Episode 258: Regional Implications of Iranian Nuclear Power with Kenneth Katzman

Coordinated and Produced by Elisa Garbil

Dive into the intricacies of Iranian Nuclear Power with Kenneth Katzman. Find out more about whether Iran has nuclear bombs, what Russia’s role is and whether Russia even plays a role, what Iran’s strategic motivations could be, the implications and consequences of the US and Israel’s military actions, whether there are Iranian opposition groups and more!

Dr. Katzman is a Senior Advisor at the Soufan Group and a Senior Fellow at the Soufan Center, positions he assumed after retiring in late 2022 from his longtime position as a Senior Middle East Analyst at the Congressional Research Service (CRS). He is also a Senior Research Advisor at the Global Insights Group’s Strategic Analysis and Situational Awareness Group. During his CRS career specialising on Iran, U.S. sanctions on Iran, the Arab Gulf states, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran-backed regional armed groups, Katzman provided analysis and advice to members of Congress through tailored reports and briefings. On about a dozen occasions, he has testified before various Committees and Subcommittees of Congress. He also participated in numerous congressional delegations to the region at the Member and staff level. During 1996 and again during July 2001 – March 2002, he was assigned to the majority staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to work on Middle East issues, organizing hearings and helping to draft legislation such as the Iran Sanctions Act (1996).

As a well-known expert on the region, Dr. Katzman has delivered numerous presentations and briefings at conferences and meetings in Washington as well as throughout Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and South and Central Asia. In 1998, he wrote expert working papers on the ballistic missile capabilities of Iran and Iraq for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (“Rumsfeld Commission”). In late 1999, and again in 2010, the Atlantic Council published his detailed monographs on U.S. sanctions on Iran. During his CRS career and since retiring, Katzman has been quoted frequently on the region and appeared in many regional media, including Al Jazeera, Al Hurra, Al Arabiya, Asharq News, Al Arabiy, and Al Ghad TV. He has authored articles for organizations including The Atlantic Council, the Gulf International Forum, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, and the Arab Center D.C. He has served on several think-tank working groups and been a consultant to several corporations.

The International Risk Podcast is a weekly podcast for senior executives, board members, and risk advisors. In these podcasts, we speak with experts in a variety of fields to explore international relations. Our host is Dominic Bowen, Head of Strategic Advisory at one of Europe’s leading risk consulting firms. Dominic is a regular public and corporate event speaker, and visiting lecturer at several universities. Having spent the last 20 years successfully establishing large and complex operations in the world’s highest-risk areas and conflict zones, Dominic now joins you to speak with exciting guests around the world to discuss international risk.

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Transcript:

Kenneth Katzman: [00:00:00] I’m sure all of these groups have, have a certain base of support in the country. What I’m trying to find out is, do they have guns? Do they have, you know, armed, strength? cause look, this regime, they’re not gonna go down without a fight. they, they’re not just gonna leave Iran voluntarily.
Elisa Garbil: Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organizations worldwide.
Dominic Bowen: Hi, I’m Dominic Bowen and I’m the host of the International Risk Podcast. And today we’re diving into one of the most volatile and consequential security challenges facing the global order, and that’s Iran’s nuclear program, what it means for national security, regional stability, and the balance of power from Tehran to Tel Aviv and from Brussels to rehab in Washington.
To help us unpack this, we’re joined by Dr. Kenneth. Katzman for over three decades. Ken was the go-to analyst on Iran and the Gulf Security at the Congressional Research Service advising the US lawmakers, drafting sanctions, legislation, and [00:01:00] briefing committees with the kind of granular, unfiltered insight that’s essential for decision makers.
He’s written for the Atlantic Council Brief. NATO partners testified before Congress and served inside both the CAA and on Capitol Hill. Ken, welcome to the International Risk Podcast.
Kenneth Katzman: Thank you. Be with you.
