Episode 271: Authoritarian Alliances: Strategic Cooperation in a Fragmented Global Order with Doug Livermore
Today Dominic Bowen hosts Doug Livermore on the podcast to discuss the rise of authoritarian alliances. They dive into the growing cooperation between China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and their proxies, the economic and military dependencies that underpin these relationships, how authoritarian regimes leverage propaganda and “unrestricted warfare,” the role of countries like Venezuela, Sudan, and the Houthis in this expanding network, lessons from Ukraine as a testing ground for irregular tactics and advanced technology, the risks this poses to democratic societies, and much more!
Doug is Senior Vice President at CenCore Group and Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command. He has served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, and the Congo, and previously directed sensitive activities and irregular warfare at the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. He has also served as Senior Operations Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. A decorated officer, Doug has received the Meritorious Service Medal, the Bronze Star, and multiple Army Commendation Medals, including one for valor, and he holds both the Ranger and Special Forces tabs.
Doug brings deep expertise on special operations, irregular warfare, and national security, combining frontline military experience with high-level strategic advisory roles in Washington. His insights draw on years of work at the intersection of defense, geopolitics, and the private sector, helping audiences understand how authoritarian regimes are reshaping the global order and how democracies can respond.
The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime, to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.
Dominic Bowen is the host of The International Risk Podcast and Europe’s leading expert on international risk and crisis management. As Head of Strategic Advisory and Partner at one of Europe’s leading risk management consulting firms, Dominic advises CEOs, boards, and senior executives across the continent on how to prepare for uncertainty and act with intent. He has spent decades working in war zones, advising multinational companies, and supporting Europe’s business leaders. Dominic is the go-to business advisor for leaders navigating risk, crisis, and strategy; trusted for his clarity, calmness under pressure, and ability to turn volatility into competitive advantage. Dominic equips today’s business leaders with the insight and confidence to lead through disruption and deliver sustained strategic advantage.
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Transcript:
[00:00:00] Doug: It is disconcerting to see major authoritarian powers, the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and the North Koreans all standing together on one stage and repeating each other’s talking points regarding anti-imperialism and an overturn of the US-dominated international order.
[00:00:14] Dominic: Hi, I’m Dominic Bowen and welcome back to the International Risk Podcast where we explore the risks that are shaping our world and the decisions that governments, industries and institutions need to make. And today we’re turning to a theme that’s increasingly shaping the global balance of power, and that’s authoritarian alliances. From Moscow and Beijing’s growing coordination, to Tehran’s drones and even Pyongyang’s munitions, authoritarian and liberal regimes are really aligning their strategies, their technologies and institutions in ways that challenge democratic norms and potentially reshape the current international order we’re seeing.
[00:01:00] Dominic: Untraditional alliances between countries like India and China, between Brazil and Russia. And these, whilst not traditional alliances, really represent shared interest between these countries in digital infrastructure, financial autonomy, and even regime resilience. And the question we need to explore is: how should democracies respond?
[00:01:20] Dominic: How should institutions be interpreting what’s now really a fragmented system? And to help us explore these questions, we’re joined by a friend of the podcast, Doug Livermore. Doug is the Senior Vice President at SCOR. He’s also a Lieutenant Colonel within the US Army’s Special Operations Command. Doug has had an extraordinary career spanning both military and corporate worlds.
[00:01:46] Dominic: He has worked in some of the most complex and high-stakes environments around the world, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Mali, and the Congo. His awards are numerous and include the Meritorious Service Medal and the Bronze Star. He’s had multiple Army Commendation Medals, including one for valor, and he holds both the Ranger and the Special Forces tabs.
[00:02:00] Dominic: He previously served as Director of Sensitive Activities and Irregular Warfare at the Office of the Department of the Navy, and as Senior Operations Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. Doug has deep experience and knowledge about special operations, irregular warfare, national security, and the corporate sector.
[00:02:25] Dominic: He brings this unique insight together to help us understand how authoritarian states are coordinating across multiple domains and how this is going to challenge the resilience of democratic societies. Doug last came on the podcast in episode 197 where we discussed Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. I encourage you to go back and listen to that episode. Doug, welcome back to the International Risk Podcast.
[00:02:47] Doug: Thanks for having me back.
