?

Stefan Wolff: Well, I think there’s a, a lot to unpack here.

I mean, starting with the, issue of whether Trump was just out or whether he really is serious this time. It’s hard to say. get a sense. To the extent that you can get any reading, uh, of Trump, that he is really frustrated. I mean, this was one of his flagship campaign promises.

He’ll end the war, in, 24 hours and we have just passed six months, actually assuming, office in the White House, for the second time, nowhere near [00:03:00] any, even a cease file in Ukraine. Quin can imagine that that really riles him up quite a lot. And in some of his, more recent statements, he has been very outspoken about the fact that, Putin promises him something on the phone and then a couple of hours later he completely relates on that and, launches another AI attack or whatever it might be.

So I think from, from that perspective, I. I would well, if I were a betting person, then I would probably put some money on Trump, actually this time being serious. And he might very well go, down the road of imposing, um, Sometimes it’s referred to a secondary sanction.

Sometimes it’s referred to as just plain tariffs that you were put on. Countries that are still doing, trade with Russia, in particular, buying, Russian oil. so I think that this is, more likely than not, to happen this time. How quickly that will have an effect, and whether it’ll actually sway, Putin.

I think that’s an entirely different, question. In the responses that we have had from the Kremlin, Dmitri, and [00:04:00] as you already mentioned, uh, the former, president Dmitri, MiEV not, indicate. Putin is, well basically planning on, withdrawing his, troops from, Ukraine as we speak.

But I also don’t think it’s necessarily so much directly about the immediate impact on the Russian, uh, economy that these Tariffs, might have if then say countries like India or China, are stopping to buy Russian oil. It’s gonna be more important how countries like China will actually respond.

It’ll President Xi, for example, put pressure on Putin now to, um, resolve this matter because Xi also plays, probably a multi-level. game here he also needs to worry, a little bit about how his relationship with Trump will be going, whether there will be a trade deal, which, is being negotiated, in parallel at the moment between, uh, Chinese and, US, trade officials.

So I think there’s still a lot up in the, air, and there is not necessarily a direct and immediate, connection [00:05:00] between Trump being serious about these, tariffs. And, then, of an, an almost instantaneous knock on effect that would lead, to a, to a ceasefire in the war against Ukraine.

Dominic Bowen: And Dimitri Medvedev has certainly during the last three or four years, really been seen as Putin’s pit dog just spewing out rhetoric, including the threats of nuclear war and, and others. So it’s, it’s quite easy to dismiss his recent comments. As you know, his comments about, uh, for wider conflict is just something to dismiss easily, I wonder if you see it the same way and if you see Trump’s deadline as just simply a negotiation deadline.

Or do you see it as something that could escalate into a, threshold including confrontation?

Stefan Wolff: I’m less worried. I, I have to say at the moment about, further escalation, not least, because I mean, for all the talk, russia still has not really made that many additional gains in Ukraine.

Yes, they are killing a lot of people in the, air raid, but, Ukraine is still holding on, for example, to the city of, Of major [00:06:00] logistics hubs in the eastern part of the, frontline in, at, so yes, I mean the Russians are making sort of incremental gains, but they are making these gains at enormous costs, um, much smaller country, that is really quite stretched in terms of, Both the, military equipment that they have, but also the, personnel. So some of the units on the front lines there have seen very little rotation certainly over the past few months. But, even, some extent in the, uh, run. I mean, people have been fighting there basically for the last three, plus years.

And, some of them were, were, were stationed in particular. in,

well before then, ever since the.

We were meant to bring some kind of, cease fire to the front line there. So for all that, I’m really not seeing where Russia would have the military resources for a major confrontation now, uh, other countries beyond, uh, Ukraine. [00:07:00] said, I think what we have seen in particular, over the past, six months is, quite a significant increase in these, sort of more clandestine operations that, the Russians have, mounted. So everything that’s sometimes referred to as, uh, hybrid war that Russia has been waging against, uh, in particular, European, members of nato.

So I could imagine that there. Potential for an uptick there, but, I do not right now, really see, Russia, you know, sending, armor divisions across this gap or, anything like that.

Dominic Bowen: So we’ve spoken a little bit about the threats of hybrid warfare from Russia and fact that this is already something that we’re seeing and we’re seeing it across, mainland Europe today.

But if we were to see, as you said, a potential uptick or an escalation when it comes to hybrid war from Russia and Europe, would that look like? What are the sort of indications that you would be looking for?