Dominic Bowen: Ken, I’m looking forward to our conversation today, but let’s jump straight in. Most discussions about Iran’s nuclear program fall into two camps, alarmism or complacency, but both lack a clear understanding of the current technical and political state of play. We’ve seen accelerated enrichment. We’ve seen reports of advanced centrifuges and.
The 2025 US airstrikes targeting Iranian facilities. Yet there’s no unified narrative about how close a run truly is to weaponization or whether there’s even an end game. So from your vantage point, how close is Iran today to the actual nuclear breakout capacity? And perhaps more importantly, do you believe Tehran is seeking a weapon or is it just strategic [00:02:00] ambiguity?
Kenneth Katzman: Well, Dominic, obviously the comments have refer before the.
Iran’s own admission now it’s deeply, deeply damaged, severely damaged. there’s been an issue of, 400 kilograms of, stockpile of, highly enriched uranium, 60% rich urine. You need 90% to have weapons grade uranium, but to go from 60 to 90, you don’t need to do that much. Takes much more work to go from 3%, which is what you need for a nuclear power plant to 60% than to go from 60 to 90.
So there is a stockpile. The issue is it’s probably under rubble. I’m not an expert enough in the mechanics of nuclear design, but you know, it could be contaminated. It could be damaged. You know this, material is very sensitive, obviously. so it’s probably, it’s not usable. I mean, Iran conceivably can dig it out and find it.
Whether it’s usable is, we’d have to do more [00:03:00] research on it. so you’re talking about the narrative, it depends who you’re talking to. The United States, obviously very big country, lot of deterrent capability. Well across the ocean, 7,000 miles from Iran. Most powerful military on the planet.
even a nuclear armed Iran. Even if it were to get to that point, it would not be an existential threat to the United States. We’ve accepted nuclear weapons, defacto in North Korea, Pakistan, there’s been countries that are potentially rogue actors, potentially unstable actors who have nuclear weapons in the US has not acted The narrative is because of who you, who we’re. Talking about, which is Israel, to Israel, it is an existential threat. So Israel’s policy is that Iran cannot, they’re not even gonna let Iran even get close to a nuclear weapon. They’re, they’re not gonna leave it to a decision of the leadership, whether they would have a nuclear weapon or not.
now you were asking about breakout. You know, at the time of the strikes, [00:04:00] Iran. Was probably about a week away from having enough weapons, grade material. If they were to continue enriching, they would probably have enough weapons, grade material for a nuclear weapon in about a week. But the issue is weaponization, to the best of our knowledge, they did not have.
The detonation system, either designed or manufactured. And so there would still be some months, uh, to do that work if, if they were to decide to do that. again, how close they were to an actual nuclear weapon is not clear. But clearly if the Supreme leader had decided to have a nuclear weapon, they, they could have achieved that.
Dominic Bowen: Ken, there’s two issues I’d like to explore with you based on what you just said then around the detonation systems and also around the uranium. So if we start with the uranium now. My understanding and, and you are, you’ve got a lot more sources and written a lot about this over the years, but my understanding is despite the significant damage caused initially by Israel, but primarily by the USA reports indicate that are unlikely evacuated or [00:05:00] safeguarded, much of it enriched uranium stockpile.
I understand that some Western officials concluded this. Strikes delayed Iran’s nuclear progress by one to two years, but others, including the International Atomic Agency said it was more likely a few months. And then of course, Iran itself is saying it’s accelerated efforts after the strike. So can you just help us clarify and understand based on what you are reading and what you understand, what is the status of the actual uranium enrichment today?
Kenneth Katzman: Okay, well, the foreign minister Abhi said there is no enrichment going on now. I mean, the, the centrifuge is, the mechanism to continue enriching is, is down. what’s being referred to is you can’t destroy knowledge. You know, Iran has the records. They still have, an ample number of scientists to potentially rebuild the program.
