Episode 270: Syria in Turmoil: Unraveling the Present, Forecasting the Future with Broderick McDonald

Coordinated and Produced by Elisa Garbil

Today Dominic Bowen hosts Broderick McDonald on the podcast to discuss the future of Syria. They dive into the different external actors and their interests, the challenges that the new government of Syria is facing, the fine line of institutional reform and unity, the need for inclusion of the minority groups, what the impact is of sanctions relief, lessons from Syria for global conflict, and much more!

Broderick McDonald is a Research Fellow at Kings College London’s XCEPT Research Programme and a Research Associate the Oxford Emerging Threats Group. Prior to this, he served as an Advisor to the Government of Canada and was a Fellow with the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC). Broderick’s writing and commentary has appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, Financial Times, The Guardian, The Telegraph, and The Globe and Mail amongst others. Alongside his research, Broderick provides expert analysis for a range of international news broadcasters, including ABC News, BBC News, BBC America, CBC News, Good Morning America, France24, and Al Jazeera News.

Broderick currently serves on the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism’s (GIFCT) Independent Advisory Committee and the GLOCA Board of Advisors. He previously lived in the Middle East and has conducted extensive fieldwork with combatants from ISIS, HTS, and other armed groups. Alongside his research, Broderick has advised governments, NGOs, law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, international prosecutors, parliamentarians, AI Safety Institutes, frontier AI labs, and social media companies on security threats and emerging technologies.

The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime, to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.

Dominic Bowen is the host of The International Risk Podcast and Europe’s leading expert on international risk and crisis management. As Head of Strategic Advisory and Partner at one of Europe’s leading risk management consulting firms, Dominic advises CEOs, boards, and senior executives across the continent on how to prepare for uncertainty and act with intent. He has spent decades working in war zones, advising multinational companies, and supporting Europe’s business leaders. Dominic is the go-to business advisor for leaders navigating risk, crisis, and strategy; trusted for his clarity, calmness under pressure, and ability to turn volatility into competitive advantage. Dominic equips today’s business leaders with the insight and confidence to lead through disruption and deliver sustained strategic advantage.

The International Risk Podcast – Reducing risk by increasing knowledge.

Follow us on LinkedIn and Subscribe for all our updates!

Tell us what you liked!

Transcript:

​[00:00:00]

Broderick McDonald: right now most Syrians, when I speak to them at least, are concerned primarily with service delivery and cost of living infrastructure. These kind of, kitchen table issues. these are, for any society, for any country, these are the ones that are felt the most acutely.

Elisa Garbil: Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organizations worldwide.

Dominic Bowen: Hi, I’m Dominique Bowen and I’m the host of the International Risk Podcast. And today we’re gonna further dissect Syria’s unfinished transition after Assad’s fall. The honeymoon period, if there ever was one is definitely over. And now the new government in Syria needs to start demonstrating legitimacy.

There’s timelines that need to be met. there’s expectations from neighboring countries. And to unpack all that, we’re gonna be joined by Bro McDonald. He’s a research fellow at King’s College. London’s, Accept research program and he’s a research associate at Oxford’s Emerging Threat Groups. I’m really excited to have this conversation with bro today and, and I think we’ll get really good insight on [00:01:00] what’s happening in Syria, the current volatility, and hopefully the, the future of the new government in Syria.

Broderick, welcome to the International Risk Podcast.

Broderick McDonald: Thanks for having me.

Dominic Bowen: Look forward to chatting, Broderick. We’ve spoken to a few guests recently about the current situation in Syria and everyone’s coming from their own perspectives and, and seeing different things and speaking to different peoples. What’s your current understanding?

There’s, there’s so many people, Israel, the USA, Turkey, Syria, of course, there are so many people with real and very significant interest in Syria. What are you seeing happening in Syria at the moment?

Broderick McDonald: It’s a real challenge because Syria sits at the heart of the Middle East, and because of that you have all of these external actors, many of which you just mentioned, all vying for a piece of Syria and trying to, you know, shape what the future of Syria will look like.

And while I think it’s good that we see interest in Syria after 14 years of, you know, relative, isolation and, and kind of, I would say. You know, leaving it to the sidelines. We also are concerned now [00:02:00] that Syria is gonna become a country which is heavily influenced by all these external actors and oftentimes in, in very negative ways.

