Episode 267: Drones Over Poland, Drills on the Border: How Moscow Tests NATO’s Resolve with Antoine Renaux
Coordinated and Produced by Elisa Garbil
With the Zapad Military exercises occurring again near the Polish border, Dominic Bowen has Antoine Renaux on the podcast. They analyse the challenges of NATO, Russia’s probing operations, NATO’s response, and more importantly, NATO’s preparedness. Find out more about Article 5 and the potential scenarios, why hybrid warfare and cyber attacks are the future and the geopolitical risks we are facing.
Antoine Renaux is an Economic Intelligence & Geopolitics Analyst, his expertise lies in defence and security policy, economic intelligence, and geopolitical risk analysis. His career spans strategic intelligence, public affairs, and policy analysis roles across both public and private sectors, giving him a nuanced, operational understanding of complex international dynamics.
His key areas of expertise lie in:
- Advanced OSINT & competitive intelligence in the defense industry.
- Policy & geopolitical analysis, including diplomatic reporting at the French Embassy’s Military Representation in Austria.
- Event & project management, including contributions to high-profile initiatives such as the Warsaw Security Forum.
His approach combines precision, strategic insight, and actionable analysis to support decision-making in high-stakes environments. Motivated by a passion for strategy and security, I aim to contribute where analytical rigour, geopolitical awareness, and clear communication can make a decisive impact.
The International Risk Podcast brings you conversations with global experts, frontline practitioners, and senior decision-makers who are shaping how we understand and respond to international risk. From geopolitical volatility and organised crime, to cybersecurity threats and hybrid warfare, each episode explores the forces transforming our world and what smart leaders must do to navigate them. Whether you’re a board member, policymaker, or risk professional, The International Risk Podcast delivers actionable insights, sharp analysis, and real-world stories that matter.
The International Risk Podcast – Reducing risk by increasing knowledge.
Follow us on LinkedIn and Subscribe for all our updates!
Transcript:
Antoine Renaux: [00:00:00] think. There is a perception that NATO is not strong enough and did not adapt it enough to the new kind of warfare.
Elisa Garbil: Welcome back to the International Risk Podcast, where we discuss the latest world news and significant events that impact businesses and organizations worldwide.
Dominic Bowen: Hi, I’m Dominic Bowen and I’m host of the International Risk Podcast, and Russian drones are no longer harassing just Ukraine. They’re now violating NATO airspace over Poland and also Romania What might’ve once been dismissed as just technical glitches is now deliber. It’s systematic and it’s dangerously provocative.
Now, these aren’t just drones entering Europe. They’re probes each incursion by Russia. It tests NATO’s reflexes, it tests NATO’s rules of engagement, and it tests Europe’s. Political will every time. Now, if we add to this, there’s the Zahad military exercises on NATO’s Eastern Flank, and that’s tens of thousands of Russian and Belarusian troops [00:01:00] rehearsing invasion scenarios and.
Pull all that together and we’re starting to stare at one of the most volatile confrontations in Europe since the end of the Cold War. And I think there’s an unmistakable truth that we need to look at, and that’s that. Wars rarely begin with declaration wars begin with a spark. They begin with a drone strike, a miscalculation or A smaller border skirmish. And right now these sparks are flying over Poland. They’re flying over Romanian skies. And these are something that we need to look at. And the question is no longer if Russia is willing to test nato. The question is, how far is Russia willing to test NATO and whether the west is actually prepared for one day when those drones actually kill civilians on NATO soils.
Today we’re joined by Antoine Renaux, Antoine is an economic intelligence and geopolitics analyst and his experience really lies in defense and security, where they meet policy, where it meets economic intelligence and where geopolitical risk all come together.And his career spans that strategic intelligence, public affairs policy analysis across both the public and private sectors. [00:02:00] And I think he’s gonna have a really interesting nuance for today’s discussion. An welcome to the International Risk Podcast.
Antoine Renaux: Welcome for the invitation and great pronunciation of the name.