So it’s not, the knowledge base is not destroyed. Although the top, two tiers of, technicians were killed as part of the Israeli operations. The stockpile there, there was some reports that they moved some of the, stockpile, but I think the most recent [00:06:00] reporting that we’re getting, the most recent assessments is that even if they did disperse it, no matter where it is at Han or Ford, oh.
it’s under destroyed structure. now, now, could it be dug out? certainly. we don’t even have an assessment. I mean, to the best of our knowledge, Iran has not even necessarily gone into these destroyed facilities to dig out anything. So we really don’t even know.
The Iranians do not want to go to these facilities because the Israelis are watching. The Israelis are. Very penetrated the Iranian nuclear sites, in terms of being able to watch them, watch what’s going on, and, certainly there’s the potential for a strike, if Iran starts even investigating what is left, what’s survived, what didn’t survive.
The issue is. Is Iran gonna let the international Atomic energy agency back in that visit? If it happens and there’s some reports there could be a visit in the next few weeks, that assessment will determine what’s really, still surviving.
Dominic Bowen: when it comes to detonation systems, we know [00:07:00] that. Iran provided Russia with a lifeline in the form of the shahi drones, which have been causing devastating civilian casualties and, and damage to infrastructure across Ukraine. So the obvious question, Ken, is how much does Russia owe Iran and could that lead to Russia providing Iran with the technology in the form of detonation systems, IE long range missiles that could carry a nuclear warhead?
Kenneth Katzman: Well, I would assess that as unlikely. Russia didn’t really even stand up for Iran during the, when it was getting bombed by Israel and the United States. And, actually the Iranians are very disappointed with Russia. They, they. Did not get the support they thought they would from Putin. Putin has been talking with Trump even about helping Trump, make sure that Iran gets to zero enrichment.
That’s what Trump is demanding that going forward. Iran not enrich any uranium at all, and Putin seems to have sided with Trump. You know, obviously there’s other issues. The Ukraine issue is out there as a, a bilateral US Russian [00:08:00] issue that Putin is more concerned about than Iran. there’s been questions all along.
Russia really strategically does not want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. They don’t want Iran to have that leverage. So I, I don’t necessarily see anybody as giving them the technology, but, it’s out there. it’s knowledge. It’s research, it’s designs that they could conceivably do on their own.
the issue is how much time it would take.
Dominic Bowen: Yeah, that’s really important. So you, you talked about the leverage and, and that makes me wonder about the primary motivations behind Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology and how they’re balancing that with civilian energy needs and of course, potential military applications because we Have to wonder how much of Iran’s nuclear ambition. Is about deterrence against regime change and how much of it is in response to what it sees fundamentally is an unequal global order where it’s power, not treaties, that guarantee survival and where they potentially see nuclear weapons as the only way that they can guarantee their survival against, nuclear powered Israel and nuclear powered USA.
Kenneth Katzman: there’s been a debate [00:09:00] in Iran for decades about whether to move toward actually having a nuclear. You know, the Iranians, I talk, I’m on Al Jazeera with them a lot. and it’s, it’s obvious there’s a, you know, been a raging debate. many, many Iranian strategists. Have always felt, that moving toward an actual nuclear weapon is much more trouble than it’s worth.
strategically a blunder, if they were to do so because their Arab neighbors could counter by acquiring their own nuclear weapons, it starts an arms race. It would bring even more sanctions on Iran. It would potentially bring US military action against Iran. So building a bomb has never really been a clear strategic slam dunk for Iran.
And the supreme leader, as always, as we know, held off on the religious decree that still stands is, is not to, proceed with building a nuclear weapon, but. the Iranian strategists feel there’s, there’s leverage to be gained from being a threshold state to, go, as close as possible without actually designing and building a nuclear [00:10:00] weapon because, that gives Iran an intimidation factor in the region.