And so I think, you know, when, when we look at whether it’s. Russia and Iran, or even Israel or the United States or the European Union and each of their interests in Syria. I think we need to essentially emphasize two things. The first, that. Countries should come and they should engage with Syria now, but it should be non exploitative, first of all.

And secondly, they should just try to help Syria rebuild at this stage. I mean, it is far too early for Syria to actually contribute in a meaningful way to, External countries. It will get there eventually, but right now the focus needs to be on rebuilding after 14 years of civil war and really putting the country back together after, a really devastating period.

Dominic Bowen: You raised quite a few really interesting points there, Broderick. And of course, some additional actors you mentioned they’re gonna have very different interests. So I mentioned Russia’s interests and Iran’s interests in Syria are probably gonna be very different [00:03:00] from Israel’s or the US and, and the European unions.

But as you said, the priority has to be. To get the country back on track. It was a, a healthy middle income country. before the Civil War. Yes, the politics were terrible. Yes, there was lots of, unnecessary suffering and significant corruption, but it wasn’t a terrible country, by many measures or by many metrics.

So as the, the country starts to look towards and, and its new leaders really look towards forming governments, forming government institutions. What are you looking at and, how should they be balancing this need to, rush institutional reform and institutional building with actually getting it right and doing it right from the start?

Broderick McDonald: They have two big priorities right now. The, the first is what you just mentioned, which is the kind of state building and, institution building that any country needs. However, that needs to be to a certain degree and you can push that too far. And the danger in Syria in particular is that because it is such a diverse society and such a diverse country with many different communities, whether [00:04:00] that’s the Druze or the Alloy or the Kurdish community, the Christian community, or a hundred others within, you know, different segments of Syrian society, gender, religion, the economic communities that, that sit within Syria.

All of these different communities need to really be integrated into the new Syrian state that is forming. And that’s a challenge of the best of times. But given that you’re dealing with a country now that has seen internal conflict for the last 14 years, many tensions have built up, many resentments have built up between these communities.

I think that’s even more challenging. And so when we think about the kind of, you know, state building that you mentioned, I think. It’s important not to rush into it, but actually to go very slowly and consultatively and deliberatively through each of these different communities and try to really include them in a meaningful way.

It can’t just be a sort of token, appointment here or a token committee there. It needs to be actually from the ground up, a new Syrian state [00:05:00] that takes all of its component parts seriously and gives them a voice. and so that’s my only fear when it comes to state building and rushing into the kind of institutional reform that some are calling for.

to the extent that that becomes a centralizing, force that really concentrates power and Damascus and concentrates power in the HTS led government, that is a risk, And the second priority that I alluded to at the beginning here is keeping Syria together. You know, Syria faces all kinds of, uh, challenges both internal and external.

We see that in the south, we see that in the northeast, even on the coasts. So you know, the challenge that Syria now has is balancing these two priorities of, of institutional reform and state building, but also with keeping its different communities together and united and homogenous. And I think that is a real, a real tension, that the new government is gonna have to work very hard to navigate in the coming weeks and months as. This new series starts to form.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, so I think right now donors and external partners really want visible [00:06:00] milestones, but at the same time, Syrians, they want electricity, they want water, they want paychecks, they want education, they want healthcare. And I think this gap between expectations from external actors and, you know, state capacity is, potentially where the government could fall over.

What sort of indicators? Are you tracking or would you be tracking to tell us if, if Damascus really is building that internal legitimacy at the same time as maintaining that international legitimacy? And, and what are the thresholds that would tell you that they’re failing or that would start to make you really worry?

Broderick McDonald: think the most important thing is to look at real progress on the ground, and you can measure that by a few different proxy, measures. But the most important of which at this stage is likely. Infrastructure and cost of living. So we have seen cost of living in Syria go up for years and years and years under this auto regime, which did almost nothing to, a life more affordable for middle class Syrians, who, lived a good life in many aspects before the conflict.

but just saw all of that evaporate over the last 14 years. We saw [00:07:00] some initial progress towards this in the first few months after the fall of the Assab regime. some things were coming down in cost as international goods entered the market as donors, contributed food aid and, and fuel aid and, energy security to the country.

But we have also now seen. The cost of, of many other things go up more recently. And so I think this is where you, you know, you need to see the actual rubber meet the road. And if people can afford bread, if people can afford food, in a reasonable manner, in hopefully in a manner that that beats this sort of, Asad crisis, that is meaningful progress.