[00:02:49] Dominic: Doug, in the space of just one week we saw the leader of China, Xi, stage the 80th anniversary Victory Day parade in Beijing. And he was flanked by Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-Un. This was the first public appearance of the trio together and it really telegraphed this de-facto alignment across defense supply chains and even sanctions. Days later we saw Xi and Putin joined by the BRICS leaders, chaired by Brazil.
[00:03:24] Dominic: I think this really signaled coordination and economic narratives around alternative governance, and it pushed Western leaders to the side saying that at least a third of the world’s population is now aligned, and not necessarily aligned with Western democratic norms. We also saw the Shanghai Cooperation Council gather in Beijing as well, another non-Western aligned group that brings together military, industrial, and information power. The messages were quite clear and left a lot of people with an awkward feeling in their stomach. Doug, when you saw some of these pictures, when you heard the dialogue, and when you listened to the speeches coming out of Beijing, how did that make you feel?
[00:04:00] Doug: It has certainly been a very momentous week, if not the last couple of months, as the global stage has taken on what appears to be a restructuring. You kind of hit the nail on the head in your introduction when you talked about non-traditional or non-standard alliance structures. It is disconcerting to see major authoritarian powers — China, Russia, and North Korea — all standing together on one stage and repeating each other’s talking points regarding anti-imperialism and an overturn of the US-dominated international order.
[00:04:32] Doug: It’s not standard alliance structures. It’s more indicative of marriages of convenience, particularly when we look at those major powers, the three that you outlined. When you talk about BRICS and those countries that have sought to join that economic bloc, it’s twofold.
[00:04:46] Doug: One, there are absolutely some legitimate concerns and grievances on the part of these countries that are seeking to join or align themselves loosely with China and Russia. When we look at economic development globally, it hasn’t been uniform. In many cases, these are countries that have found themselves left behind.
[00:05:00] Doug: They feel they aren’t being treated equitably under the existing systems and are looking to turn the existing order on its head. There are some legitimate concerns there from these countries that are seeking to basically form around a new bloc with China as the rising head and Russia as a junior partner.
[00:05:20] Doug: On the other hand, it would be unwise not to look at the very concerted efforts by China and Russia, and North Korea to a lesser extent, to stoke those grievances and position themselves as anti-imperialist forces. That’s somewhat ironic when you look at the Russian Federation, which has a long history of imperialism of its own, mistreatment of minorities, and expansion at the point of a bayonet.
[00:05:45] Doug: The Russians, like the Soviets before them, have had great success in propaganda — positioning themselves as defenders of the proletariat and the disenfranchised. A little more interesting is China, which can point to its history and largely say it has been anti-imperialist.
[00:06:00] Doug: What China relies on as its primary form of influence is its economy. Nobody who studies international economics can deny that for the last couple of decades, China has been a rising economic power, which has given it influence and entrée into less-developed economies: Africa, South America, and even the Middle East to a large extent.
[00:06:23] Doug: The Chinese have been able to leverage cheap credit, products, and attractive loan terms under the Belt and Road Initiative to expand their influence and access.
[00:06:35] Doug: So what I think we’re seeing right now, particularly with the conference in Beijing and then later in Shanghai, has really been the culmination of decades of work. Both to stoke, through propaganda and influence, resistance to the US-dominated international order, as well as a response to the legitimate economic grievances of those now coalescing around China and Russia.
[00:07:00] Dominic: You’ve argued that the post-Cold War assumption of unstoppable democratic expansion globally has now given way to a much more multipolar competition and a resurgence of authoritarianism. We’ve seen bilateral trade between China and Russia double over the last few years. It’s now about $245 billion, double what it was in 2020. I think this is just one of many metrics that highlight the depth of the partnership between China and Russia. Can you help us understand the drivers of this shift and some of the irregular tactics that are now central to statecraft in achieving these partnerships?
[00:07:39] Doug: Nobody can talk about the economic cooperation and consolidation between Russia and China without referencing Ukraine. February 2022, when the Russians launched their full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent economic isolation the Kremlin faced, really forced a marriage of convenience or desperation, in which one of the few countries Russia could turn to was China.
[00:08:00] Doug: As we’ve looked at the extent to which Russia has become reliant on China, I don’t think anyone thinks that’s a co-equal relationship. The Chinese are getting the benefits of incredibly cheap gas from Russia, they’re getting market access, and an increased reliance of the Russian economy on China. It’s similar to how China has exerted influence over much of the developing world, particularly in less-developed economies.