Stefan Wolff: Well, I think we, we have probably seen a lot of that, already. So you have all kinds of, cyber attacks, of, of various, sorts against, [00:08:00] critical, infrastructure, uh, institutions in, uh, countries.

We have seen attempts to, cut, under sea cables. in particular in the, in the Baltic, we have seen, arson attacks, including here in the uk, against, warehouses. We have seen, when, Joe Biden was still US president, attempts to place explosive devices on cargo aircraft.

So I all of these things, I mean, there, there’s a wide repertoire of actions that Russia has, carried out in the past. and we have also seen things like, the, forced migration, crisis, it’s still to some extent, uh, going on, along the border with, Finland and, and parts of the Baltic states and, Poland.

Nowhere near, near as bad as, we had it, for example, in, in Belarus, in, 2019. But I think there is a, a range of options that, Russia has if it wanted to try and escalate, target some of, Ukraine’s key, Western, allies too. You know, try to undermine, erode, public, morale scare people force [00:09:00] governments to, to make concessions.

but all that said, I also think that, western countries are much better prepared for that now probably have, uh, whole range of options how they would, retaliate against Russia if that, escalated.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, no, I definitely agree that Europe is much better prepared today than it was several years ago, albeit it from a, from a very slow start.

But I, I continue to see that Putin is the expert at surprises, and we are generally not as creative as perhaps Putin is. And we continue to be surprised by what he’s done in Ukraine or by, by certain, hybrid attacks in Europe. I continually just try to challenge myself and, and, and clients and colleagues about what are potential hybrid or what are potential hybrid actions that Russia could take that we haven’t yet experienced?

Would it just be more of the same, or would Putin continue to, to surprise us with, something new? And you know, yet to, yet to come up with a definitive answer on that one. But I’m not sure if that’s something that, you’ve been considering, you know, Putin’s, ability to continually surprise.

Stefan Wolff: Well, I would never put that [00:10:00] beyond Putin, not least because, I mean, must never forget that he, started his career as as a KGB, officer being stationed in, East Germany.

So he probably had. Very thorough training in, sort of the, the whole range of operations that, foreign intelligence services can can conduct. And certainly, I mean since then, over the past, 35, uh, so years, the, the Russian intelligence services have continued to develop.

I mean, we have seen all kinds of, attacks, including here in the uk, where they went after, opposition figures, where they went after, former, spies and so on and so forth. I could see a lot on that, front. I mean, last year we had a. a scare that, the CEO of one of the, largest German, arms companies apparently was, on a target list by the, the Russian military intelligence, services.

I think all of that, um, certainly possible. But what I would also assume is that. There probably have been some very clear communications, through whatever channels that [00:11:00] still exist between, sort of key, Western allies and Russia, to make it very clear sort of what the, what the red lines, um, that Russia must not, cross to the extent that, information is publicly available.

I mean, when Russia planted these explosive devices on cargo aircraft last year I mean, it was very clear communication from the Biden administration to, to the Kremlin, saying, this has to stop, or else, it did stop. I think from, that perspective, we shouldn’t underestimate, Also the deterrent capabilities that the west, still has, even though it looks often a bit fuzzy, a bit vague, a bit, soft. But, I mean, after all the West did survive, a very ugly, uh, war that lasted for a good 40 years and came out on top. I some of this metal just needs to be rediscovered, and put into action again.

Dominic Bowen: And so I’m, I’m curious about the conditions. You know, certainly there’s a a lot of risk, but we also wanna focus on the opportunity and the potential for [00:12:00] Rush Ukraine Peace Talks and identifying a viable path towards a durable ceasefire. And then ultimately, a. A peace settlement. But you know, there’s obviously these core security concerns.

They’re both Russia and Ukraine State. know, there’s the territorial issues, there’s third party monitoring, the removal of sanctions. That’s probably a little bit easier. the role of different countries in a post settlement period. do you see as the, as the key roadblocks or the, the key checkpoints that need to be ticked off if we’re going to move towards a viable p settlement in Ukraine?

Stefan Wolff: Well, I mean, there are a cover that you have already mentioned. what both sides currently envisage as acceptable, or at least what they communicate in public as acceptable. There’s just no bargaining space in between. I mean, you, you can’t have Ukraine on, the one hand saying.

For restoration of, territorial integrity in internationally recognized boundaries as of 1991. And Putin saying, well, I do want those, four regions plus, Crimea, fully recognized as as Russian. So there, there’s nothing. In between there where you could sort of, fudge [00:13:00] the issue.