But we’re not seeing that across the board yet. And then it’s to be expected given some of the, the enormous challenges that Syria faces. But I’m also hopeful that as sanctions come off of Syria and as some of the donor money, particularly on bigger projects like energy, like infrastructure start to come into position, we will actually see some meaningful progress on that.

But. That depends on, HTS and Sharah and the government that they lead, [00:08:00] maintaining that kind of international legitimacy that they’ve achieved in the last few months. and we’ll, you know, I’m sure we’ll talk about, the United Nations General Assembly, UNGA coming up and, and what all of that means. But I think there’s, there’s some things to be optimistic about there without. Sort of overlooking, how far they need to go and where some of the shortfalls have been already.

Dominic Bowen: You mentioned the minority groups before, and I, I wanna pick that up. You know, I, I lived in Iraq during the, really, the worst of the sectarian violence there.

And it was, it was just shocking, but it was so visible. there was no disputing and it was, it was so clear and you’d see, it occurring every single day. but then a few years later, was living in and working in, Syria during the, the Civil War there. You could see it less so, but there was still definitely very clear different between the northeast, the northwest, the south, and of course, damas and the coastal areas.

Uh. So there is a real risk, as you said, and I think most people can see that there is that risk of exclusion of minorities and, and opposition groups. So what, what sort of mechanisms do you think are needed and what sort of mechanisms you’re hoping will, will start to [00:09:00] be built and to be strengthened to ensure that there really is genuine political inclusion of minority groups, of opposition groups so that we can avoid the same sort of sectarian conflict we’ve seen in, in other post-conflict states in the region.

Broderick McDonald: For the inclusion of these different ethnic and religious communities. I think Syria really needs two things. The, the first is transitional justice and doing that in a meaningful way. Now we’ve seen violence in the south, we’ve seen violence in the coast.

We’ve also seen violence, with Kurdish communities for Syria many different, ethnic and religious. Minorities to feel like they can trust this new government. I think we’re gonna need to see, really effective and accountable forms of transitional justice. That means, independent inquiries into these different, uh, conflicts that have happened in areas or in alloy areas or in Kurdish areas and really.

Trying to bring those different communities into the process of transitional justice so that there is trust that the, mechanisms and institutions that are set up will work [00:10:00] for them. it cannot be this sort of central government, coming down from above and telling communities what’s gonna happen.

It needs to be those communities actually integrated into the commissions, into the inquiries themselves. And feeling like their voices are heard. Now, that requires, frankly, the central government to also be self-critical of itself and to, I think, be willing to, in some cases, even go so far as to prosecute members of its.

Armed group, or now it’s government that have committed atrocities and abuses, which we know has happened, but it is of course, very, very difficult. Firstly to adjudicate who those members are and who is most responsible. And then also to take action against members that have, you know, in many cases supported the achievements of the group or the government.

And so, so that requires, think a phenomenal amount of, of self-awareness and, I think really responsibility. But if there is, you know, gonna be a moment where this can happen, it should be now, after we saw this, historic collapse of this solder regime. And, and I think [00:11:00] longer term, inclusion of Druze or Alloy or Christian or Kurdish communities that’s gonna require institutional reform to actually give them a voice in, you know, democratic elections and, and a democratic parliament.

But I think we’re still a ways away from that, yet we’re hopeful that in the next three to four years we’ll see some meaningful progress on that. But it should start right now with that transitional justice file, because that is the most important.

Dominic Bowen: So, so talking about what’s most important and, you know, the importance of democratic elections, I think most of our listeners will, will recognize and understand that, and you referred earlier to this, you know, historic moment of responsibility that the new government in Syria has.

I, I wonder when we, when we balance things, when what this communities on the ground need now, but in the long term, and then of course regionally what all the, neighbors want. What is gonna be more important? Is it pushing for early elections? Is it to prioritize governance, or is it just a focus on just basic service delivery after, you know, 14 years of civil war?

what’s the benefit of each one and, and what’s the risk if the government prioritizes one of those over the other? [00:12:00] I.

Broderick McDonald: I think all of them are important, but right now we’re still less than a year out, from the end of the Syrian revolution, if you will, or the fall of the Assad regime.