[00:08:30] Doug: Looking at it from the outside, it’s becoming clearer that Vladimir Putin is mortgaging the future of Russia to China to maintain his war effort.
[00:09:00] Doug: We’ve seen, particularly in the discussions around President Trump’s potential secondary sanctions on China and Chinese companies that have been so vital to maintain the Russian war effort, some of that non-standard or irregular cooperation. As more and more equipment gets recovered from the battlefield in Ukraine, and more recently in Poland with the drones that were shot down there, you are seeing the extent to which the Russian war economy, their military industries, their defense industrial base, is dependent on China. Both for actual products — electronics inside drones — but also for skirting sanctions and restrictions that have prevented Russia from importing components for weapons directly.
[00:09:46] Doug: From a geopolitical and diplomatic perspective, China has extended a lifeline that has kept Russia in the game internationally. Most of the civilized world has correctly ostracized Russia for the invasion of Ukraine. Going back to our previous conversation about the amount of influence that China exerts on other countries, that has served as a segue for Russia to maintain relationships with many countries — Brazil, BRICS members — in a way that otherwise wouldn’t have been possible.
[00:10:20] Doug: There are a couple of ways to look at China’s motivation in its relationship with Russia. First, pure and simple, there’s an economic benefit. The trade imbalance gives China a huge advantage over Russia. I don’t think it’s hyperbolic to say Putin is mortgaging the future of the Russian economy to China to maintain his war effort.
[00:10:43] Doug: Second, the current administration has argued, somewhat convincingly, that the US and Europe’s focus on Russia and Ukraine has diverted attention away from China and its actions, particularly in the South China Sea and regarding Taiwan. We’ve seen a struggle on the US side about how to make that pivot that has been discussed for a decade — away from the Middle East and Europe, toward the Pacific and confronting China’s rise.
[00:11:13] Doug: Just as there’s an argument that support to Ukraine prevents Russian expansion and aggression and provides a great return on investment, China may see support to Russia as a way to keep the West and the US distracted while it expands its own power base, both in Asia-Pacific and globally.
[00:11:37] Dominic: Continuing with the Moscow–Beijing axis. When I describe this to European business leaders, I often talk about the strategic partnership between these nations and how it’s marked by deepening energy integration, evolving arms cooperation, and consistent coordination at the UN. But I like the way you described the relationship as one shaped primarily by Russia’s dependence on China’s senior role. From your perspective, what do business leaders need to understand about this cooperation across energy, arms, and votes at the UN?
[00:12:00] Doug: You mentioned in your introduction the recent moves by India to also move closer to Beijing and Moscow. That’s relevant to the discussion of economies and business. Historically, the West and the US have sought to use levers of influence on Russia, China, and to some extent India around energy. But the way this bloc — not a formal alliance, but certainly a bloc — is forming, it serves as a bulwark against that influence.
[00:12:32] Doug: You have Russia as a major provider of energy, primarily gas and petrochemicals, and then you have China and India as the largest consumers of that energy. As these three countries move closer together, it limits the West’s ability to apply pressure in ways that might influence their activities.
[00:12:54] Doug: From an economic perspective, there hasn’t been much access for Western companies in Russia and China. Their inward turn to closed systems, combined with sanctions, makes it increasingly difficult for outsiders to get in.
[00:13:14] Doug: From the US defense industrial base perspective, this has long been a challenge. The CCP, through state-owned enterprises, has its hands in every Chinese business. That has made it unattractive and often impossible for US defense companies to engage without risking intellectual property theft. We’re now seeing US-produced components, sold through Chinese companies, appearing in Russian military equipment in Ukraine.
[00:13:44] Doug: Economically, between sanctions avoidance and the closing off of major economies — Russia, China, and to a lesser extent India — the West will have less ability to influence and engage.
[00:14:00] Doug: On the military side, it’s been fascinating. India had pursued high-ticket defense projects with Russia before the invasion of Ukraine — the PAK FA, the Su-57 fighter project. India pulled out last year because of sanctions, delays, Russia’s inability to deliver, and unwillingness to share technology and production.