It does potentially insulate the regime from our ground attack, which is a whole different subject we can get into, but, there’s been thinking in the United States and elsewhere that a, a US ground attack on, on Iran is completely off the table, not even anything under consideration. And I, and I detect, there’s differences of opinion.
Now there’s not an absolute consensus not to have a i this whole episode, this war, the 12 Day War, the US strike has resurrected, a lot of the, old stories about Iran, the hostage taking of 1979, the Marine Barracks bombing of 1983, the killing of US soldiers in Iraq with IEDs and EFP projectiles.
Iran’s human rights record, the hangings, the executions, the, repression of women. this war is, has bubbled all of that up for the American public. And so it’s no longer a given that there will not be some [00:11:00] major US military operation against Iran. If Iran makes, what I would say it was, would be the wrong decision to try to accelerate its nuclear weapons program.
Dominic Bowen: And you mentioned an armed race. I think that’s really interesting ’cause there’s been a lot of focus on Iran versus the US and Iran versus Israel, but previous guests that we’ve had on the podcast over the years have raised the topic of. The reality of what happens when other regional actors, including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, potentially start recalibrating their needs and their military posture based on Iran’s nuclear trajectory.
And in that case, we’d no longer just be talking about a bilateral conflict. We’d be talking about a multi vector instability across an already fragile region. So what’s your assessment of how. Iran’s nuclear progress is influencing the broader Middle East. And are we already in a regional arms race?
Kenneth Katzman: Well, I would say we’re not there yet. and I do think the Israeli and US strikes have perhaps moved the needle further away. there is less impetus [00:12:00] to counter Iran’s program. a lot of discussion around the Israeli decision to.
Conduct the attacks and Mr. Trump’s decision to join the attacks. A a lot of its centers on how far along Iran was, uh, before the, these attacks. And, the issue is it was getting to the point where Iran looked, unstoppable as if they were on an inexorable march toward a nuclear weapon.
Now that’s not the case. You know, there, there is a certain, I would say, relaxation in the region. So you mentioned Saudi Arabia, crown Prince, MBS. he said openly that, uh, if Iran a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia would have to counter it. I mean, he said this publicly, Turkey, as you note, is another candidate, uh, who was looking very closely at what Iran was doing.
Egypt. so it’s, not limited to necessarily just a few. It’s could be a lot. And then, and then you’re looking at a, a regional potential nuclear, showdown within the region. Highly, highly volatile, highly volatile situation. [00:13:00] I mean, we have to assess US policy. Mr.
Obama chose to try to stop Iran’s progress through an agreement. Mr. Trump canceled the agreement, viewing it as not sufficient and having an expiration. Mr. Trump came back to negotiations, hoping to get a better deal, and politically he has to get a better deal than Mr. Obama got in 2015.
Right? So. That’s kind of where we are, and we’re still, that’s still where we’re, even after the bombs have fallen, that’s still where we are. Mr. Trump wants a deal and, but his deal must be better than Mr. Obama’s deal of 2015.
Dominic Bowen: And the King deal marker. President Trump, you know, he engaged in what many people have called, diplomatic deception when the US was publicly engaging in nuclear negotiations with Iran, whilst concurrently conducting bomber strikes against nuclear facilities. Now. The US and Israel, what’s believed to be reasonably orchestrated, a deliberate misinformation campaign to lull around into a sense of security convincing Tehran that no, [00:14:00] imminent strike was going to occur even as B two bombers were on route to, to targets.
And, you know, this is potentially an erosion of trust, undermines negotiations. I think. That potential breach of diplomatic norms may make it harder to get Iran back to the negotiating table with the us. What’s your assessment of the diplomatic landscape and ability to strike a deal knowing that this is what happened last time during negotiations?
Kenneth Katzman: Well, Dominic, yeah, it’s gonna be very tough. I mean, they’ve never trusted Mr. Trump because he abrogated the 2015 deal that has been what they’ve said about dealing with Mr. Trump the entire time is why are we dealing with a, they had a debate. Should we deal with Mr.