And I think right now most Syrians, when I speak to them at least, are concerned primarily with service delivery and cost of living infrastructure. These kind of, kitchen table issues. these are, for any society, for any country, these are the ones that are felt the most acutely.

now this isn’t to say that the transitional justice we spoke about or the kind of democratic reforms that are needed cannot come at the same time, but I think that. Looking at Syria today, 10 months after the fall of the solder regime. I think those are what are gonna resonate most with Syrians. And I will say there is, when we look at Syria today, it’s a mixed bag.

There are some things that have gone, I think, much better than many of us who watch and follow Syria so closely, had hoped for. but there’s also many things that have gone worse and, and one of the things that I think. I have some optimism about is the [00:13:00] ability of this new government to actually build infrastructure and to do service delivery.

So if we look historically at the kind of track record of this group in Idlib, which is the kind of small enclave in the northwest of Syria that it governed, you know, for eight years before then taking over Damascus and the rest of the country. In the enclave of Idlib, it was, actually much better than any of the other armed groups there in terms of developing, infrastructure that worked in terms of providing electricity, providing reliable fuel, providing reliable access to cellular networks.

it certainly had its mistakes and it. Committed human rights abuses in Idlib, but on these kind of in infrastructure and cost of living service delivery issues, it tends to be very, very consistent, very well organized. And that’s down to the cohesiveness of the group, which I’m, I’m happy to speak about.

But I think as we see this arm group now transition into a government, it’s gonna keep that DNA of prioritizing infrastructure, law and order. service delivery because [00:14:00] that’s, that’s really where it comes from and where a lot of its expertise lies. And that is good in the short term because it should hopefully provide Syrians with a bit of a better standard of living, at least if the new government includes all these different communities.

But in the longer term, I think it’s gonna need help from outside donors. From outside countries, particularly the eu, the us, the uk, and others, to really make progress, not just on infrastructure, but on the kind of democratic reforms and the institutional building, that is needed for, uh, Syria to stay united long term.

Dominic Bowen: And I think it’d be really interesting. You mentioned sanctions relief earlier. I’d be keen to know how might. Partial sanctions relief or full sanctions relief with time actually relieve, the current pains in Syria, and what sort of trajectory we’d expect from those and what guardrails needed to prevent corruption to prevent elite capture, to prevent at further marginalizing groups.

And maybe we should start by, uh, if you can give a sort of a current understanding of what is the picture today with sanctions relief. Have any countries relieved or [00:15:00] removed their sanctions on Syria yet?

Broderick McDonald: Yes. So the United Kingdom, which is where I’m based, the United States, the European Union and others have lifted at least partial sanctions in, in some cases, all the way, in some cases, part of the way.

and this has been a huge help to ordinary Syrians because for, much of the last 14 years, they were under one of the most, severe sanctions regimes that the world has ever seen. and that. Not only impacted Siri’s ability to import the foods and medicines and goods that they needed, to have a healthy, coherent society, but also impacted Siri’s ability to export, anything.

And, I don’t just mean the sort of limited oil that. Exists in the east of the country here. I also mean the, kind of entrepreneurial genius that Syria had before the, conflict. I mean, cities like Damascus and Aleppo in particular had, really strong. Business communities before them.

They, they were actually renowned throughout much of the Middle East. many of my Jordanian friends, you know, when I used to live there, would drive up, before the war [00:16:00] and visit Syria for a day to kind of buy everything they could because they could get it at a cheaper price and the quality was better, the availability of options was better, you know, so, so Syria has a history of a great history of entrepreneurship and business, and I think.

All of that was essentially put under wraps the last, 14 years. and Siri was, unable to provide for itself because it was being held back by sanctions. Now those sanctions, were against the sold regime and the sold regime did, did horrible things. So, we understand that. But now that many of those sanctions have been lifted or will be lifted likely in the coming weeks and months, I think it really unleashes a lot of, Syrian.

Expertise and, and really genius, uh, on these sort of entrepreneurial business ventures that I hope will ultimately make Syria. Like you said at the beginning of this, at least a middle income country that is sustainable and isn’t reliant on donors from any country, whether that’s the Gulf or the eu, the ultimate goal is that Syria can stand strongly on its own two [00:17:00] feet and really actually provide leadership to the rest of the region rather than being a, recipient of aid.

Dominic Bowen: Now, of course, during the Civil War, the armed opposition groups in northern Syria and, uh, northwest and northeast and, and certainly even in the south, you know, were able to sustain, their operations because of support from international actors. There was cross border support from several states, but now we’re in a different situation.