Dominic Bowen: Thanks very much, Antoine. Many analysts are calling these drone flights tests. They’re talking about them being probes, probes of NATO’s, air defenses, it’s. Plausible, and I’d say it’s very realistic that Russia is actually trying to normalize violations of NATO sovereignty in order to lower the threshold for war. And so I wonder, do you agree with that hypothesis? Do you think that there’s a possibility that Europe is sleepwalking into accepting hostile acts as something that becomes more routine?
Antoine Renaux: Absolutely, I totally agree with, the analysis that has been provided by various, analysts specialize in defense and geopolitics. What we have witnessed in Poland in the night of the 10th of September is really a probing operation for sure. The Russian and Bela Russian authorities were claiming that these drones ends up in Poland as they [00:03:00] were jamming. Over the Ukrainian territory, and it’s true that over androids of drones were distinct to Ukraine at the same time.
However, when we witnessed the sheer number of drones that flew over the territory of Poland, plus the fact that according to official reports, none of them were caring, explosive. We can realistically thinking that it was a probing operation, especially knowing that this type of vehicles that has been confirmed as being done, Russian missile, Iranian production, but produced under license in the Russian Federation, can contain cameras or photographic apples. For nce. We have a sheer number of drones. That can conduct intelligence operation. Plus, when we witnessed that, several of them went far into the Polish territory over 300 kilometers after the border, including our roots that are hundreds of kilometers away from Warsaw, but also More interestingly in the [00:04:00] direction of that is a major logistical hub. 80% of NATO support to Ukraine passes through the airport in. We can realistically assess that it was a probing operation.
Dominic Bowen: Yeah, thanks for mentioning Soff. when I travel into Ukraine and I travel into Ukraine on behalf and with clients quite regularly, and soff is, is usually one of the common transit points, and anyone that’s traveled there will have seen the, the significant air defenses that have been built up there. And it’s not surprising that that Russia is probing and is testing and is trying to collect intelligence of, of what’s occurring in the area. On the International Risk Podcast, we’ve spoken to a lot of guests about the hybrid warfare and the gray warfare that’s been occurring across Europe for many years, originating from Russia and also from Chinese assets. But if we look at the, current drone incursions in NATO airspace, how likely do you think a, a deliberate escalation could be? And and what thresholds do you think we’d need to see to actually trigger a NATO response to Russian incursions?
Antoine Renaux: I would say it’s still [00:05:00] really early to say, according to the declaration that we have already witnessed from police authorities, but also EU and NATO allies. We can see that deescalation is still under control even if there is a real sense of urgency. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tus mentioned that it was the highest risk of confrontation since, the Cold War, and I couldn’t agree more. There is a difference between. One or two Russian aircraft crossing NATO borders in the Baltic states or Scandinavia and being escorted back to the Russian Federation territory. But at that moment, what was witnessed was Ted for some kilometers away from the border. Here we have. 19 drones crossing from over 300 kilometers. It raises a significant threat for escalation. On the other end, we don’t witness on NATO’s reaction on reinforcing the posture. That’s the alliance, and Poland will [00:06:00] like to more.
Dominic Bowen: And I mentioned in the introduction the Zabar exercises, and for those listeners that that aren’t familiar with it, these are massive joint military drills that Russia and Belarus staged together roughly every four years, and they usually do it right on NATO’s border. Now, these aren’t just routine training activities, they’re simulate large scale offensive operations. And if. You’re wondering what large scale offensive operations are. They include practicing invasions of Poland and the Baltic states. And I just wanna say that again, to emphasize about every four years, Russia and Belarus practice. Invading the Baltic states and Polands. So for nato, this really matters.
This matters because it blurs the line between where is an exercise occurring and where is it actually preparation for war. So what we see and, and what we assess is, is very likely, is that the zar exercises is less likely about. Defense. They’re more and much more likely to be about intimidation, a rehearsal for [00:07:00] war that’s carried out in the full view of Europe. It’s not secret, it’s carried out in the full view of Europe. To make it very clear, we are preparing for this, we are practiced for this. We have the skills and capabilities to do this. So I, I wonder, Antoine, with these exercises ostensibly presented as defensive, but they’re clearly simulating large scale offensive.