Trump? He got out of, you know, we were complying the IAEA said. Dominic, well, you know, we we’re compliant and, there was no need for Mr. Trump to exit that deal. And so this has been the fundamental question. Now, not only has he gotten out of the 2015 deal, now he has bombed Iran too.
and as you said, I don’t think the Trump administration went into the [00:15:00] talks where Iran, in April. Deliberately deceiving. I, I mean, I, I think they intent wanted to get a deal, thought they could get a deal. I, I don’t think they calculated or Netanya didn’t tell them.
I don’t believe that he was planning a strike all along. So I don’t, I don’t think the Trump decision to. Try to get Iran into a negotiation in April was, was a deception. But at the end, yes. Mr. Trump, I think the day that Israel started striking, he said, well, they may strike. And that was an indication that, Israel had told him they’re gonna strike.
And clearly he knew they were gonna strike and he was still, you know, being very vague about it, knowing full well the strike was gonna unfold late, a few hours later. So. At the end, yes, there was a certain amount of deception, but, but I don’t think they went into the talks, intending, uh, to deceive all along.
Dominic Bowen: And what about the domestic political factors within Iran that influence the country’s nuclear ambitions, and how do various factions, ’cause there are quite different factions within Iran, and how do they view the issue of nuclear weapons [00:16:00] development? Because I understand that since the US strikes on Iran, there’s been an increasingly firm political consensus within Iran to continue advancing its nuclear program and.
Officials and parliamentarians are really reaffirming the resolve to maintain and rebuild what they believe is really a deterrent capability, a deterrent capability that’s critical to national security. Can you tell us a little bit more about the domestic considerations in Iran?
Kenneth Katzman: You’re, you’re quite right, Dominic. There is a very vibrant debate. I, I don’t think it’s resolved. you’re right there, there are hard liners, particularly in the Iranian Majlis, the Parliament and, uh, the P on Al Jazeera any number of times. But some of them, occasionally, they would say.
Uh, US and Israeli attacks prove that Iran needs a nuclear deterrent, and Iran is always gonna be vulnerable unless it hasn’t. The political establishment though, and I would point to President Masu and even the Supreme National Security Council, even to some extent, the supreme leader himself, they have not concluded [00:17:00] to become completely defiant and.
Begin pursuing some sort of a nuclear weapon development. again, their program is basically halted right now. they would have to rebuild a lot of it to get back to where they were. and with Israel and the US watching very closely and knowing exactly what’s going on in Iran, that obviously opens them to more military action.
So, I would lean more toward, Concessionary approach. they are now talking about inviting the International Atomic Energy Agency back in to, visit. they’ve said that they are indeed providing the IE information with their assessments of, the status of these facilities that were struck.
So they, they seem, even though the Parliament voted to stop cooperating with the IE. They still seem to be cooperating to some extent. Now let’s see if they actually allow this visit. and I think we’ll know in a few weeks whether they’re going to fully resume cooperation. The Europeans, Dominic. They had a meeting with Iran last Friday and they are saying, unless you resume [00:18:00] cooperating with the IEA and begin talking again with the United States on nuclear issues, we’re gonna reimpose the UN sanctions.
Which, you still have that, the official structure of the J-C-P-O-A, the nuclear deal in place and, the uk, France, and Germany could still snap back sanctions under the. UN resolution endorsed the J-C-P-O-A. It’s un resolution 2231.
Dominic Bowen: And one group you didn’t mention then Ken was the Yaman Revolutionary Guards Corps. And that that’s a group that has been, I just still find it hard to fathom the level of destruction that, that they suffered during, Israeli and us, uh, strikes. And just to sort of paint a picture for our listeners, we’ve got major general salami who was the commander of the.
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. He was killed in Tehran by Israeli strikes. general Rashid, who was a Deputy commander in chief, he was killed alongside his son. he was replaced by Major General Ali Sani, who was then killed by the Israelis. You have, Mohamed Kazemi, who is the intelligence chief.