So I think in, in, in that sense, it’s very unlikely in my view that we’ll get to an actual peace agreement anytime soon. I mean, what, what would be more conceivable is, um, a cease file open-ended, permanent, whatever you want to call it, that, freezes the, the front lines, but basically means that nobody recognizes the current.

Territorial status quo as it might exist by the time a ceasefire comes into effect as something in any way, permanent or not subject to future negotiations. I mean the, the, the model that a lot of people site, for that would be, probably the Korean armes, from, 1953, which basically still, exists now.

Follow on problems with that because you would need proper security guarantees, which I mean you have in Korea clearly it’s more difficult to see how they would become fully operational, in, in the case of of Ukraine. problem is that, um, are also certain things that, Dependent on other, countries playing [00:14:00] ball. So one of Putin’s demands, for example, is that, he wants all sanctions, lifted. Now, that’s not even in Trump’s gift. so Trump may be able to pressure zelensky to accept a deal. much harder for him. I think to pressure. all the other European countries that have, signed up.

I mean, the EU now I think is on, its. 18th or 19th, sanctions package. So again, I mean there, there are other sort of things in the margins that, I think are, are more difficult, to achieve. And the final roadblock, I think that’s probably at the moment, in my view perhaps even more significant than the substantive disagreements is there simply isn’t a credible process, the moment.

you would have sort of, Solid, prolonged sustained, engagement between the parties. a credible mediator who has, you know, the staying power, the attention to detail also the leverage and the resources to actually bring, bring the two sides to, uh, an agreement. I mean. the latest, meeting that they had, about a week or 10 days ago.

I mean, it didn’t really resolve anything. [00:15:00] I mean, yes, there might be more prisoner exchanges and yes, they have set up three working groups, but, I mean, we have had working groups under the Minsk agreements for, uh, years, and they have delivered much nothing. And in the end, full scale invasion uh, followed.

So Designing a process whereby you could get Kyiv and, Moscow, to actually take constructive steps towards, progress of even, a lasting ceasefire. I think that’s, that’s one of the, the key things where also at the moment see very little evidence that this is actually being achieved.

Dominic Bowen: I’m really keen to hear your thoughts, Stefan, on how Russia’s currently stated demands and what you can read between the lines, how that reflects Russia’s long term, their strategic objectives beyond the immediate territorial claims in Ukraine. I’m particularly concerned about Russia’s grand strategy, the potential that that Moscow wants to reassert its influence and status as a, as a regional hegemon, the risk that Russia wants to restore elements of its former imperial power.

I think [00:16:00] this is a concern for many analysts combined with Moscow’s desire to weaken Western influence and undermine NATO’s capability, particularly within what it sees. Its. Sphere of influence. So how do you see Russia’s current demands reflecting what you see as its long-term strategic objectives?

Stefan Wolff: No, I think it, it very much, fits into this, vision that, I think lot of people would, ascribe to Putin that he basically wants to restore some version of a Russian empire. The Soviet sphere of influence, at least within sort of the, what were the, territorial, boundaries of the Soviet Union until, 19, um. But arguably, I mean, if you, at, certain maps going back to 1989, for example, I mean, the Soviet sphere of influence, extended, basically right into the middle of, Europe. I mean, Germany was still divided. East Germany, Germany, where I grew up, was very clearly under Soviet, domination.

So. I don’t think it’s very likely that, Putin will get, that far. But what you have seen, for [00:17:00] example, in the proposals that the Russians put out in December, 2021, where they, not only demanded that there be no further, uh, NATO expansion and certainly no, admission of Ukraine into nato, they also wanted NATO troops and military assets.

where they were, prior to 1997. So before we had the first enlargement of NATO in, 1999. So I think from, from that perspective Putin clearly has, um. I would say an idea in his head of how far he wants to push a Russian sphere of influence, some kind of buffer zone between Russia, as it exists, and now maybe the union state, Russia, Belarus, and what he would probably see as, core of Western power, which probably begins somewhere.

I would guess, in Germany, Berlin or, something like that. So I think that’s, that’s definitely, going on. by the same token, I really don’t see this as, realistic. Not only because, I mean, Russia is stretched as it is, uh, So pushing further west, I think is, is relatively unlikely.

But [00:18:00] also if you look at what’s actually going on in other sort of parts of the, post-Soviet periphery, if you want. I mean, if you look at the South caucuses major falling out now between, uh, and uh, Azerbaijan, I mean in Central Asia, I mean the Chinese are not pushing very hard, but they clearly have a much more.

pronounced and active presence on the ground, now than they had, even five, let alone, 10 years, ago. So, I mean, in many ways Russia isn’t out of any of these regions, but it’s clearly no longer the unquestioned, hegemon that it was probably until, I would say at least the mid, 2020.