They’re no longer a rebel group or an armed opposition group. They’re now a government actor and some of those long-term backers, and now sometimes some new backers are, are coming in and, and trying to engage with that new government. is there that risk of Syria becoming the, the next proxy contest, the next country that Iran, Russia, the West and Europe are fighting over to control and influence?

Broderick McDonald: There’s a huge risk that it becomes that, but I think when we look at the leadership incus and I think. When we look at the history that they’ve had to deal with the last 14 years, they’re also quite astute, in terms of how to deal with each of these countries. So for instance, in the kind of days [00:18:00] after the offensive was launched in, in November, 2024, um, the Shara.

Well armed group at the time, it’s now the government that he leads, reached out directly to Russia. And even though Russia, had been propping up the Assad regime for years and years and, and in many cases committing, atrocities against Syrians, I. They reached out to them because they knew that strategically Russia was important to have on their side as a, not even as an ally, but, not as an opponent.

and so they, you know, sort of very deftly handled that right from the beginning of the offensive and. Ultimately that helped them to not just stop at Aleppo when the offensive started. That’s sort of as far as many people thought it would go, but push all the way down and take the capital mask us.

And so I think, we shouldn’t underestimate the pragmatism of this group and this leader. and I think. He has gotten crash course in international diplomacy for the last, 10 months. He is, almost constantly being, either going to the gulf, going in some cases, you know, to the European Union, to the United States, even, [00:19:00] even Russia.

and I meeting with all of these different actors and I think, forming. Relationships, basically, on shared interests. Not, necessarily on shared values at this point, but on shared interests. And that’s a good place to start. I think it’s very unlikely though, that we will see Iran and some of these, countries, that played such a meaningful role in propping up the auer regime, ever having the kind of influence that they had before.

It’s just hard to imagine that Syrians today, after 14 years of being bombed by Russia or being, attacked by Iranian troops or Iranian proxies on the ground, would be willing to entertain that level of engagement. But that doesn’t preclude, smaller agreements, security agreements, food security agreements, energy agreements with countries like Russia.

I think that is within the realm of possibility. but when we look at the bigger picture and how each of these groups is interacting, I think it’s really important that even. what would be considered allied countries or, or close countries to Syria do not take a, domineering role in the new Syria as it’s being formed.

So, even a country like Turkey, which [00:20:00] played a big role both in Idlib before the offensive and, and ever since, has played a big role in, Syria’s defense and, and economy. I think it’s important that these countries don’t look at Syria as, a proxy that they can control and they can shape. and, and there’s a number of ways that they can avoid doing that.

the first is staying out of deals that, you know, sell off national assets. So I think that kind of tendency, for, for some donors in the Gulf has been oftentimes to, go after. Strategic assets that, bring revenue to a country, whether that, is, oil and gas or even tourism as we’ve seen, some Gulf countries going after, particular tourist assets in Egypt.

These kind of exploitative deals are gonna turn Syria into a proxy. but by the same extension, even funding armed groups within Syria, post. Syrian revolution posts, fall of facade. Those present real risks that the country is gonna be pulled, in the interest of, a neighboring country rather than the interest of Syria.

So I think even when we look at, countries that are close to the new government, they need to be careful [00:21:00] not to prioritize their own interest, but to really prioritize what’s right for Syria in this moment.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, thanks for explaining that. And you are obviously heavily involved with King College’s except, research program looking at cross-border conflicts of which Syria was a long time and sort of at the center of much study around cross-border conflicts.

But I wonder now that the, hopefully the Civil War is over and that we can call that conflict finished and moving into a post-conflict stage. What are some of the lessons we learned and, How is this relevant to other conflicts that we’re seeing around the world?

Broderick McDonald: I think the big one for me is something actually quite personal when I started working on this project with King’s College London. And, and except there was almost no international attention being paid to Syria, whether that was media or governments or even international organizations. Many of them had sort of moved on since 2014, 2015. and, and this makes sense in some ways because, other conflicts emerge, other issues come up.

civil wars become, less important as. Conflict, whether that’s, Ukraine, [00:22:00] Russia, or others, takes on prominence. But what we saw last year and the beginning of this year is that when we. Ignore these sort of forgotten conflicts, these issues that everybody else has moved on from, we have real blind spots when something happens.