[00:14:33] Doug: We’ve seen increasing interest from China in observing Russian operations. Chinese observers are learning from the ongoing war in Ukraine. Ukraine is the hottest test bed for military equipment development right now. Both sides are innovating. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense even set up an office to manage Western companies bringing technology to test on the battlefield.
[00:15:00] Doug: We see North Korean artillery rounds, guns, armored personnel carriers, and Chinese equipment being pushed through Russia to the battlefield. Iran was one of the first authoritarian regimes to throw in with Russia, driven by pariah status. The Iranians first provided Shahed-136 drones. Initially they shipped drones to Russia, then showed the Russians how to use them, then Russia fired them. Now there are production lines inside Russia.
[00:15:38] Doug: We’ve seen advancements from the original Shahed-136 — propeller-driven, cheap drones I encountered in Iraq in 2022 — to the Geran-3s, the latest generation. The Russians developed technology with Iran, and that technology has now flowed back to Iran, improving its own production.
[00:16:00] Doug: With North Korea, we’ve seen artillery tubes and guns sent to Russia, but most importantly, medium-range and theater ballistic missiles. These gave North Korea a test bed. We know for a fact that North Koreans sent technicians to observe launches and assess effectiveness, then took notes back to adjust their missile production lines — posing a threat to US and allied forces in South Korea and Japan.
[00:16:43] Doug: We know North Korea already has the ability to strike the continental US. With improvements from battlefield testing in Ukraine, those systems will only get better.
[00:17:00] Doug: Everything is interconnected. This pack of authoritarian regimes is supporting each other in ways that will have economic impacts that challenge our influence, and militarily, will have negative impacts on Western countries and the US-led order.
[00:17:30] Dominic: Over the last two decades, nearly three-quarters of China’s weapons imports have come from Russia. This has been a long-term relationship. But as you said, Russia has more recently turned to Iranian drones, artillery shells from North Korea, and even support from South Africa. Beyond this axis, we also know Sudanese and Venezuelan mercenaries are being used around the world. What are some of the lesser-known members of this authoritarian network that our listeners might not know about?
[00:18:00] Doug: We can jump around the world on this one. The Houthis, the terrorist group controlling most of northern Yemen, have absolutely aligned themselves with the authoritarian bloc of Russia, China, and Iran. The Houthis came to power thanks to Iranian support. Very similar to the Russia model, the Iranians exported ballistic missile technology, cruise missile technology, and drones to Yemen for use by the Houthis. That was a huge source of instability when the Houthis effectively shut down a maritime choke point through the Red Sea, significantly impacting international trade.
[00:18:46] Doug: What most people didn’t realize — and I’ve written on this — is that there was a tacit agreement between Russia and the Houthis, China and the Houthis, and Iran and the Houthis, that the Houthis would not fire on ships bearing their flags, or ships they had previously communicated with. Russia’s shadow fleet rarely sails under its own flag, but to avoid attacks, there was an understanding.
[00:19:15] Doug: This meant economic and geostrategic benefit. These countries could continue to transit a maritime choke point that the US and its allies could not. Particularly with Iran’s other proxies degraded in the Middle East, the Houthis have kept up a pace of attacks on Israel, a US ally, creating challenges as the US continues to support Israel with interceptors for systems like THAAD and Iron Dome.
[00:19:52] Doug: Looking to the Western Hemisphere, Venezuela has gotten attention recently. Venezuela is closely aligned with both China and Russia. They’ve been a thorn in America’s side in our own backyard. We know China is building out infrastructure there — dual-use facilities. Ostensibly for civilian purposes, but easily convertible to support Chinese Navy vessels or space-based attacks against satellites.
[00:20:26] Doug: I’ve also written on the flow of fentanyl and narcotics from Chinese-linked cartels through Central and South America, with Venezuela as one stop. Under China’s concept of “unrestricted warfare,” narcotics are a viable way to undermine American security, health, and resolve — killing citizens, degrading society.
[00:20:55] Doug: That’s the whole idea of unrestricted warfare. No one action will defeat the US or the Western bloc, but death by a thousand cuts — economic degradation, narcotics, proxy wars. Precursor chemicals from China, routed through places like Venezuela, are just one avenue of attack.
[00:21:23] Doug: You mentioned Sudan. Russia, first through Wagner and now the Africa Corps, has supported the RSF — the Rapid Support Forces — against Sudan’s legitimate government. This was designed to give Russia access to Port Sudan, a Red Sea port for the Russian Navy. That appears to have fallen through.