So, looking at that and then. looking at whatever Putin’s grand ambitions in Western Europe might be. I think there is a very clear mismatch between Russia’s ambitions and Russia’s capabilities. And that in many ways presents, an opportunity here for the rest to, well, we have some time, to build up, but build up we must, so that, there’s a clear.

[00:19:00] Signal that is being sent to Russia, which is one of absolute, credible, deterrence.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, credible deterrence and, building up. We must, uh, great points. I’d like to, to pick up Stefan, I’ll just take the opportunity to remind our listeners to go to the International Risk podcast website and subscribe to our newsletter to make sure you’re getting our latest articles, podcasts, and resources in your inbox every second week.

Stefan, Russia’s current rate of aerial bombardment in Ukraine appears to be intensifying and escalating even further from a very high base. And its ability to launch hundreds of drones and missiles against civilian and military targets every night in Ukraine is, is really astounding, and this scale reflects significant logistics, financial, technological investment, and adaptations by Russia certainly.

Far beyond Europe’s current capabilities. Now, we’ve been hearing stories since the first week of Russia’s illegal invasion that can only sustain this for a couple of weeks. Russia will run out of technological components. Russia will run out of energy, know, and clearly all those turned out to be wrong.

with of [00:20:00] hindsight and, learning, how do you assess and how sustainable is Russia’s current rate of aerial bombardment given the logistical financial and technological constraints it has?

Stefan Wolff: I think there are, as always sort of, there are, several dimensions, to that.

So I think Russia has, done quite well over the past couple of years is, been able to. Build up its own defense industrial base. So I think a lot of drones that Russia is using now, they might be based on Iranian designs and Iranian technology, but, from what I, read, are produced in Russia So Russia clearly has the capability to, to manufacture at quite a high rate. So that’s, one thing. Then after three and a half years, it’s probably not, Overestimation to say that, the stocks that Russia had of all kinds of, ammunition and spare parts and whatever they, need on the battlefield.

That’s probably run low now, but. They also, have managed to, strike quite a, an interesting deal with North Korea, where North Korea clearly, supplies, Russia [00:21:00] with a lot of, hardware. And now, since last year also with, manpower, There were some stories, in the press only last week that also Indian, companies have, supplied Russia with, explosives, for example.

So Russia still has sources, outside, and it has, um, capability in Russia itself to, to manufacture. Now that’s, that’s one side. on the other side, we also need to ask, of course, well. It’s one thing to launch hundreds of drones, how effective they will be is sort of the flip side here again, I mean it’s, it’s interesting some of the discussions, involving, European allies and, uh, the White House seem to indicate that, is now much more willing to make us military equipment available to Ukraine. Obviously he keeps emphasizing that NATO partners will buy for it and then the will buy it, pay for it, and then send it to Ukraine.

So the US makes money, it’s a great deal, him and all of that. that, I mean, in, in many ways would, course also blunt a little bit, the, attacks that Russia can launch. So if Ukraine actually is able to, [00:22:00] Build up its air defense uh, system again, then yeah, I mean the Russians might launch their drones, but they would probably not have the same success rate that, we, have seen certainly over the last, four to six weeks.

the final point is that, Yes, it’s also been talk that, more, offensive, weapons would be made available, to Ukraine with even fewer restrictions. And that would then, also enable Ukraine to strike at some of the logistics hubs, inside Russia, are facilitating those attacks and potentially as we have seen with, more spectacular drone attacks that, Ukraine, has launched including just, in the last couple of days, actually go after some of the manufacturing facilities, Russia produces the drones and the missiles that it, uses against Ukraine. So I would say this sort work in progress. But there clearly are signs that whilst Russia may potentially be able to sustain some elements of those attacks, the effectiveness of those attacks might also come, question over the next, well hopefully, days. If not that, then maybe weeks.

Dominic Bowen: And it was interesting. I was in Ukraine [00:23:00] recently during one of the pauses when the US paused intelligence sharing with Ukraine. And the, and the frontline units, instantly felt it, their, their ability to identify track, target, fix, enemy assets was, uh, hamstrung. And I remember asking, several commanders, aren’t the French, aren’t the Germans?