And so I think this is something that my team at, at King’s College London has talked about a lot and, and I think we will continue to try to advocate for, it’s very important, When there’s so much happening in the world, and so much that we could focus on that we don’t overlook these conflicts that we perhaps think are, finished or we think they’re over, we think they’ve, just become frozen and not worth paying attention to.

It’s really critical that we continue to pay attention to. Parts of the world that are oftentimes forgotten because big things can and do happen. And when they do, we’re gonna lack the expertise to understand it and respond to it. We’re gonna lack the, you know, connections on the ground to make a meaningful difference.

And so I think to the extent we can spread our resources, uh, as effectively as possible. It’s really important [00:23:00] for not only for these countries that, that are, you know, perhaps experiencing something like the Syrian Civil War, but also for, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Japan, others. it helps us to respond more effectively and to have better policy responses in the long term.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, definitely agree with that, Broderick. And when you look around the world, what are the international risks that concern you the most?

Broderick McDonald: You know, I mean, speaking of this, I think one of the big challenges that I see right now is there are so many different directions that we’re being pulled in. And one of the.

Directions is of course great power competition. We obviously see, the US and China, we see Russia and Ukraine, you know, competing with the, European Union and the United States, somewhat through a proxy. but still, there are big, big strategic issues. But I I come from the, kind of counterinsurgency counterterrorism world and I think that there is oftentimes, A tendency to look past the importance of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency as we shift to these big interstate conflicts or great power competitions. And I [00:24:00] think the real risk there is that if you take your eye off of, the ball for too long, the challenge has become even larger and even more insurmountable and actually end up costing western governments, if you will, much more in the long run.

So it’s actually much better to keep. Kind of consistent, steady approach that isn’t heavily invested and and isn’t. entangled in conflicts in the Middle East or Central Asia or, Africa, or wherever, it may be. But rather is, is sort of constantly scanning and monitoring, with sort of minimal footprint so that we know what is happening, for instance, in Mali or Burkina Fasa right now.

So we know what is happening in Tajikistan or Central Asia right now. These are, Countries where I see, future risks from, either Islamist armed groups or South Fi jihadist armed groups. And I think, you know, we, we oftentimes are, are tempted to ignore these and kind of think that this is something that was largely resolved by the time Russia invaded Ukraine, but.

It’s actually gonna cost us much more in the long run and, actually in danger, not just security of, of [00:25:00] Western states, but also the internal security and safety of these countries and, and civilians within those countries if we completely move away from them. The last part of it is really what has happened, not universally around the world.

There are still some countries that are funding this kind of work. I do think that the kind of peacekeeping and USIP work that was done, is very, very important. not only for monitoring, but also building the kind of local institutions and local economies, that prevent countries from descending into armed conflict or civil conflict.

and we have seen, Across a number of Western countries, significant cuts to the budgets that fund that kind of on the ground work. and I think, it’s tempting to, cut those programs when budgets are tight and, there’s, pinching that needs to happen, but. Again, as with the counter-terrorism work, that kind of international development aid work on the ground, it actually ends up costing more if we get rid of that.

now just to save a bit of money, and balance the budgets in a sort of rushed way, [00:26:00] it’s much better to actually. spread the resources as, far as we can, and to keep some impact on the ground. Even if you have to make, cuts. Don’t get rid of these programs entirely. ’cause they make a real difference and they save lives.

Dominic Bowen: Yeah, I totally agree with you and, and having seen and, and led many of these programs, I I definitely agree with you that the impact is huge on the ground and it can’t be overstated. I appreciate you raising that Brodrick, and I, I really appreciate you coming on the podcast today.

Broderick McDonald: My pleasure. Thanks for having me.

Dominic Bowen: Well, that was a great conversation with Broderick McDonald. He’s a research fellow at King’s College. London’s accept research program and he is a research associate at Oxford’s Emerging Threats Group. I really appreciated hearing his thoughts on Syria, the current volatility in the country and the future of the new government.

And the Internationalist podcast is now on YouTube, So if you prefer to watch our conversations, make sure you search for the International Risk Podcast on YouTube. Now, today’s podcast was produced and coordinated by Elisa Garbil. Thanks very much for listening. We’ll speak in the next couple of days.

Elisa Garbil: Thank you for listening to this episode of the International Risk Podcast. For more episodes [00:27:00] and articles, visit the international risk podcast.com. Follow us on LinkedIn, blue Sky, and Instagram for the latest updates, and to ask your questions to our host, Dominic Bowen. See you next time.