[00:21:48] Doug: Across the Sahel, Russia has supported instability, particularly in Libya, to secure military overflight rights and bases. There’s credible reporting of Russia’s Africa Corps supporting opposition in Libya to maintain access to Benghazi airfield as a transit hub for Mali and the Central African Republic. This became even more important after Russia lost access in Syria with Assad’s fall and the loss of basing rights there.
[00:22:24] Doug: In Western Africa, Russia has helped replace democratically elected governments with authoritarian regimes, specifically to secure access to minerals, basing options, and to push out the US and allies.
[00:22:41] Doug: This has been years in the making — a pernicious and creeping effort by authoritarian regimes. Unfortunately, it has been very successful, destabilizing regions, causing death, and pushing out the US and partners. Consolidation has been harder for Russia, China, Iran, and others than they expected — maintaining influence is proving difficult — but the destabilization itself has been effective.
[00:23:18] Dominic: From my own time in Sudan, I can say Wagner had a large presence, though not appreciated by locals. They weren’t a force for good. You also mentioned “unrestricted warfare.” We’ve heard how North Korea is learning on the battlefield in Ukraine. China has military advisors learning from operations. This is a testing ground. The Ukrainians are fighting for survival, but also teaching lessons. What lessons are Ukrainians learning, and what can allies take from their special operations, drone swarms, sabotage campaigns? What lessons should we be applying to other theaters to protect democracies?
[00:24:00] Doug: What most folks don’t realize — and I’ve appreciated how the West has gotten better at telling the story — is that the war in Ukraine didn’t start in February 2022. It started in 2014, when Russian-backed separatists, the “little green men” who were really Russian soldiers without insignia, invaded eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
[00:24:23] Doug: Starting in 2015, the US and NATO partners launched a comprehensive effort to support Ukraine. Advisory groups worked with Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces. The CIA has recently been upfront about the support it provided to build Ukrainian intelligence capabilities.
[00:24:44] Doug: Back then, the Ukrainian military was a Soviet model: no NCO corps, officer-driven, no mission command or decentralized operations. With Western support, Ukraine reformed into a more NATO-standard force. It wasn’t perfect or complete, but it was a huge improvement. By February 2022, Ukraine’s military, special operations, and intelligence services had made enormous progress.
[00:25:12] Doug: That’s why Russia’s advance on Kyiv failed. The airfield seizure at Hostomel turned into a rout for Russia. The infamous 40-mile-long convoy north of Kyiv — the “highway of death” — was destroyed. That was thanks to Ukrainian courage, but also Western supplies and years of advisory support.
[00:25:44] Doug: So by the time Russia launched its “three-day special operation” in 2022, Ukraine was ready. That three-day operation is now a four-year quagmire.
[00:25:58] Doug: For the West, Ukraine has been invaluable as a testing ground. The rapid pace of innovation has been cat-and-mouse: Ukraine develops a new drone or comms system, Russia counters, Ukraine adapts again.
[00:26:16] Doug: Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense even set up a formal program for Western companies to test technologies in specific conditions. This replaced the early ad hoc system where companies leveraged personal contacts. Now it’s organized, reflecting the recognition of Ukraine’s value as a testbed.
[00:26:39] Doug: From a training perspective, Ukrainian units rotate through Poland, the UK, France, and elsewhere for NATO training. That has created invaluable exchanges of lessons learned.
[00:26:54] Doug: From a special operations perspective, we’ve seen a blend of old and new. Operation Spiderweb is a good example — an 18-20 month plan where Ukrainian SOF and intelligence infiltrated Russia, pre-positioned drones in railcars and vehicles, then launched them simultaneously to destroy or disable a third of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet in one morning.
[00:27:27] Doug: That was old-school sabotage — similar to WWII SAS raids in North Africa against German aircraft — updated with new drone technology.
[00:27:00] Doug: I was just speaking at a panel at the Irregular Warfare Conference two months ago where we discussed the implications of Spiderweb, and also Operation Rising Lion — the Israeli operation in Iran. That was a two-year effort where Israeli operatives, their partners in the Iranian resistance, and drones were pre-positioned inside Iran to decapitate the regime’s command and control in one strike.