Amar [00:19:00] has, I’m not gonna do justice to his name, but Amir, who was the commander of the Air Force, he was also killed. and then, Ben Ham, uh, who was the commander of AL’S weapons transfer force and also their overseas force was also killed. I mean, this is unfathomable that, that, that many senior people were killed.
Bei how did that happen? And and what’s the, I mean, first of all, how did that happen? And secondly, what’s the impact That must be devastating on the, Iranian Revolutionary Guards core.
Kenneth Katzman: Well, Dominic, if you want my honest answer, there’s a lot of Iranians within the system who are against the system, not necessarily these figures that were killed. Were not necessarily working with the Moosa. I’m not saying that, but people under them. or people on the periphery of Iran’s security structure and nuclear structure, who know who’s involved, where they live, what their movements are it’s obvious, there’s certain amount of cooperation.
What the most sad, the, the Mossad bombed on June 12th, I think, in a meeting of the Supreme National Security Council out in the outskirts of Tehran. And, uh, they nearly. [00:20:00] Killed, he’s admitted to being injured in that bombing. So, they clearly have a lot of intelligence. you mentioned a lot of key figures, Haji, ZDA, the Air Force Commander, RRGC, air Force, which is really the missile force.
It’s sort of a misnomer. You, the RRGC. I wrote a book on the IRGC, as you know, the Warriors of Islam. It’s an old book, 1993, but still somewhat valid. The IRGC Air Force never really became a, a classic Air Force. It was just too expensive too, intensive in terms of capital. but it became Iran’s missile force.
So the RGC Air Force runs Iran’s missile program. Jido was killed. and missiles are important to Israel just almost as much as nuclear weapons. So yeah, there was a lot, a lot of senior figures killed. There are still strikes going on in Iran. let’s be honest about this, there, there are still, every day there’s a drone strike inside Iran.
So the Mossad is still operating in Iran. Dominic, with a lot of Confederates and my, I’m. Hard at work trying to investigate [00:21:00] who’s cooperating with the Mossad, how many of what we’re seeing, what is being carried out by actual Israeli Mossad agents and what is being carried out by Iranian confederates.
and if, we say there’s a lot of Iranian confederates in Iran, what, who are they are, are these. Disaffected opposition people, uh, Persian ethnicity. Are these minority groups like the Kurds or RIS or Blu? I mean, I’m trying to figure out who was the Mosad recruiting here? There’s some reports of Afghan.
You know, there’s a lot of Afghan refugees in Iran that, there’s reports that they are cooperating with Moad. So there, there’s a lot of work, investigative and research work to be done here.
Dominic Bowen: Well, certainly we’ve seen Iran forcibly displaced, I think it’s 1.5 million Afghans forcibly displaced, 1.5 million Afghans out of Iran back into Afghanistan, which is certainly not a country that’s able to assimilate 1.5 million civilians. So there’s, certainly some reason that the Iranians want the Afghans gone, but have you been able to draw any conclusions [00:22:00] about.
What this Iranian confederation or confederates might look like that, that, that might be supporting Israel.
Kenneth Katzman: Well, you know, part of my, I’m trying to find out whether the Maja is Cooper, you know, the Maja claims to have resistance cells, Iran, and, okay, well. That would seem to be unnatural, you know, if, the MEK and, and other groups have said, you know, we would do more against the regime if we had some armed, support, if we had a way of countering the regime’s monopoly of armed force.
Okay, well the Mossad now is applying some force against the regime, so the opposition can no longer say they don’t have any armed force. There is an armed force now, and that’s the Mossad who is taking out targets. even yesterday. I mean there is targeting on a consistent basis.