Activities against NATO members isn’t Russia. And, and how do we pronounce, how do we analyze this when, when Russia is so clearly rehearsing an invasion of Poland and the, the Baltics in plain sight? Should we stop calling them exercises as NATO members, as western countries? Should we just start calling them what they are, which is pre-war drills?
Antoine Renaux: Like, what you have noticed is actually. Something significant to highlight. It really shows a certain probability of being pre-war operations. If you remember the last Zappa operation that was held in 2021, it was lasted winter of that year with Russian troops being deployed for the exercise being in the meantime [00:08:00] reinforced. Then staying in place for later being sent to Ukraine. It was the northern front that was added directly to Kiv. So as a perspective of a defense analyst, this is the worst case scenario. It must be taken into account on the other hand. We are witnessing that the war operation, the, let’s say special military operation in 2022 failed.
It was absolutely crazy to invade a country with only 180,000 troops on six axis of progression with one third of conscript. And if I remember properly. We’re around on the northern front from Belarus with 40,000 troops trying like to cross a muddy forest areas around 100 kilometers trying to reach Kiev. And it failed miserably. The fact that today if we are thinking that Zappa 2025 can be used as this pre-war operation. Before being launched against the Valki gap, [00:09:00] I would say it’s unlikely given the light of the precedence that happened. The Russians are nowadays on the learning curve in Ukraine. I asked us that they might have taken into account the lessons of their previous mistake, but for sure, I’m not into the secrets of the Russian I command such. The factors and the rational analysis can occur.
So I would judge this hypothesis unlikely. What I would say is, however, as you mentioned before, that it is a maneuver of intimidation. One of your fellow citizens, mark Gall, mentioned the heavy metal diplomacy on his book, the Weaponization of Everything. And what I would think would be really with this coordination of drones probing NATO defenses and having Zappa 2025 organize, it’ll be a way to intimidate, it’s a political test to test the NATO resolution.
Dominic Bowen: And when we look at NATO resolution, I, I really wonder what sort of signals or what sort of red [00:10:00] lines, Antoine, do you think NATO should be establishing and clearly communicating globally in order to deter. Further Russian provocations without actually provoking escalation. And of course, that’s the, that’s the balance, isn’t it? We want to, deter further provocations without further escalating the situation ourselves. So what red lines, what signals do you think NATO members should be laying out clearly today in order to prevent further escalation from Russia?
Antoine Renaux: it’s a very delicate matter because on one hand what we have, witnessed in Poland last week was not considered as an act of war by the Polish authorities and nato, but a violation of the airspace. Even if what we have witnessed is violating the aerospace with military vehicles, even if they were drones and They were containing no explosive payload. It’s a very serious matter. Plus we have in front of others, Vladimir Putin, who is a real risk taker, is probing, seeing the weaknesses and when there [00:11:00] is some weaknesses that are spotted, the initiative is taken. And as deterrence clearer red lines on the other end. Also further defensive operation because here, what we have seen on this night is despite several drones being, shot down, there were only three and four of them on 21. Confirm. Violating the airspace for sure. We should not jump into conclusion for on 21.
It’s very small because there are NATO procedures that instead of wasting a missile probing if this drone can crash into a deserted area. I think. There is a perception that NATO is not strong enough and did not adapt it enough to the new kind of warfare. If you listen, for example, one propagandist of the Kremlin, French Propagandist, Xavier mo, former military personnel turning businessman in Russia. One point he is always insisting is the inadequacy of NATO forces. Versus the new, [00:12:00] way of warfare that the Russian are practicing a low-cost warfare. And that’s pretty valid argument. It could give. I think without strongly reforming and taking stronger sense, taking more initiative, we will be perceived as weak.
Dominic Bowen: It’s a really interesting point when you talk about inadequacies and, and, and weaknesses. I was in Ukraine. I was actually along the donnet, near the airports. I was in Abdi Care. I was in Marpol just before Russia invaded, and one of my biggest concerns was. Nato, unity, across Europe as this invasion occurred, and I’ve been pleasantly surprised. I’ve been pleasantly surprised how United Europe has been over the last few years, and NATO doctrine as, as we all know, says in an attack against one member. An attack on all members. you talked about au but I wonder what happens if tomorrow a Russian drone kills three polish civilians in, in au you know, a hundred kilometers from the the border with Ukraine. Do you feel confident that NATO really would trigger Article five, or do you think the alliance might be bluffing? invite, and [00:13:00] this might in turn, obviously invite further Russian escalation.