[00:27:32] Doug: Those operations show how old-school concepts — infiltration, pre-positioning, sabotage — are now being blended with new technologies like drones. For the US and its allies, it validates concepts we’ve long trained on, but it also forces us to ask: what happens if adversaries do the same to us?
[00:27:55] Doug: When I went through Special Forces training, the idea of “stay-behind operations” — supporting resistance networks in occupied countries — was theoretical. Now we’re seeing it in the real world. Watching Spiderweb unfold, seeing Rising Lion, it’s a reminder that our adversaries are learning these lessons too.
[00:28:21] Doug: So while these are validation for NATO concepts, they are also warnings. From cartel drones in Mexico to Chinese state-owned enterprises buying land near US bases, we must ask: what if these tactics are turned on us? That’s why we must learn from Ukraine — because authoritarian regimes certainly are.
[00:28:46] Dominic: Before applying for Australian Special Operations selection, officers have to read Admiral McRaven’s Spec Ops from 1996. It includes case studies like Belgium in 1940, British midget submarines in Norway in 1943, and Rangers in the Philippines. It’s fascinating to see those principles now applied with modern tech in Ukraine.
[00:29:13] Doug: Absolutely. Great book, still highly relevant. And those “high-tech” examples at the time — gliders at Eben-Emael in Belgium, shaped charges against fortifications — were untested technologies then. Just like drones and AI are now.
[00:29:33] Doug: Honestly, someone could write a new edition today using examples from Ukraine, Israel, and elsewhere over just the past five or six years. Operations like Spiderweb and Rising Lion alone would warrant chapters. And of course, Israel’s ongoing operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. It’s past time for an update.
[00:30:00] Dominic: You mentioned the US being distracted from the Indo-Pacific. How concerned are you — and how concerned should listeners be — about the risk environment in East Asia today?
[00:30:13] Doug: There’s enormous risk. Our key trading partners — Japan in particular — face threats, as do South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines. China has been explicit: the nine-dash line, rejecting UNCLOS, building artificial islands, expanding territorial claims in one of the world’s most critical maritime choke points.
[00:30:41] Doug: Recently we saw China parade new military technologies. The West often comforts itself by saying “China hasn’t fought a war since 1979, and they lost to Vietnam, so they don’t know how to fight.” That’s dangerous complacency.
[00:30:59] Doug: First, China has been exporting its weapons. We know Chinese systems are being tested — by Iran, the Houthis, Russia in Ukraine. For example, anti-ship missiles used by Houthis trace back to Chinese designs sold to Iran. So Chinese tech is being combat-tested, even if indirectly.
[00:31:26] Doug: Second, AI and quantum computing are changing the calculus. The West prides itself on experienced command and control. China is experimenting with handing C2 entirely to AI — simulating every possible battlefield scenario, issuing orders directly to units.
[00:31:50] Doug: China’s military has never been strong at decentralized initiative. But if a computer is directing units with quantum-powered precision, that shortcoming could be erased.
[00:32:07] Doug: Combine that with China’s A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategy. They’ve mass-produced anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles, and positioned them to extend the range at which they can keep US forces out of the Western Pacific.
[00:32:29] Doug: Admiral Aquilino, INDOPACOM commander, has spoken about this. The Chinese plan is simple: if they move on Taiwan or the South China Sea, their A2/AD bubble will prevent us from responding effectively. And frankly, they may succeed.
[00:32:51] Doug: If that happens, US allies — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, even Australia — could be left outside the bubble, with no credible US military response possible. That’s enormously dangerous.
[00:33:13] Doug: Add to that China’s expanding nuclear rocket forces, which can hold the US homeland at risk. We could face a scenario where US conventional forces can’t respond, and nuclear threats tie our hands. That would give Beijing massive leverage.
[00:33:36] Doug: This is part of what the Trump administration’s “Golden Dome” missile defense initiative is about — countering these growing threats. But while the US is distracted — by Ukraine, by the Middle East — China keeps advancing. And that distraction is intentional.
[00:33:58] Doug: I was in Iraq in 2022, in uniform, watching Chinese-backed Iranian militias tie down coalition forces. Same with Houthi actions in the Red Sea — supported indirectly by China via Iran. All of this keeps US resources bogged down, preventing focus on the Indo-Pacific.