There is still a low level war going on that Israel is prosecuting inside Iran now. So I, I don’t know. I haven’t reached any firm, I’m not getting any firm answers on who, who the Confederates are. I think a lot of it is minorities, but a [00:23:00] lot of it is, potentially the Kurds. I mean, let’s be realistic.
the Kurds have, are generally been cooperating with Israel and Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is right. Across the mountains from Iran. Very easy. If the Mossad has access to Northern Iraq, it can easily infiltrate to Iran through Iraqi Kurdistan, right. Azerbaijan obviously at odds with Tehran for a very long time.
Has a border with Iran friendly toward Israel, Israel has carried out spying operations on Iran from Azerbaijan for decades. That’s a natural, transit point. So Iran has, some enemies on its borders and Israel is exploiting that for sure.
Dominic Bowen: Yeah, you, you raised one group that we don’t hear a lot about, the MEK, the muja, you know, this was a, a group that was actually involved who opposed the Shahs regime and was involved in the 1979 revolution. But, shortly after the, the revolution, they, they lost power and they were the, the largest opposition force to, the current autocratic or theocratic.
Islamic [00:24:00] Republic, you know, were pushed back to Iran, were eventually, disbanded and, and became a political party. but they’re, for most of our listeners, they’re probably not familiar with MEK, but are they still active today? Are they considered a fighting force or just a political opposition group sitting in neighboring countries?
Kenneth Katzman: Well, they are, they are active. don’t know how active, they claim to have, armed operatives inside Iran. they haven’t. Displayed that much that I can tell. these explosions and strikes inside Iran seem to be coming from the Mossad, not the MEK. So Hard to know how much support they have in Iran. The, Shaw’s son just had a big major conference in Munich over the weekend. I’m sure you saw that Dominic, he claims to have assembled, new groups that were not working with him before, that are now sort of coming on board with him. Don’t know.
I’m sure all of these groups have, have a certain base of support in the country. What I’m trying to find out is, do they have guns? Do they have, you know, armed, strength? cause look, this regime, they’re not gonna go down without a fight. they, they’re [00:25:00] not just gonna leave Iran voluntarily.
So, the only way to push them out is the, there’s going to be a requirement for some armed operations. I’m sorry to say. I hate to say it, I know a lot of your viewers and whoever might be viewing the podcast doesn’t want to hear that. But, any, any major opposition push to displace the regime is going to have to use some level of operations.
Dominic Bowen: Yeah, no, and thanks for mentioning Reza. You know, the, the, the Shah’s, son was uninvited from the Munich Security Conference earlier this year. Then he created his own, conference, this month. Potentially, uh, influential rallying point for political opposition, but we’ll have to see what happens next.
But what do you see, reading the tea leaves, looking at the crystal ball, what do you see happening next in the Middle East and, in Iran over the coming months?
Kenneth Katzman: said publicly on Algis Deer and other places, Iran is really, the regime is out of options. So they, they don’t have any options here. I think they really have to accept Mr. Trump’s, zero enrichment requirement. they don’t have an option. what are they gonna do?
[00:26:00] rebuild uranium enrichment facilities? they’re gonna get another. Visit from the B two if that happens. And interestingly, Dominic, you know, and I’ve said this on Al Jazeera and other places, the Iranians before the US strike operation, midnight, hammer believe that’s what it was called, right?
The Iranian regime, they thought, oh, we’re safe. There’s no B twos in Diego Garcia. There’s no B twos in Europe. There’s no B twos in cutter. We’re safe, we’re sa No, you’re not safe. No, you’re not safe. They flew all the way from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri and you didn’t even detect them. You didn’t even get a one shot off at them.
So they’re not safe. sorry to get a little emotionally, they don’t have any options, Dominic. they can send Mr. Aachi out to say, we’re not gonna accept zero enrichment. They can keep saying it over and over again. They, they don’t have any options. They’re going to have to accept what Mr.