Antoine Renaux: A very serious concern indeed, but I would say that NATO would provoke Article five. It’s, something that I, based on, uh, the previous experiences of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it surprised myself, or not only nato, but the EU became united, especially several months after the disaster in Afghanistan. I would say yes, NATO might trigger Article five EU Allies will enter into war. The question is, what would be the differences between a political act triggering Article five versus committed enough resources to this action? NATO is. Around 30 members from various location. The security issues of Greece are not the same as Poland or France and the uk.
So there is always the question of what’s your number of troops you can deploy to support Poland when you are the Greek military or the Italian military? Considering is it a [00:14:00] vital interest for Rome or for Athens? Will you deploy enough? Or also, do you have enough Troops to deploy in the first place? And we are not talking here about the numbers of troops on paper, troops equipment, main battle tank car T system airplanes, et cetera, et cetera, but also the coherence of these troops. That’s the differences between the effective and the armed forces and the operational force. Even if you have an operational force, what is stockpile of ammunition has been the training effective.
How is the ability of various units, various regiments to work into a brigade or even now in a division? The division level has been dropped since the end of the Cold War. Now it’s became standard in Ukraine. And there is no improvisation. You don’t jump from brigade to division level in abl. It needs years to prepare. So yeah, they will go to war, will be able like to manage it effectively on the battlefield. That’s another question, and I’m more doubtful [00:15:00] and also will civil societies will follow as major NATO partners in Europe are heavily divided in that facing civil unrest. That’s the case in France. We have witnessed that in the uk, the two main partners.
Germany also suffers a lot since the beginning of 2022. We have three of the major player that are showing signs of ATS on their population. Will their population be able to sustain a long war?Who knows?
Dominic Bowen: I think that’s a really great point because since. Russia deliberately entered Polish and and Romanian airspace. The us, France, and Germany, the Netherlands, and many other member states have issued unambiguous public statements. They’ve been very clear that they would treat an attack on Poland, an attack on a NATO member state. As a trigger for collective defense, and that’s what’s required under Article five. So that messaging, the statements have been quite clear, but what you started to allude to Antoine, I’d be really keen to understand how prepared are NATO member states politically. [00:16:00] And militarily to actually honor Article five commitments. If Poland was directly attacked, do they have the political mind? Do they have the backing of society, but also do they actually have the military capabilities today, not in 10 years time when we’re working towards spending 3.5 or 5% of GDP on defense, but in 2025, do you think member states have the political and military capability ready today?
Antoine Renaux: Not everyone, not everyone, member on the Russian threat. You have noticed there was violation of the Polish airspace, but also as Romanian, what was fascinating in the Polish context. Following this intrusion, it has forced the newly elected president Naski from law injustice. To closely cooperate with Prime Minister Donald Tusk from the civic platform, and the last election was absolutely tense and shown how polarized is the Polish Society.
All the major political parties in Poland’s Parliament I’ve spoken to say the same [00:17:00] thing, condemning asking for more reassurance. Asking for more security for the Republic of Poland. It’s historical. It’s in the collective mindset of the polls that the Russians are always uniting the polls. You take the the Russians away, polls will start fighting each other. You bring the Russian on the equation, they will unite as one man. That’s what Catherine II was, right into her ambassador. Before the partition of Poland plays on the division of polls, that will be easier. So a member state like Poland or Romania, they have the backing of the civil society in terms of conflict.
Militarily, it’s debatable. Poland is turning not as the first armed forces of Europe, but the biggest land forces, which is already something big. But we have also to jump behind the sheer list of military equipments to see once again how modernized there is major issues of modernization of Polish armed forces, especially as the newest equipment are [00:18:00] joining newly creating brigades. Jump from four brigades to six, and these two new additional brigades are receiving the modernized equipment. But as they are new will, the training will be enough to adapt. When we talk about the rest of the alliance, I’m little more skeptical. Little more skeptical knowing, for example, for the uk, for France, for Italy, will they be able to provide enough armed forces to effectively debtor or to fight back against an invasion. I would say they can deploy a very small number very fast, but it wouldn’t last long. What will decide if they can last long will be. Are their politics, political systems and societies ready for such actions?