[00:34:25] Doug: It’s all connected. China and Russia flood the information space with propaganda, distracting Europe and the US. That delay could give China the time it needs to make a fait accompli move — an invasion of Taiwan or closure of the South China Sea.
[00:34:46] Doug: If the US is unable to respond, both militarily and morally, that could end the American-led world order.
[00:36:00] Dominic: If we look inward, what should the US and allies be doing better internally? If we take the Five Eyes — US, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the UK — one of the oldest alliances, or AUKUS, one of the newest. Institutionally, these alliances remain strong, but there have been strains.
[00:36:20] Dominic: Five years ago I’d have said “never,” but now we see Canada and New Zealand as more timid members of the partnership. The Five Eyes is primarily an intelligence-sharing group, but even AUKUS, where Australia has invested billions in facilities, has seen reviews under the Trump administration. Reasonable perhaps, but it stoked unease in Australia and the UK — at the same time the US Secretary of Defense is calling for a pivot to Asia.
[00:36:53] Dominic: Add tariffs and what some call Trump’s “trade war on everyone,” and there’s unease. These alliances are strong, but what should we be doing to reassure each other, especially when challenges are growing globally?
[00:37:14] Doug: I was Director of Sensitive Activities, Special Programs, Special Operations, and Irregular Warfare for the Secretary of the Navy during the first round of AUKUS talks at the start of the Biden administration. It was absolutely the right move at the right time.
[00:37:31] Doug: Reviews are natural, especially with highly classified, strategic capabilities. But AUKUS is the model we need to pursue — US and allies, burden-sharing, modernization.
[00:37:44] Doug: The US dwarfs everyone in defense spending and capability. That has benefits, but it’s also created imbalance. Allies have sometimes relied too heavily on US security guarantees. With strategic competition rising, allies must invest more in their own defense.
[00:38:07] Doug: Take Australia. Originally they were set to buy diesel-electric submarines from France. Objectively, those weren’t the right choice for operations in the Western Pacific. They had limited range — maybe as far as the Philippines. Nuclear-powered submarines, co-produced with the US and UK, make far more sense. Global reach, higher survivability, shared technology. That was the right choice.
[00:38:39] Doug: Facilities in Australia also provide dual-use benefits. Just like China has built dual-use ports in Venezuela, the US and allies need bases in the Pacific to support ships and submarines. That’s why AUKUS is so important — win-win for both sides.
[00:39:02] Doug: The strength of Five Eyes and NATO has always been standardization. Shared ammunition, interchangeable magazines, compatible facilities. Australia has been a huge partner for the US for decades. With AUKUS, that cooperation extends to submarines and beyond.
[00:39:24] Doug: Yes, there’s churn — Canada questioning US intentions, domestic politics creating noise. But these relationships have been forged in blood. I’ve served alongside Canadians, Brits, Australians in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. That bond is strong.
[00:39:43] Doug: At the end of the day, Western democracies know they share values, history, and interests. They face authoritarian regimes that are aggressive, revisionist, and threaten the global order. Whatever the day-to-day political noise, those shared values will prevail.
[00:40:04] Doug: And we must remember: none of these challenges can be viewed in isolation. Houthis in the Red Sea, Iranians in the Middle East, Chinese in the South China Sea, Russians in the Baltics — it’s all interconnected.
[00:40:25] Dominic: That’s a good note to end on — a reminder that authoritarian alliances and Western alliances alike are deeply interconnected, and the risks cannot be siloed. Doug, thank you for spending the past hour with us and helping us unpack these challenges.
[00:40:44] Doug: The pleasure was all mine.
[00:40:46] Dominic: That was a fascinating conversation with Doug Livermore on authoritarian alliances and the international risks they pose. If you enjoyed this, go back to episode 197 for Doug’s insights on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
[00:41:00] Dominic: Remember — as Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and their partners deepen cooperation across economic, military, energy, and digital domains, it’s clear democracies, governments, and business leaders need to understand these alliances and rethink their playbooks.
[00:41:21] Dominic: We’ll link to Doug’s writings in the show notes and on our website — I strongly encourage you to read his work. It’s insightful and important.
[00:41:32] Dominic: Today’s podcast was produced and coordinated by Katerina Mazzucchelli. I’m Dominic Bowen, your host. Thanks very much for listening. We’ll speak again in the next few days.