Aren’t the Swedes? have you not got a, a backfill? And their answer was just a, a complete no. We rely almost exclusively intelligence for our targeting from from the us, which was a little bit shocking that.

Force, was able to provide that capacity to Ukraine. And so I’d be keen to hear from you about what extent the Ukrainian military capabilities are being shaped by these pauses, delays, and resumptions Western military aid. Europe, of course, has been slow, but attempting to ramp up and I think Europe.

To be commended in their, intent, if not their speed, at least their intent to support, Ukraine. And of course, not just with military hardware, but also intelligence and training. So how, how do you see these military capabilities being shaped and how do you see that evolving in Ukraine over the coming months?

Stefan Wolff: I mean, potentially that [00:24:00] this is, uh, going to be quite a symbiotic, relationship. I mean, in some ways the argument that, could be made as well. I mean, after all, Europe still has reasonably deep pockets. So money is, there and you have skills and knowledge and understanding, in, Ukraine.

So if you marry those two can actually sort Have benefits on, both sides. So the, the Ukrainians get the resources to ramp up their own, defense production. and the Europeans can both help Ukraine and at the same time use, um, well, some of the, investment that they are making in Ukrainian defense, contractors to also build up their own NT capabilities. now at the same time as, as part of the trade deal that, line and Trump, apparently struck over the weekend, the Europeans will also buy more, military equipment the US at least, some of which, I would imagine could be, given, Ukraine.

And on top of that, I would, I would say probably the, first step that that needs to happen is again. I said earlier, which is, really strengthening Ukrainian air [00:25:00] defenses so that you actually have a a better chance of, really building up those defense industrial, capabilities in Ukraine.

To manufacture stuff without necessarily, risking Russian missile strikes that then blow everything up after you’ve just built a, drones factory or munitions factory or something like that.

Dominic Bowen: And if we change TA little bit, I’d be really keen to hear your thoughts on the, the long-term risk to Ukraine’s war effort If, if public trust continues to decline due to perceived democratic backsliding or anti-corruption reforms. I mean, how might the recent anti-corruption protests in Ukraine impact internal political stability and cohesion, especially during wartime mobilization, also with Ukraine’s backers?

Stefan Wolff: I think that that was a really unfortunate, episode. I think there are many different reasons. I mean, some of my Ukrainian contacts are, are also telling me is that, there’s probably two sides, to, the story, as well. so I think the main problem really is that, From, from what I [00:26:00] know and, and here is that, I mean, Zelensky is quite, isolated. Uh, he has a very small circle of, trusted, advisors and not necessarily a lot, of broader information, gets, him. So I think it was a misjudgment, to, try to Remove the independence of these two, anti-corruption, agencies, partly because it just sends the wrong message and feeds into this Russian narrative of Zelensky.

as an illegitimate leader who has lost, support. He is only clinging on by, do, means. But also because I, I, I think there’s a general danger here that It just distracts from, from what is actually really, essential. I mean, what is really essential right now is that Ukraine is being, Put in a position where they can continue to resist, Russia, on the battlefield. And over time, ideally, roll back some of the, advances.

neither Zelensky removing the, uh, independence of [00:27:00] these, anti-corruption, agencies, making claims about, uh, Russian infiltration. That doesn’t help in the public protests against, Zelensky do not necessarily help either. So I think in, in that sense, what would really be needed from, from my perspective is needs to be more engagement, a broader cross section of Ukrainian society.

ultimately, and I mean all analogies are, are bad analogies, but, we think back to to August, 2021 part of the reason why the Afghan government collapsed so, quickly and rapidly was that nobody trusted the government and, and nobody thought, well, why, why should we resist, uh, the Taliban if we’re doing it at the behest of a corrupt, government?

Now, as I said, this is not. In any way, sort of a like for like, with, Ukraine, but the broader point remains. I mean, only if people trust Zelensky and his government will they actually be able continue. To carry this massive [00:28:00] burden of a country that has now been, fighting, quite an existential war, for the last, three and a half years.

when that courage and resilience dies because people are fed up, I think that’s the main danger. And that is probably, if anything. that would be what, what might hand Russia a victory here for, for all the wrong reasons.

Dominic Bowen: And Stefan, I’d love to hear as we, as we wrap up, if you were briefing European leaders about Ukraine the current opportunities and risks in Ukraine, be the main point you’d want these business leaders to hear?

Stefan Wolff: I mean, if you, if you look back a couple of weeks to the Ukraine, recovery, conference in, Rome, I think what we saw there and what, what I thought was actually quite useful was there, it wasn’t just sort of, donor handouts, uh, Ukraine. Um, there were quite a lot of actual.