Do they have backup plans to mobilize the population, mobilize the defense industry to take care of the wounded producing in mass equipment, because that’s also another issue in the light of Ukraine. We have seen that orders increase since [00:19:00] 2022. But defense industries are still at the same size as they were at the end of the Cold War, and nothing seems like to changed. That is very, very hard question.
Dominic Bowen: It’s a really interesting point, isn’t it? even though we, we quite clearly accept that the geopolitical and the security landscape is very different today, you’re right that the, the military capabilities of NATO hasn’t kept pace with that. but I’ll also take the opportunity, Antoine, to remind our listeners to go to the International Risk Podcast website and subscribe to our newsletter. It comes in every second week, straight into inbox, so you get analysis, news and podcast directly into your inbox every second week. But I’m also wondering, Antoine, about cyber attacks and about hybrid operations. We’ve spoken about that a lot on the International West Podcast, and we know that legally they can be treated as Article five violations under the NATO’s charter if the scale and impact are deemed as comparable to a conventional, um, attack. And this position has been reaffirmed in, that’s official doctrine since at least 2014, and it’s been strengthened in recent [00:20:00] summits. so. What’s left to determine is really the political consensus and the case by case assessment. So I’d love to hear from you, Antoine. To what extent in practice in real life can cyber attacks and hybrid operations really be treated as Article five violations under NATO’s Charter, when this is what we’re seeing every single day across Europe.
Antoine Renaux: It’s a fascinating question indeed to raise the point on because we have witnessed since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, and not only, but since 2022, it has massively increased that some of these attacks are not only let’s say massive in them. Of destruction that we are witnessing. We are talking here about, for example, physical sabotage of ammunition depot or cyber attacks against logistic infrastructure. Example a month ago, the airport in Crackle Jam second International airport has been blocked by cyber attacks attributed to Russians, and here we are talking about cyber attacks [00:21:00] against what is considered as a vital infrastructure.
An attack against the vitamin structure to refer into the real of the Declaration of War, and still Polish authorities or NATO have been silenced, on condemning that. So I would say it’s becoming a new reality. It’s becoming a new reality that we have to adapt to because despite becoming an act of aggression that will encourage for further securitization of the society, we are once again into what Mark Gti described in the weaponization of everything. On the other end, it’s the Russians that are eating us. We let them do, but on the other hand, I never heard about us being able to fight back. We might be outside of the real of traditional warfare. What is happening in Ukraine is only between the Russian federations and Ukraine. Still, the conflicts still over toward the U and nato, but there is no further reaction or at least a further reaction. Is also on providing Ukraine to fight back, meaning basically backing [00:22:00] Ukraine as a proxy.
Dominic Bowen: We assume that Russia is probably betting that some of its vulnerabilities can be compensated by potential vulnerabilities within the alliance, within the NATO alliance within European member states that there wouldn’t necessarily be a unified response if Russia invaded a small state, a Lithuania, a Latvia, a Romania, or Poland. Do you think there is evidence of vulnerabilities within nato, within European members?
Antoine Renaux: There is. There is, absolutely. And I think the Russians are aware of that. The question is, do they have a clear assessment, rational assessments of the vulnerabilities of the and nato, or are there assessment based on a certain, despise. of the Westerners and the Europeans in particular, we can’t get away the fact that Russians, for example, do not consider the EU and EU members a despicable because they lost their sovereignty, whereas the Russian Federation [00:23:00] is playing like a traditional 19th century sovereign state.
Dominic Bowen: And every escalation scenario that politicians and analysts come up with ultimately runs up against Russia’s nuclear doctrine. And we know this was the fear of many, administrations, including in Germany, including the US at the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Do you think that Western leaders are sometimes paralyzed by this fear of Russia’s nuclear weapons and the fear of nuclear escalation? And, and if so, does this almost make us more vulnerable because of Russia’s potential to, to capitalize on this fear that, that western states have against nuclear escalation? And so how do we properly gauge the risks of nuclear escalation and take that into account when we try to deter russian military aggression?
