Armenia: Between Russia and the West and the Complicated Dynamics of Peace with Azerbaijan

Recently, an apparent warning was issued to Armenia via the Russian Ambassador. OC Media reported that at the “East-West Confrontation: Ukrainian Dimension. Scenarios for the Future” conference in Yerevan, Sergei Kopyrkin, in reference to Ukraine, advised Armenia that the current situation there:

Clearly demonstrates what can happen if a state abandons its own national interests and turns into an instrument for implementing destructive geopolitical scenarios of the West in the context of confrontation with Russia.

Sergei Kopyrkin

This statement, made amid Armenia’s growing bid for EU participation and nearly a year after suspending its financial obligations to the CSTO, underscores the nation’s increasing disillusionment with Russia. The erosion of trust stems largely from Russia’s failure to support Armenia in recent clashes with its neighbor, Azerbaijan. While Russia’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine may explain this lack of intervention, it also inadvertently created a window of opportunity for Azerbaijan to initiate military offensives with little fear of consequence.

Yet, paradoxically, Russia’s distraction may have also enabled a push toward Armenian-Azeri peace. As Moscow’s influence over the region wanes, the South Caucasus is undergoing a major recalibration of alliances. Armenia’s interest in Western institutions is increasingly evident—not least in its ratification of the Rome Statute and accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC), a bold move that requires Armenian authorities to arrest Vladimir Putin should he enter the country. It’s a step that aligns Armenia with international justice but symbolically distances it from its traditional ally.

Still, as Armenia nurtures relationships with the West, the question of true and lasting peace in the South Caucasus remains elusive.

Constitutional Tensions and the Delayed Peace Agreement

In 2024, Armenian and Azerbaijani officials announced that the terms of a long-awaited peace treaty had been finalized. However, its signing has since been stalled by fresh Azerbaijani demands—chief among them, amendments to the Armenian constitution. Baku contends that references to Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) and calls for Armenian unity with “liberated territories” pose a threat to Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.

Moreover, Azerbaijan is demanding a direct land corridor through Armenia to its exclave, Nakhchivan. The so-called “Zangezur Corridor” would allow for an unimpeded link between mainland Azerbaijan and Turkey, enhancing economic connectivity for Turkic states and bolstering Baku’s regional leverage. For Armenia, this raises fears not only about sovereignty but about the precedent such concessions could set.

Pan-Turkism and the Azeri-Turkish Strategic Alliance

A crucial yet often underexplored dimension in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations is the Pan-Turkic agenda, subtly advocated by Ankara and Baku. Turkey has been Azerbaijan’s ally, promoting the mantra “one nation, two states.” While full political unification of the Turkic world is not the goal, increased integration across Central Asia, economically, politically, and culturally, may be in motion according to our recent guest on the podcast.

For Turkey, normalized relations with Armenia could open new trade routes and reduce regional isolation. For Armenia, cooperation with Turkey offers a gateway to Europe and economic revitalization. However, Ankara has made it clear that normalization is contingent upon Armenia’s acceptance of Azerbaijan’s terms, including the corridor and constitutional changes. This diplomatic quid pro quo places Armenia in a difficult bind.

As watchdogs have noted, Azerbaijan’s rhetoric has escalated into dangerous territory. President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly referred to modern-day Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan,” extending claims even to the capital, Yerevan. This narrative combined with the systematic destruction of Armenian heritage sites and the mass exodus of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 may amount to more than irredentism. It risks laying the ideological groundwork for future conflict or even large-scale displacement.

Russia’s Regional Influence, and Growing International Risk

Russia, meanwhile, views increased Turkish-Armenian cooperation and Western involvement in the Caucasus with suspicion. Moscow has historically framed itself as the regional arbiter, and any shift in Armenia’s orientation toward NATO or the EU threatens to erode this influence. Though the Kremlin appears increasingly incapable of enforcing its will, it remains invested in maintaining a buffer between Western institutions and the former Soviet sphere.

Hence, Russia’s muted response to Azerbaijan’s military victories, as well as its growing hostility toward Armenia’s Western outreach, may be strategic. Armenia’s pivot leaves it vulnerable—no longer protected by the Russian security umbrella, yet not fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures either.

Human Rights Concerns: PoWs and Sham Trials in Azerbaijan

Further complicating peace efforts are the unresolved human rights violations following the 2020 and 2023 escalations. Armenian prisoners of war remain detained in Azerbaijan, with many subjected to sham trials, forced confessions, and torture. International organisations have documented multiple breaches of international law by Azerbaijani authorities, including the extrajudicial execution of Armenian soldiers and degrading treatment of civilians.

These abuses underscore the deep asymmetries of power between the two states and raise serious doubts about Azerbaijan’s commitment to international norms. A peace agreement signed under duress or without robust mechanisms for human rights accountability risks being short-lived.

A Precarious Balance

Armenia today stands at a precarious geopolitical crossroads. The path to peace will require more than a signed treaty. It will demand constitutional clarity, protection of human rights, economic resilience, and a vigilant international community ready to hold all parties accountable. Most of all, it will require Armenia to balance aspiration with pragmatism to forge new partnerships without becoming a pawn in a broader East-West confrontation.

In the South Caucasus, the line between diplomacy and deterrence is razor-thin. For Armenia, survival may now depend on mastering both.