Investment deals, being struck. Joint ventures created between Ukrainian private sector organizations.

a very important direction in which, to go [00:29:00] because, not least if we look back, history going all the way back to whatever the 16th, 17th, 18th, centuries, I mean, where you have a vibrant, sector in the growing private sector that also ultimately. Helps with building resilient, liberal, democratic institutions.

Obviously, I mean, there is a long way to go as we have just seen with this, unfortunate anti-corruption, situation in Ukraine. There are of course risks for investing in a country that are no longer just, risks related. But there’s still this, Systemic problem with corruption in Ukraine, institutional fragility quite a high level of concentration of power, around the president and his inner circle.

So all of those things are things where I would say, well, needs to be watched. And that’s where, the question then arises, well, what can the private sector actually, contribute here? How can the private sector position itself, in a way that it doesn’t, exacerbate some of [00:30:00] those, problems.

insisting on clean, transparent, deals, working with trusted, partners, in Ukraine and making sure that basically throughout your supply chain you have solid, uh, practices of good governance and so on and so forth, and all of that. I mean, it, it is difficult, but I think one of the lessons that.

You see over and over again, both in, in wartime economies and in transitions from wartime, economies to, peace time economies. Ultimately, there is something to be said, why you need to insist on, governance, uh, corporate responsibility, oversight and all of that.

And I think. Investment in that, which doesn’t necessarily have to be monetary investment, but, paying attention to these issues, not just in the long run, but also sort of in the, in the short to midterm, also make, The recovery of Ukraine, more likely, after the war, and will certainly contribute to, to the resilience, of the, country, including society, economy, whilst the war is still going on.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, no, I totally agree with that. And it [00:31:00] certainly is possible, and I work with a lot of companies that are setting up very large and, very complex operations in Ukraine and, you know, setting up the right governance structures, the right partnerships around, accountability mechanisms right.

Internal and external auditing, compliance schemes really is possible. And you can set up, you know, good operations that you can be comfortable, that you’re gonna be you know, European regulatory requirements. So it is possible. And just to finish, Stefan, you, obviously, uh, a professor more broadly, not just of Ukraine, but uh, internationally.

you look around the world, what are, what is the international risks that concern you the most?

Stefan Wolff: Well, let’s put it like that. I, I don’t see myself going out of business as somebody who teaches, students about all the dilemmas that they might be facing, in the future. they, uh, go into government, if they go into the, uh, sector But they will have to make some, some very tough judgment calls in terms of what the right thing to do is whether you stick with international law or whether you prioritize whatever you, consider, immediate, national interest, however it’s [00:32:00] defined of the day.

So, I mean, if we are looking at. Many, European countries now leaving the, landmine treaty notifying that they’ll basically pull out of the, the Ottawa, uh, conventions and then start, uh. Producing and, uh, deploying landmines again. I mean, well, the realist in me can totally see why this is absolutely the right thing and we need to make sure that our borders are secure, against, a potential, uh, threat.

then the liberalist in me who, always had a liking and belief in the utility of, international law things. My God, where are we heading? And I mean, it’s not just this, I mean, if you look at the situation in the Middle East, I mean. The way in which Israel, clearly violates, international humanitarian law in its campaign, in Gaza again, I mean, makes you really just, worried and afraid the people there, who lived that, but also as a symptom of, how clearly the international order that sort of.

Grew, certainly I would say in the, 1990s and maybe, two thousands, but also had some, some antecedents in [00:33:00] the, period how this is really just gonna bits and pieces and, the drain if you want.

Dominic Bowen: Yep. a very, very valid point. And, and thanks for, for raising that Stefan.

And thank you very much for, for coming on the International Risk Podcast again.

Stefan Wolff: My pleasure. Thank you very much.

Dominic Bowen: that was a great conversation with Stephan Wolf. Stephan is a professor of international security and at the University of Birmingham.

I really appreciated hearing his thoughts today about Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war in Ukraine and the risks to Europe. Please remember to go to wherever you download your podcasts and subscribe to this podcast for future episodes. Today’s podcast was produced and coordinated Alyssa Garel.

Thanks very much for listening. We’ll speak again next week.

Elisa Garbil: Thank you for listening to this episode of the International Risk Podcast. For more episodes and articles, visit the international risk podcast.com. Follow us on LinkedIn, blue Sky, and Instagram for the latest updates, and to ask your questions to our host, Dominic Bowen. See you next time.