Antoine Renaux: I would say that the nuclear fear is some pretty on risk assessment. Unlikely. An interesting point is we have lived under the assumption that the nuclear balance makes conventional wars [00:24:00] between countries impossible, or even a non-nuclear state attacking a nuclear state.
Offensive proved us wrong. Ukraine has been able to launch a surprise attack against the Russian territory, without triggering a nuclear answer. So I would say that the European leaders for sure are afraid of the nuclear escalation, but not only, I think they are also afraid of the conventional warfare escalation. Once again, as we have in front of others, the Russian strategists and Vladimir Putin that are risk takers, opportunistic, they see this as a vulnerability that they can exploit. So that’s why there is this emphasis on, um, irid warfare and nonconventional attacks. They know they, they can push it, they can sabotage. Critical infrastructures still, the only answers that there is is declarations and further security, that’s for sure something to do. But as a first step warfare remains a dialogue you are giving. [00:25:00] Its opponent give you its, and in the end, the one that is exhausted, the first drops the competition and submits to the will of the opponent. That’s what we are witnessing right now, not only on the conventional field, but on weaponizing every tools of statecraft.
Dominic Bowen: Antoine, you are an intelligence and a geopolitical analyst. So when you look around the world, what are the risks that concern you the most?
Antoine Renaux: Well, an easy question would be for sure to say the US China opposition in the Pacific. That’s for sure the top one risk that is announced by intelligence officials. But to be honest, I would say that’s. The situation in Europe is pretty concerning because what we are witnessing between the US and China. Some kind of repetition of the Cold War, but in more complex, the world is much more multipolar than the Cold War was. And even the Cold War in the 1980s had a much more multipolar war than we fought, and there were still a [00:26:00] rationalization behind both actors to avoid the field of direct confrontation because both are aware of the vulnerabilities of their opponents, but also their own.
But they also see a balance. And when there is a balance, you can be sure that you will go quickly to war and get an easy victory. The real of uncertainty. That’s why both the Chinese and the Americans are going for, let’s say, irid warfare or secret warfare. To me, the situation in Europe is far more concerning because what I’m witnessing is a further disbalance between the capabilities of the Russian Federation that for sure are reaching certain limits I don’t imagine the Russians thinking that they’re gonna have to go to war against NATO in Europe just for the Baltic states, but having to fight on thousands of kilometers of frontline, including the Arctic, the Baltic state facing NATO and G trains in the Baltic State Forest, as at least launching an offensive to against Poland to keep NATO forces [00:27:00] away.
But We can’t face a certain surprise. After all, the beginning of the war of Ukraine proved us wrong. Everyone was thinking that the Russians are not crazy enough to attack. Looks like that’s, they believed their own fake intelligence reports. So as we are witnessing agreeing this balance between the capabilities of NATO forces in Europe, mostly on European side versus the Russian at war for three years, rebuilding their defense apparatus, the probability that the situation gets out of control is still low, but it’s likely, and that might be frightening.
Dominic Bowen: Yeah. Thanks very much for unpacking that for us, Antoine, and thank you very much for coming on the International Risk Podcast.
Antoine Renaux: Thank you very much for inviting me.
Dominic Bowen: Well, that was a great conversation with Antoine Renaux. He’s an economic intelligence and geopolitical analyst, and I really appreciated hearing his thoughts on the international risks associated with Russia’s, illegal invasion of Ukraine and recent military incursions further into Europe. Please remember to subscribe to our emailing list on our website, the international risk podcast.com. Today’s [00:28:00] podcast was produced and coordinated by Elisa Garbil. I’m Dominic Bowen, your host. Thanks very much for listening, and we’ll speak again in a few days.
Elisa Garbil: Thank you for listening to this episode of the International Risk Podcast. For more episodes and articles, visit the international risk podcast.com. Follow us on LinkedIn, blue Sky, and Instagram for the latest updates, and to ask your questions to our host, Dominic Bowen. See you next time.