Trump demands of them unless they want more visits and the Iranian people don’t want this. the Iranian people rallied to the regime because they were getting bombed Then [00:27:00] the bombing stopped, and now we’re seeing unrest. Sure enough, as most experts predicted, once the bomb stop, the blame goes on the regime.
we not only have no water, we not only have no electricity. now you’ve brought us war. Now you’ve brought the American military, the strongest Air Force ever assembled on this planet. You’ve now brought them to our doorstep, Mr. Supreme leaders. So the level of frustration is.
At a boiling point. In fact, PKI has talked about, let’s have a national dialogue. let’s talk with the opposition. What that tells me is they’re sensing the frustration on the streets right now.
Dominic Bowen: Yeah. Uh, you put forward a compelling case, Ken, and we’ll certainly have to see what happens and evolves, but one question we always ask guests as we’re wrapping up the interview, Ken, is when you look around the world, when you look at the myriad variety of international risks, what international risk concerns you the most?
Kenneth Katzman: Oh my goodness. around the world. that’s a broad question. I still think the Russia, Ukraine issue is, I think that the global perception is it’s sort of on a low [00:28:00] boil. it’s not going up where it’s not escalating, it’s not deescalating. It’s sort of a steady state.
But it’s, it’s a tough situation. the Russian government, I’m, I’m very surprised that the Russian government has held together, I mean, with the amount of pressure it’s under. And, it’s hard to understand really why the Russian people are accepting just sending Their sons into this battlefield without an outcry that’s hard for me to understand. But, the Russian mentality is, very, very difficult to deal with. Very, very hard. And Mr. Trump said this same thing yesterday, hard to understand how they can continue to send these soldiers into killing fields here and insist on continuing this war in Ukraine.
Could they use a tactical nuclear weapon? Yeah. Would I rule it out? No, I would not rule it out. the depths to which Putin might or might not go are still, I believe, undetermined. How is he gonna respond to this new program of the US selling weapons to NATO and then passing them on to Ukraine? How is he gonna respond?
I don’t know. He could do a big mobilization. Uh, he’s held off because he [00:29:00] doesn’t want the political consequences in Moscow and St. Petersburg. he could do one. What does that mean for Europe, European security? Does it spill over into, you know, the Baltics and other places? Malva, Romania, so that’s still, I would say my main flashpoint even more so than Iran and the Middle East right now.
Dominic Bowen: Yeah, I think that’s very valid. every week working with senior European business leaders and and government actors, I definitely see firsthand that Russia does pose a significant And a multifaceted threat to global stability. the military aggression, strategic nuclear capabilities, cyber and information warfare, influence operation, hybrid attacks.
I mean, you know, this hybrid warfare and sabotage that we’re seeing across Europe is very real. occurring right across telecommunications and infrastructure and energy on European soil today. And then of course, the global geopolitical influence that Russia aligned with Iran, North Korea, China are really counterbalancing many Western narratives.
And the risks that you mentioned there and the threats are, are very significant and very real, so, so thanks for [00:30:00] raising that, Ken. And thank you very much for coming on the International Risk Podcast today.
Kenneth Katzman: Well, thank you so much for having me. I look forward to watching the playback and gauging the reaction. I think some of my comments might get, a strong reaction from some of your viewers. We’ll see. I appreciate you having me on, and I love to keep investigating all these subjects that we discussed today.
Dominic Bowen: Definitely Ken, and look, you know, we don’t have all the answers, but certainly we wanna be prompting discussion and thought. And that’s all we achieve today, then I think this has been a successful episode. Well, that was a great conversation with Dr. Kenneth Katzman. Ken has over three decades of senior research and policy advice, experience, and I really appreciated hearing Ken’s thoughts today on Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the implications, across the region.
Please remember to subscribe to our mailing list that you can get on the International Wist Podcast website so you can get our news in your inbox. Every second week, today’s podcast was produced and coordinated by Elisa Garbil. I’m Dominic Bowen, the host. Thanks very much for listening, and we’ll speak again next week.